

Transcript

Insurgency and Jihad: The Iraqi Theater and Beyond

Panel Two

April 11, 2005

Michael Scheuer: I was educated by Jesuits and they always said, have enough for your audience to stand up and address them... plus I have arthritic knees which drive me crazy. Today I thought I would look at what I call the wages of ignorance, in terms of what has been opened up for America's future in Iraq, and the talk is simply called that, Iraq and the Wages of Ignorance.

We live in a country whose elites prate endlessly about the economic, democratic, and international glories of Globalization.

The world is smaller, they say, borders are increasingly irrelevant, and a secular, liberal political-economic orthodoxy -- however you choose to define it -- is spreading irresistibly and is welcomed by all peoples everywhere.

Oddly, in view of our elites basically one-world orientation, U.S. foreign policy is still challenged if it has to focus on more than one major issue at a time. This reality is worsened because we tend to assume circumstances have not changed since the last time the issue at hand held the center stage of our attention.

Iraq, I think, is a splendid example of this peculiarly American malady. For Iraq, the recipe was simple: invade; defeat the Iraqi military; establish order; form an interim regime; write a constitution; hold elections; throw the keys to the new regime; and make tracks for home.

This was our prewar, bore-sighted vision and plan for how the invasion of Iraq would wash out. While there was much talk of the democracy-producing, domino-effect that the "liberation" of Iraq would have on the rest of the Middle East, this was mostly rhetoric, unless you believe Washington was prepared to damn-the-torpedoes and welcome the vast instability that would flow from overthrowing every Muslim regime from Rabat to Riyadh. No, Iraq, from the start, was the focus of U.S. policymakers, and their plans were made as if Iraq was securely contained in the late Johnny Carson's hermetically sealed mayonnaise jar.

Fault-finding after the fact is important, but relatively easy. But even more important -- and even somewhat easier -- I think, is to look at what we knew and ignored before the invasion of Iraq and how that which we ignored is likely to come back and haunt us.

Among the most important things we ignored was the fact that Islam -- like Roman Catholicism -- has been since its inception an agent of globalization. And in the last thirty years one of the most important drivers of Islamic globalization has been the concept of the defensive jihad.

The proponents of jihad, when they look at the world from wherever they are standing at the moment, see it as a whole, not one nation at a time. Though their attention will rest on any nation-state afflicted by infidel intervention or invasion, the jihadists seldom lose their focus on how each such state-specific opportunity can be integrated into their globalization project. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq provided the jihadists just such a chance to enhance their project, and they grabbed it.

What we have created in Iraq is the classic motivation for a defensive jihad -- the infidel invasion and occupation of a Muslim country. In providing this advantage for our jihadist enemy, there is no after-the fact excuse for being surprised. The invasion of Iraq differed in few ways -in Muslim perceptions- from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, except perhaps that the Soviet invasion was a near-surprise to Muslims, while they had watched several U.S. administrations lick their chops and drool over the prospect of invasion for over a decade.

Again, there is no excuse for us not to have known that the invasion of Iraq would replicate the mujahideen magnet the Soviets created in Afghanistan, and that this Iraq-based magnet would be more powerful. That is, the magnet we created in Iraq would attract more mujahideen, more rapidly than was the case in Afghanistan. There are several reasons for this reality, all of which were known before the invasion:

First, Iraq is the second holiest place in Islam, and squarely in the center of the Middle East. In 1979, Afghanistan, was far removed from the Islamic world's mainstream. Parenthetically, I might say that I think that Afghan example is too often ignored. Col. Lang this morning reached for Vietnam as an analogy, and many other people reach for Algeria, but I really think that Afghanistan is the closer of those three.

Second, the occupation of Iraq would complete the occupation of Islam's three holiest places by Western infidels. For huge numbers of Muslims -- whether or not they agree with bin Laden -- the occupation of Iraq gave Americans control of Iraq in addition to their hold on the Arabian Peninsula. Israel, of course, holds Jerusalem -- Islam's third holiest site -- and there is no reason for us not to have known that Americans and Israelis are now viewed by Muslims almost as interchangeable enemies.

Third, the travel, arming, and funding mechanisms used by jihadists have now been in place for more than a quarter century. The focus of these mechanisms and networks only had to be redirected toward Iraq, none of them had to be created. In addition, Iraq's vast and uncontrolled borders made the work of these networks far easier than in Afghanistan.

Fourth, the existence of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The jihadist movement that turned its attention to exploit new opportunities in Iraq was not only was in place, but had at its head a man, Osama bin Laden, who is really the only credible leader and hero in the Islamic world. Even before the Iraq invasion, bin Laden had shown Muslims that the Red Army's defeat in Afghanistan was not a fluke, that the remaining superpower could be badly defeated at home and its astonishingly powerful military stymied abroad. Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and their allies had, in the eyes of millions of Muslims, established a tradition of victories for Islam, which in turn had generated a sense of optimism.

Fifth, the destruction of Saddam's regime put Iraq up for grabs in the seemingly eternal rivalry between the Shi'a and Sunni Islamic worlds. Breaking Saddam ensured that: (a) Saudi Arabia and its Gulf associates would facilitate the movement of would-be fighters into Iraq who could not use mujahideen networks to get their themselves -- this to make the emergence of a strong Shi'a state impossible, and (b) Iran and its Lebanese Shi'a allies, eager to achieve what the Gulf states feared, would do its best to make sure its co-religionists dominated the new Iraq.

Sixth, although this is hard for Americans to hear and accept, U.S. foreign policy is exponentially more hated in the Muslim world than it was either when Afghanistan was invaded in 1979 or when the first U.S.-led invasion of Iraq occurred in 1991. This pervasive and easily recognizable

anti-American fervor guaranteed that many Muslim men -- veteran mujahideen and novices alike -- would saddle-up and head for Iraq even as the build up for the invasion was occurring.

While the foregoing are issues that make the jihad-spreading nature of the Iraq invasion different from that created by the invasion of Afghanistan, there are three other results that mirror events that followed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Again, these three factors were completely knowable before the invasion of Iraq but apparently were not recognized.

First, Machiavellian allies. In the decade after 1979 most of the Muslim countries of the Middle East -- especially those then and now heralded as America's best allies -- emptied their jails of Islamic militants they had incarcerated on the condition that they would go and fight the Red Army in Afghanistan. The regimes hoped that these men would kill some Soviets, but even more that they would die in the process and not return home and cause trouble. Obviously, not all of these men were killed, but the Afghan theater did give the Muslim states a decade-long safety valve through which they could release at some of the militant pressure growing at home.

Though little noticed in the West, this pattern has reappeared since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Employing the same cover they used in the Afghan era -- the releases occur as amnesties granted to "reformed" criminals at Id al-Ahda and Id al-Fitr -- large numbers of reformed criminals were released in 2003 and 2004 in Egypt, Turkey, Yemen, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. While clearly a short-sighted policy for these regimes -- as was the same policy in the Afghan era -- the probable dispatch to Iraq of many of these reformed militants will, as before, kill two birds with one stone: they will fuel the insurgency and kill a number of infidel invaders, and for the near-term, the regimes will have reopened the safety valve that draws down domestic militant pressures.

Second, the nature of Islamist Insurgencies. There is element of comedy involved in the West's inability to keep focused on the vast difference between its own sense of time and that of the Islamists. This failure gives the enemy a great and perhaps decisive edge. For the last six weeks or so, this failing has been visible in Iraq. Our goal in Iraq remains constant -- "clean-up and go home." Because this is our goal, the government and the media tend to see each positive event as a sure turning point. Recently, for example, U.S. military officers, policy analysts, and journalists have waxed eloquent about the corner-turning meaning of recent insurgent activities, such as a move to softer targets, a drop in the daily average of attacks, and a decline in American casualties. Surely, the consensus said, we are seeing light at the end of the insurgency tunnel -- and then Zarqawi's fighters hit the hardened target of al-Ghraib with multiple car bombs and an infantry raid, inflicting nearly 50 U.S. casualties. Insurgencies are always marked by peaks and valleys, extended lulls and periods of intense activity, and waves of attacks and sporadic minor incidents -- Iraq is no exception. And just this weekend, U.S. officials and the media began beating the drum about "emerging divisions" in the Iraq insurgency, apparently forgetting that such divisions in the late Afghan insurgency denied the Soviets a target against which to deliver a war-winning blow. It must be recalled that a divided insurgency -- even one bitterly divided -- is not necessarily an advantage for counter-insurgent forces.

Third, contiguous safe haven. The most dangerous result for the United States of the invasion of Iraq -- which again was knowable before the war -- is the opportunity afforded the jihadists to create a nation-state-sized safe haven -- a new Pakistan, if you will -- smack in the center of the Middle East. Realistically, the prewar odds of establishing a post-Saddam Iraqi government capable of controlling all of its borders and territory were very long. The likelihood of such an outcome in the foreseeable future seems very remote. So as we focus on what experts say may be a decade-long insurgency in Iraq, some portion of those insurgents will be ignoring the ongoing

struggle and devoting their efforts to building bases, training camps, arms caches, safe houses in Iraq from which subversive operations can be run into Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Kuwait, and to which fighters can return and find haven.

Bin Laden, in particular, whose formative military experience was the war in Afghanistan, Has often spoken about the jihadists' need for contiguous safe haven such as that provided by Pakistan during the Afghan jihad. Bin Laden has often lamented that the lack of such safe haven has hampered al-Qaeda's ability to operate in the Balkans and inside Israel. For bin Laden, Iraq's geographical position adjoining the Levant takes al-Qaeda a step closer toward the target of Israel proper.

From bin Laden's perspective, Jordan is likely to be a top-priority target for the al-Qaeda forces he bases in Iraq. Since bin Laden first associated with the Palestine-born and Jordan-educated Islamist scholar Abdullah Azzam, he has shown interest in liberating Jordan.

One of the first military activities connected to al-Qaeda after its 1988 founding, were attacks in Jordan by a group named Jaish Muhammed. The group was tied to an early al-Qaeda member named Muhammed Jamal Khalifah, who happened to be married to bin Laden's sister. Jaish Muhammed's goal was to destroy the Hashemite monarchy, and it staged low-level bombings in Jordan between 1991 and 1994. Jordanian security killed or arrested many members of the group, and about a dozen were tried and sentenced to prison terms or death. Khalifah was tried in absentia and sentenced to death. He was arrested in California on visa irregularities in 1993, deported to Jordan, and exonerated when a witness miraculously recanted that portion of his testimony that dealt with the Saudis. Khalifah returned to the kingdom and was greeted on the tarmac by a senior Saudi government official.

More recently, al-Qaeda planned to conduct several attacks in Jordan as part of its Millennium Plot in January, 2000. The attacks were to target Israeli and American tourists at hotels in Amman and religious sites on the Jordan River. U.S., Jordanian, and Pakistani security services stopped the attacks, and Pakistan deported to Amman a planner of the Jordan attacks, a Jordanian-American named Khalid Deek. Deek was tried, convicted, incarcerated, only to be awarded amnesty several years later and released. He has not been seen since.

In February, 2003, bin Laden publicly reasserted the need to move quickly to liberate Jordan. One of the major goals of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, bin Laden said, would be "to establish a huge Jewish superstate, a Greater Israel" and part of this new entity would be Jordan. For this reason, bin Laden said, Jordan must be "one of the most qualified regions for liberation to establish the rule of God on earth."

Most recently, the post-Iraq invasion emergence of Jordan-born militant and al-Qaeda ally Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi at the head of a multi-national insurgent organization increases the threat to Jordan's stability. Zarqawi hails from al-Zarqa, and draws many of his fighters from there as well as the areas around al-Salt and Ma'an -- places which have been dubbed Jordanian Tora Boras after bin Laden's former Afghan stronghold. The Jordanian media report that many young men in each of these areas are heavily influenced by Salafist ideology; Ma'an, in particular, appears to be a hotbed of Salafism- on several occasions Jordan's military has entered the city to break the power and confiscate the weapons of the Salafists.

So, for Jordan, the repercussions of the insurgency in Iraq seem to promise an increased threat to domestic stability. But Jordan will not be alone. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, Bin Laden's operatives have been quietly at work in Lebanon among Sunni groups in the country's north and

among Palestinians in the south. In addition, bin Laden has long cultivated ties with the remnants of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood who went into exile after Assad's massacre at Hama. And, last week, the media reported the creation of a new al-Qaeda brigade which would have responsibility for the jihad in Greater Syria.

Overall, it may well be America's interests probably are as much at risk from mujahideen entering the countries of the Levant from Iraq as from those entering Iraq from the Levant.

In conclusion, the situation we face today in Iraq should be a surprise to no one. What should be a surprise is the extensive knowledge that was ignored before the invasion.

Prominent among these ignored factors were the lessons documented from the Soviets' disastrous decade in Afghanistan; the ageless and anything-but-subtle rivalry between Shi'a Iran and the Sunni Gulf states; the amply gauged rise in the Muslim world's hatred for America; and the undeniable fact that in bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the Islamic world has found both a rallying point and an expectation of success.

But more than these items, we ignored the most obvious complicating factor arising from any invasion of Iraq: that is, the implicit challenge and opportunities therein to the jihadists' time-tested war-making capabilities and globalizing ambitions.

While we destroyed the Ba'athist regime and removed a human monster, we did so blindly, ignoring the blatant lessons of the last thirty-five years in the Middle East. In doing so we have created in Iraq a set of U.S. targets to be attacked, a cockpit of international rivalry, and a jihadist base for regional subversion. This is a high price to pay, but then, generally, acting with willful ignorance in any walk of life, exacts a terrible cost. Thank you very much.

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Stephen Ulph: Mike Scheuer has just pointed out something very interesting, that for the mujahideen, its one jihad, part of one great process, marked by peaks and valleys. Colonel Pat Lang mentioned an interesting figure, I hope I got this figure right. I think he said 200,000 sympathizers are required for 12,000 insurgents. This forms the background of what I would like to highlight now. The broader culture of jihad, or at least the development of a jihad-friendly environment as it were, one that does not bar its existence, a virtual culture. Because the sheer wealth and the power of the jihadi culture are being fanned by events in Iraq. It's fanning and spreading slowly down the gulf, spreading this jihad-friendly environment, which has allowed for such events as the bombings, the attacks in Kuwait and even perhaps for the bombing in Qatar. So, I want to just give a very quick portrait of just how strong this culture is and why we should take notice of it.

Now there have been many discussions over the years about the role of the Internet and the use terrorists can make use of it. But I would say that in the case of the Islamist terrorists, they are so much more objectivist because so much more depends on the success through the use of the internet. It is because they are trying, and this is a very important factor, and it is not just an abstruse intellectual argument, it actually has operational implications, they are trying to create a virtual culture. But this is a difficult thing to do. All of the mujahideen have been brought up in an educational system, an educational system which is by its nature moderate, broadminded, and international. It is a large, broad Islamic civilization. What the jihadis are trying to do is create a virtual culture, a virtual identity, and to do that takes a great deal of effort. One of the problems

about discussing this is that it's true that the vast majority of literature is in Arabic, so it's difficult to find major discussions of this occurring in the Western press or in Western analysis in general.

Probably since the internet was invented, there has been jihad-like materials flying around the web. But after the 9/11 period, there was a massive increase, an exponential increase, for two obvious reasons. I am stating the obvious here. The role that the internet can play in facilitating communications and coordination, this is particularly useful in the type of cell structure which is taking over now from the hierarchical structures with leaders. We have independent cells, so the use of the internet is now becoming strategically extremely important. And the other is the role that the internet is playing in creating what we could call a "virtual Afghanistan." Soon we may have to call it a "virtual Iraq," but we can still use the term "virtual Afghanistan" because it explains it quite well.

The type of literature broadly falls into these categories, which you can see on the screen. Military and technical training, this is made up of a myriad of individual monographs and technical treatises, but very often coalesces into the form of training manuals, and I'll come to this very interesting point later, can also reach apogee with very large and very impressive encyclopedias, encyclopedias of jihad. On the subject of the ideological side, these are mainly religious commentaries, but they do have operational implications in a minority of cases, and we'll come into that later. On operational communications, the obvious thing which we see reported in the press almost daily is declarations by Zarqawi, notices of events, interpretations of events, or threats or warnings, and propaganda and morale. Propaganda and morale are actually internal jihadi communication made up of mostly treatises, but very interestingly we saw an example of this this morning, made up of some very slickly produced periodicals. These periodicals, one can tell by the care that's being taken to produce them, are designed to appeal to the eye, and the market is clearly, it's not us, the market is the armchair mujahid. Now why the armchair mujahid? Well the problem is, is that they know statistically that not everyone who reads a forum is going to go out and run with it. It is just as useful to create a passively friendly environment through which the active jihadis can operate. And this I feel, and I think it's been established, is what is underlying the events in the Gulf because we did not just see evidence of individual or self-sustaining cells striking, we saw evidence that they were in fact moving in some form of environment which allowed them to move. So the armchair mujahid, if we can use that term, is a very important factor, very important part of the struggle.

In these periodicals, the basic idea according to issue one of the ones you can see on the screen, is to "spread military culture among the youth. Because many of Islam's young do not yet know how to bear arms. Your brothers of the mujahideen on the Arabian peninsula have decided to publish this booklet to serve the mujahideen in its place of isolation. Giving basic lessons to the framework of a military training program." That comes from the first edition of Mu'askar al-Battar, and it takes the name of Yusuf al-Ayyiri, who was killed in 2003, who did much, before he was killed, to establish training camps for mujahideen from Afghanistan.

The features of al-Battar are trying to establish a virtual training camp, which is the name of the magazine, published by a publishing house called Sawt al-Jihad, Voice of Jihad, which is responsible for two, I should stop using the present tense, I'm going to have to say it in the past tense because they did actually cease production in October, but they produced two magazines, the Voice of Jihad itself, and the Mu'askar al-Battar, producing amongst themselves essays which deal with doctrinal matters, principally the Voice of Jihad, and in the Mu'askar dealing with military features. You can see it from the list the type coverage which the al-Battar maintained over its 22 volume history. Most of the articles which deal with physical training were done by

Ayyiri himself, security and communications were done by Saif al-Adl, and the tactics and guerilla warfare were penned by the former leader of the mujahideen Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin.

So you can see here you've got a very full sample of the 22 volume history which covers most of the areas of military training which was probably likely to reflect the type of curriculum that was existing at one point in Afghanistan. But the true extent of the materials available, were collected again very early into miniature encyclopedic collections, and the Western press became aware of this first when a Mujahid house in Manchester, England was raided and a small work called "Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants" was discovered, it became the subject of much media interest.

However since that time, May 2000 when that raid occurred, the type of encyclopedic material available on the web (inaudible). There are several specialize in poisons or specialize in explosives, but the most phenomenal and fascinating example is the *mau'suat al-I'dad*, the encyclopedia of preparation. This is not an encyclopedia in the normal book sense. Those of you who are IT savvy will know that you cannot download an entire book from the internet. Here instead of limiting themselves to the types of downloads you can get on Adobe Acrobat, you have an extended contents list, every sentence of which is a URL. So taking the example of the slide you've just seen, this is a very tiny, tiny selection, of the type of materials covered in this small section of the Encyclopedia of Jihad. Each one of those titles will send you through to another URL, and then you are sent to another until you get down to the details. This is the extent of the materials available to aspiring mujahid.

Another important factor that the Sawt al-Jihad publications were concentrating on was the maintaining of morale. This has manifested itself in articles which concentrated on news events, such as justification for attacks, excuses for failed attacks, eulogies and elegies of martyrs, or denial of Western media reports. The media war was always very important for them. It demonstrates how important that was and how sensitive they felt about it when a series of confessions of captured militants came out which outlined how much effort the mujahideen needed in Saudi Arabia to isolate their new recruits from access to Western media.

Now, within the ideological movement, so as you would expect, considerable space has to be given over to doctrinal rectitude, to doctrinal propriety. This is only partly familiar from studies—for instance communist groups, where there is a certain degree of doctrinal rectitude there, this is far greater. This is a near obsession, it accounts for something like 60 percent of all the literature available on the web. It is found in the form of Jihadi treatises, in fatwas of radical sheiks and treatises which deal with the aims of the jihad and, very important here, historical precedence. Other than that, reputations of those who falsely oppose their views.

But interestingly enough, the discussions of ideology, the discussions of religion, are not purely abstruse elements, they often have an operational applications, such as here, in the legally permissible actions. The most famous example was the "Treatise on Weapons of Mass Destruction" by Sheikh Hamid bin Fahd who went to great lengths in what seems to be an almost absurd, how it hinges on a pin head argument, but it was very important at the time and a matter of principle to establish that it was possible to use weapons of mass destruction as the Prophet had done so, and the example he chose in that was by using the technique of analogy to demonstrate that in the wars against the Byzantines, the Prophet had used a manganikon, a Byzantine catapult. By definition a catapult would kill more than one person at a go, so therefore it is only a short leap from using a catapult to kill three or four to using an atom bomb.

That may be trivial to some, but the practical application here is a “treatise,” which gives justification for the killing of prisoners in custody. This is actually counter to virtually all Islamic ideology, the history of Islamic doctrine on holy war. However, they managed to find a sheikh who argued it, and this is one of the most popular works that has been circulated around the net. It was particularly popular at a very particular point. You will recall that there was a spate of attacks in Saudi Arabia where there was an outcry at the number of Muslim victims. This vexed the mujahideen greatly, and they were forced to issue several detailed treatises to defend their actions. The importance of doctrinal propriety should not be underestimated.

There are also, and these are fewer in number, but they are interesting in their own right, there is some evidence of the use of ideology to elaborate broader strategic goals. In this case, we have a book on international relations in Islam. I’ve had a look at it, it is a bit flimsy, it is mostly pious comments with very little practical application. But the same can not be said for the next example, which is a fascinating study on the broad strategic direction of an ideal jihad movement. This was discovered only recently floating around the net, but it actually is, shall we say, a recent reproduction of an earlier treatise. The Management of Barbarism is a very weird name, and what the author means by this, is that clearly what has happened is that Afghanistan was an embarrassment. The chaos caused by the Taliban actions, the forced acceleration to Islamize, was noted and the author of this treatise attempts to rationalize the collapse of order, the collapse of all standards, and to make out a scheme whereby that is a part of the divine system whereby you dismantle the kafir system, you go through a period of barbarism, but unlike in Afghanistan, you learn the lesson and you introduce Islam- Islamism, and Islamic laws incrementally. Again, it is clearly a post-Afghanistan lesson. Jamestown itself published a detailed study of this in the March 17th issue, which I think you may have with your package.

So much for reading matter. In terms of the mujahideen, the web forums support the proper arena of jihad. The advantages of using the web chat forums are clear. Fundraising is self-explanatory, the distribution of information, literature and news again self-explanatory, data mining this was flagged up recently by the discovery during the conflict in Afghanistan, where the encyclopedia put a very interesting quote in the preface it suggested that using public sources openly without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy. Next of course is networking, importantly, this again is particularly relevant to the particular progressive transformation of jihadi cells from hierarchical structures, as I mentioned, to structures where there is no single command hierarchy. Recruitment, of course, and mobilization, these are self-explanatory too.

Now, a chat forum these jihadis hardly news, but the interesting use of chat forums by the mujahideen, show a difference in format. Take for example the very slick production by al-Ma’sada. You have on average six or seven sections, and da’wa is fairly self-explanatory, it is the true Islamic ideological part, those laws which underpin jihadi activity and they probably account for the largest part of the postings on the forum. “Welcome to the New Mujahideen,” this section is an interesting method of eventually gaining recruits, but it is quite innocent in its early parts, it is about orienting new participants, fostering individual relationships and trying to develop, again, a virtual community and then afterwards that it would lead to further activity. The next section is very simply about applying ideology to issues of international politics such as U.S. foreign policy or the stipulated Arab regimes, there is plenty of material on that, it is a constant feature. There are some intellectual elements which come in there, but they are rather abstruse such as one I saw the other day which was “does Sufism have a role in opposing imperialism?” I suspect their answer was no.

There are claims on the news section there, as you would expect there are plenty of declarations and warnings. This is interesting what I found late, an urgent letter from the rulers of the Emirates. What is happening here is that a participant is posting up his view of shock and what is happening in Jebel Ali, which is the refurbishing of the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk in contravention of Islamic laws. The interesting point here is that he makes an elaborate analysis of just how the Arab rulers are contravening Islamic law. He does it very scholarly, very patiently, it is not a rant, it is a very carefully argued Islamic legal document setting out why the Emirates should be the next target of jihad.

We also discovered recently, by mining the forums, an issue on a Syrian forum, where it was somewhat countered by Western perceptions of what is going on in Syria, there were warnings posted for mujahideen not to go to Iraq through Syria because they were being picked up by the police, and the road checks are getting heavier. It is interesting materials you can derive just by going through these forums.

Media. This is where the forum gets to be its most creative, or most gruesome, depending on the point of view. It is a matter of lectures, audios, videos, short films, some photos (lots of them in Iraq), and a gallery of heroes and martyrs. This is an example of one of the martyrdoms which was put on this section fostering the culture of the joy of death, and the joy of meeting your Maker. "The Electronic Jihad," this of course is self-explanatory. This is a large cyber section divided between strategic articles and targeting and methodology and timing and also on basic IT hacking techniques for the latest software on the internet. This is actually way above me, so I haven't gone into it in any detail.

Most interesting of all is the section called "Jihadi Cells." This is the closest you can get as a non-militant to tapping into their latest interests, their latest targeting. Recently I found some interesting new requests. One of them was "how do I join a jihadi cell?" that was very interestingly replied to, request for technical advise on weaponry, where to obtain explosive material on the open market; this would be very useful place clearly for military analysts. I'm not sure how many military analysts tapped that section, but I think it is something they should keep in mind.

In the section on manufacture- just basic samples on how to make an explosive belt, how to make anti-armor bullets, bomb recipes. And in the tactics section: just to sum up very quickly, most guerilla tactics, urban warfare, counter tactics, and about enemy penetration of the forums. And in the strategy, looks more helpful than it is in this particular case, the strategy of the mujahideen on the apostates' home grown which is more of an organizational chart rather than an idealized process order of events.

Now the value, just to sum up, the value of examining web literature is fairly self-evident. The value of examining forums in particular, I think has been proven. In the case of the Islamist forums, it is more than mere chats. The use of examining the forums can be, I think the obvious choice is to feel the temperature of these mujahideen. We saw in the case of the Emirates, the rage at the refurbishing of the Kitty Hawk and you got an idea of their next area of interest. But what you don't see is the care they attach to ideological propriety because ideological propriety is the most important factor that underpins the morale and the motivation of the jihadis. In terms of the temperature, a good example, I think, is the Algerian website, from GSPC, the Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, cause there is an example that it looks like a jihad all the way, and you can see in the postings of the participants, not only a certain amount of despondency, but also an interesting mismatch between participants from inside Algeria and

those from outside. There is already an interesting debate between the two areas as to the success or failure of the jihad. You get a very interesting window onto the mindset.

Very little, I shouldn't say none, very little of the wealth of jihadi ideological literature is mined by the intelligence community. This may be for practical reasons, it is difficult material, much of it is quite abstruse and appears to be very abstract. But in the case of certain operational matters such as we saw the slide on the prisoners, I won't repeat the Treatise on the Weapons of Mass Destruction, that's an exotic example, but in the case of several applications, the study of the ideological literature does have its benefits. It is a powerful propaganda tool, and therefore very energetically fostered. Few attempts, as far as I can see, have been made to counter this propaganda by trying to target it from the inside. We have seen certain unsuccessful, and sometimes, according to the press "laughable" attempts at counter propaganda. Given the persistence and the robustness of the culture, I would have thought that it is entirely sensible to give a bit more attention to the intellectual underpinnings of the jihadi phenomenon. Professor Giles Kepel was quoted- fairly germane to the issue- that "the battle for Muslim lives is not being fought by radicals in Fallujah or in mosques, it's being fought on the net." If we keep in mind the ideological strength that the mujahideen gain from the jihadi culture, we also realized that that strength by nature has to also be a point of sensitivity. And I think if we were to search them, more off into this shall we say abstruse, intellectual underpinnings of jihadi culture, in order to be able to eventually flag up potential weak points, at least we will be able to decide whatever is feasible, and learn how to place our resources more effectively.

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Harlan Ullman: I thought I would introduce my remarks with a page out of a great book that was published some 50 years ago "The Cane Mutiny" written by Herman Woe. For those of you unfamiliar with that book, it was about WWII and the storyline later called "U.S.S. Cane" under skipper and one lieutenant commander Philip Kwee and a number of officers that ended up believing the captain resulting in a huge court marshal for which they were acquitted. About that book years later, an admiral friend of mine whose very crusty remark, each one of them reminded me of some son of a bitch I knew in the navy, but never once did I serve in a ship with all them son of bitches were in it with me.

I'm going to talk about spillover in which all them son of a bitches are serving with us because of the three realities I want to make. The first one is that all these events are largely linked, that if we have a regional only view that imposes blinders, restrictions, and distortions, and as H.L. Macon once noted "anyone who has a short, simple answer to a complex difficult problem is wrong." The second reality I want to make is that it seems to me that the global system today, certainly among developed states, is far more fragile and vulnerable than it has been, and it is growing increasing fragile and vulnerable. And thirdly, my (inaudible) is this, the United States, despite all the money, despite all the investigations, despite all the rhetoric, still remains terribly unprepared in the tasks at hand in waging, what Mr. Bush likes to call "the global war on terror."

About point one, let me just go quickly around the horn of international events and let you draw your own conclusions, but it seems to me that while we are so preoccupied with events in Iraq, Syria, and the greater Middle East, we cannot forget for a moment what is happening in North Korea, China, Asia, and Japan. Because where there may not be a direct correlation, certainly our interests are keenly engaged, and whether you agree or not with the National Chinese Congress that the anti-secession law is serious in the event of Taiwan declaration of independence, the fact

of the matter is we have events bubbling over in East Asia for which we need to be paying greater attention and we are not.

The same thing can be said for Europe and NATO, I sit on the advisory board of the Supreme Allied Command of Europe, and clearly Europe is becoming far divided, more divisive, over Iraq no matter how good the trips of the Secretary of State or the President may well be. And I will make an observation, that it is interesting that those who say you cannot negotiate with terrorists, Osama bin Laden in terms of his demands for negotiations about how he will call off his jihad and amend its fatwas, it is interesting that ever since Spain has removed its forces from Iraq, there have been no al-Qaeda sponsored terrorist attacks as far as we know, and in fact when one reads on the net, Spain has now been given, if you will, some kind of a pass at least for the time being.

And then of course one looks at Iran, with what is happening there with movements towards their nuclear program, and right now as we speak, Prime Minister Sharon and Mr. Bush are meeting on the future of Israeli settlements, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, possibly the Israeli evasion of the West Bank and Jerusalem. Those events are obviously clearly related. So my point is that when we look narrowly, for example at the spillover in Syria and Lebanon which I will get to, the fact of the matter is in today's world what we are looking at is global, it has global consequences and we are ill-advised to just restrict our vision to one particular locale.

As far as being more fragile and vulnerable, in one of my incarnations I actually worked for a living, and the observation that the last time the Dow Jones was at 11,000 was when George Bush first entered office, is not so much a commentary on the economic policies of this administration, or the fact that oil was some \$58 a barrel, but the fact of the matter is we have enormous economic problems and the engines for growth that were apparent in the 1980s namely the mechanism for pro-activity increases and in the 1990s, technology and communications, did not seem to be here. And when you take a look at the banking systems in China and Japan, the huge amount of debt, situation in which American production is far exceeded by consumption, and you may have seen Paul Volker's piece in the *Washington Post* yesterday, that was a recount of his earlier speech in February, suggest the vulnerability of the international system. And so my point is that we ought not to rest on our oars thinking we have isolated problems in Iraq and a war on terror with everything else (inaudible), far be it that being the situation.

As far as the Americans still being unprepared, I had a piece Friday in the *Washington Times*, some of you may have seen, co-written with (inaudible), which talked about the coming swarm in the Pentagon. The fact of the matter is when you take a look at our preparations to deal with the global war, in terms of defense, intelligence, and the inter-agency process, very little has changed in a really positive way to make a big difference in my judgment since September 11. Take a look at the Defense Department. We are spending about \$500 billion dollars a year right now on our defenses. We have a Quadrennial Defense Review which is imposing almost impossible requirements on the military forces to achieve, such as how do you convince countries to make the right strategic decision in the future, namely China or Russia, that is to do something that is not in our negative interest, at the same time when you are trying to prepare for war, or when you are trying to prepare for preventing insurgencies from beginning big ones, when you are trying to prepare for disruptive and catastrophic events, and at a time when we have not really ever cancelled any weapons programs in a serious way, and right now weapons programs from the army, future combat systems which currently are estimated at \$125 billion for the F-22 to the B-22 (etc., etc., etc.) cannot be sustained in the budget. And by the way, whether you think the U.S. military is broken or not, it is pretty damn close, and certainly the reserves and guard are in terrible shape, and in the next coming months when the recruiting numbers go through the floor

as they will because we have been relying on an interesting notion called “deferred recruiting” to fill up the numbers, things will not look particularly good.

The inter-agency process in Congress I would argue is a joke, and it is a problem, and not getting any better, and it will focus its energies on Terri Schiavo and not on really serious things, it is just one small unhappy example, but if you read Steve Hadley’s memo of March 20 “Reorganizing the NSC Staff and the NSC,” he now has 21 deputies who report directly to him. If you can make sense out of that organization, you are a far better man or woman than I. And finally regarding intelligence, we have had another report come out by Judge Silberman and former Senator Rob that decry the intelligence community and tells us how bad we are, but let me ask you if you think there will be any improvements even with the appointment of John Negroponte to be the new National Intelligence Director, how it would really fix some of these problems, and the simple answer is that we have not and it is very unlikely that we will. So as we look at these things, you ought not to be optimistic, you ought to just be asking your government what they should be doing differently, demanding of your leaders, elected and otherwise, for some commonsense answers to the really tough problems, because it is your security and my security on the line.

Let me get to the issue of Syria and Lebanon. Some number of years ago after he left his post early as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, Wes Clarke was wandering around the Pentagon, and all his, not all, but some of his army chums were saying “Wesley, come on, General, these guys are planning to go after Syria.” Clarke said “this is nuts.” Well the fact of the matter is now you look at Syria and Lebanon in the context of Iraq, and what does it provide? You know the current strategy. The current strategy is to force Assad to get out. Syria has said he will do so by April 30th. Some people may not be as old as I am and can recall that in 1976 who were the ones that really wanted Syria to go into Lebanon and why? For those of you who do not recall answers to those questions, Lebanon was in the midst of a civil war, and the Maronite Christians were about to get slaughtered, and at the behest of the U.S. government, Syria said “Ok, maybe we ought to send some forces there.” They have been there ever since. Now I am not suggesting that it is a good thing to have Syria there, but let’s face it, the stability of Lebanon, good, bad, or indifferent, has rested heavily on the presence of the Syrian military, Syrian intelligence, and other people. And with their withdrawal, if there will be a partial withdrawal or a full withdrawal, we have to realize that the situation in Lebanon can easily become unglued. I am not predicting civil war, but I dare say you haven’t read anything about this in the press, the administration has not said a great deal about this, nobody in Congress, but it is one of the realities of what is going to happen.

In terms of the strategy, it has struck me for some time that Syria could be the ultimate exit strategy from Iraq. Many senior people in the Pentagon believe, assert, say that the centering for the insurgency in Iraq is Syria, that if you get rid of the Syrian connection, then the Iraqis will be able to deal with the insurgency and the world will be a better place. By the way, doesn’t young Assad have all those mysterious weapons of mass destruction that somehow got out of Iraq? Isn’t he a villain? Isn’t he doing the same kinds of things to his people that Mr. Saddam Hussein did? And so by the way, do we not have good reasons to go into Syria?

And if you take a look at further parallels between Iraq and Vietnam, and Lebanon and Algeria and Afghanistan, think about the parallels between Syria and Iraq at least in terms of the arguments for some kind of intervention. They may be somewhat remote today, but I think there are some people in the administration, I know some people in the administration who believe that Assad is the next one to go, that the exit strategy from Iraq would be to go in quickly into Syria. It is not going to require a lot because the Syrian army, by comparison even with the Iraqi army is not a particularly good one, we would be there for a matter of weeks or months and we could turn

over very quickly the administration and the control to moderate Arabs (does that sound like a familiar story?) and as we head from Iraq west towards Damascus, at some stage we can keep going.

Now, I don't say that because I'm crazy, I don't predict that's going to happen, I suspect that the chances each day that it does not are reducing the possibility that it may. But what I am saying is that there is an awful lot of uninformed discussion going on about the whole issue in Syria and Lebanon, about the consequences of what will happen post-Syria if there is a complete withdrawal, what we need to do about it, how we are trying to put together what is going to be needed for the rebuilding of Lebanon, the stabilization of Lebanon, how does that relate to what is happening in Israel and the deals that will be struck about the final roadmap that will come out of the Crawford Texas talks, and how does this relate to what's happening to Iraq?

Let me go back to my original comments about the three realities. These events are linked. They are linked in fundamental ways, and we seem incapable in dealing with them in ways that are integrated and we understand causes and effects. They will have huge causes and huge effects. We have to realize that in many ways we are more fragile and more vulnerable with oil at \$58 a barrel, you could envisage very easily many things that could happen that could make the economic consequences quite profound, and we still have to prepare ourselves.

To that end, I am not optimistic because I do not see any mechanisms for change. As I said originally, this administration is, I think, firmly fixed on course, there is going to be no deviation, I think that the appointments of the latest leadership, John Bolton is undergoing his hearings for the UN today, were made with malice and were forgone. I think they were very cleverly done in the heart of an administration that knows exactly what it wants. It wants to be a kinder and gentler administration. I don't see anybody in Congress, I don't see anybody in the so-called opposition standing up, the media unfortunately has rolled over, and America's public has become very, very complacent waiting for the next crisis perhaps, or more concerned about social security and medicare and all the domestic things.

A somber assessment, a somber assessment. But I have to tell you that in my judgment, the potential consequences of the period that we live on may in fact be as dangerous as any kind since the civil war. I think what Mike Scheuer has to say about Islam and jihadism is absolutely accurate. I think if you think about the enemy we face, in terms of where the Bolsheviks were a hundred years ago, and nobody thought that Lenin would ever take over Russia and turn it into the Soviet Union, or in England where nobody thought some eighty years ago Germany would turn into the Third Reich. I think that's where we are today. We underestimate the nature of the problem because there have not been subsequent September 11ths, because it is very easy to spin all the news coming out of Iraq as very positive. We have had elections, now we have a president who actually is heard, the fact that the Sunnis and Shiites are really talking to each other which is a profoundly fundamentally wrong conclusion, in fact we've got quite the opposite, leads to a very superficial impression.

So let me say that the only remedy it seems to me is for the American public to get mad, to get angry, to ask questions. Nobody has really provided answers to September 11th. All of these intelligence reports have held nobody responsible. Tommy Franks, George Tenet, and Jerry Bremer are all good people, you get to know them you'll like them. Did they really deserve medals of freedom? Nobody in the administration was really held accountable, except most implicitly Colin Powell since he was one of the very few to go. Does that really make sense? What are we doing about...what are we thinking about? I hope I've encouraged you, when we talk about the consequences of (inaudible), at least to examine your own thoughts and maybe get

a little bit angrier or at least get a little bit more skeptical and cynical and maybe help ask some questions that would give us better answers if we are ever to be safer and more secure. Thank you.