Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation

Russian Orthodox Church Prioritizes �Integration� With Kazakhstan

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 08:08:00 -0700

On January 16, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Kirill Frolov arrived in Astana for a two-day visit. He attempted to lend a purely religious character to his journey to Kazakhstan, a predominantly Muslim country, and originally planned to visit Almaty. However, thick fog prevented his plane landing at Almaty airport. Whether it was the deliberate intention of Patriarch Kirill, the visit assumed a clearly political connotation and culminated in extensive talks with President Nursultan Nazarbayev who received from the hands of the guest the Glory and Honor Order, the highest mark of distinction in the ROC, previously granted to the former Russian President Vladimir Putin, the former Patriarch Alexey II, and the pro-Moscow Head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus Allahshukur Pashazade.

Addressing an audience in Astana, Patriarch Kirill stressed the existence of �inter-ethnic, religious tolerance, and mutual respect� in Kazakhstan, condemning at the same time �the spread of extremism and terrorism,� while praising the Kazakh leader for his �approach to these problems,� which helped to avoid conflict. The pro-government media in Kazakhstan praised the visit of Patriarch Kirill as �an important event of historic significance,� serving the cause of �consolidating the relationship not only between Orthodox believers, but also our states� (Kazinform, January 18).

In Astana the head of Russian Orthodoxy attended the opening ceremony of the new Uspensk cathedral, the largest Orthodox Church in Central Asia occupying 2,000 square meters and designed to hold 4,000 people. After the sanctification of the cathedral and a religious service Patriarch Kirill thanked the government of Kazakhstan for its assistance in constructing the cathedral and decorated Imangali Tasmaganbetov, the mayor of Astana, Timur Kulibayev, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of �KazMunaiGas� the state-owned national oil and gas giant and Askar Mamin, the head of the national railway company with awards. Nazarbayev said that the opening of the Uspensk cathedral was timed to coincide with the arrival of the patriarch and was intended as �a gift to all Orthodox followers� (Liter, January 19).

The opening of the Uspensk cathedral in Astana symbolizes the efforts of the ROC to retain its influence in Kazakhstan following its independence and the arrival of missionaries from Roman Catholic, Protestant and other churches, primarily in the Russian-populated North of Kazakhstan, which was previously a domain of Russian Orthodoxy. Although numerous western religious sects and trends are mushrooming in Kazakhstan, Astana openly prioritizes the significance of Islam and ROC in its domestic policy, regarding them as an effective tool in preserving domestic peace and stability and as a counterbalance to �destructive� influences of what is officially depicted as the �non-traditional� religious trends from the West.

Patriarch Kirill�s trip to Astana was also synchronized with the creation of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which was welcomed by Kirill as an important step towards integration. Echoing the words of his guest, Nazarbayev said he would go further and urge his Russian counterpart to work together to create a single economic union. He called on Patriarch Kirill to jointly counteract western cultural values �imposed by international organizations (www.nur.kz, January18).

The patriarch then flew to Almaty in order to visit the Voznesensk cathedral and was greeted by an enthusiastic crowd. Officially, more than 3,000 religious associations representing 40 denominations are registered in Kazakhstan and 30 percent of believers preach Russian Orthodoxy. Almost 70 percent of believers are Muslim. However, these figures are difficult to verify and the exact number of religious sects and associations are unknown even to the ministry of justice, which is responsible for their registration. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the number of Orthodox churches and Mosques are rapidly growing, frequently thanks to lavish financial support from local government. In the case of the Uspensk cathedral, its construction started in 2005, but the work was delayed due to financial problems as donations from church members were insignificant. However, the mayor of Astana rushed to renew the construction work, securing an injection of money from local business (Aikyn, January 18).

The visit of the head of ROC occurred at a time when Russian Orthodoxy faces a deeping crisis in other parts of post-Soviet space, above all in Ukraine and the Baltic States aggravated by divergences between churches. Significantly, the visit came in the wake of Kazakhstan�s ascension to the chairmanship of the OSCE, an event closely watched by Moscow seeking to mend its relations with the West. In his interview with the Kazakh state news agency KazTAG, Kirill praised Kazakhstan�s OSCE chairmanship as a significant event contributing to positive development of inter-cultural relations. Evidently, the ROC is strengthening its ties with Astana in an effort to spread its influence within the region.

Rights Organizations Recall Mass Killings in Chechnya�s Aldy

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 08:04:00 -0700

On February 5, the head of Makhachkala�s police force, Ahkmed Magomedov, was gunned down in the center of Dagestan�s capital. Magomedov�s driver and two his bodyguards also died in the attack. According to the investigators, the murder was likely to be connected to Magomedov�s professional activities. He had reportedly survived an attack at the same location in 2005. The same day that the head of Makhachkala�s police force was killed, another important figure in the ranks of the Dagestani police, Gapiz Isaev, the head of the republican interior ministry�s inter-regional department for the fight against extremism, was killed in a bomb blast in the Dagestani coastal city of Izerbash, south of Makhachkala (www.gazeta.ru, February 5).

Dagestan is grappling with violence as the republic awaits the Kremlin�s decision on who will lead the republic after the term of the current president, Mukhu Aliev, expires on February 20.

Violence also continues in Ingushetia, despite the government�s repeated promises to stop it. On February 7, two people, including at least one policeman, were shot dead in Ingushetia. On February 6, the chief of staff of the Sunzha district police force, Magomed Agiev, was wounded in an attack as he approached his house in the settlement of Ordzhonikidzevskaya (www.ingushetiyaru.org, February 7).

Chechnya has experienced a surge in the number of attacks and victims since the special counter-terrorist operation regime was lifted in April 2009. According to estimates by the Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasian Knot) website, 270 people died and 190 were wounded in attacks during the period between April 2009 to January 2010, which was more than the number of casualties in the same period of the previous year (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, January 12).

At least ten people were killed in recent clashes in Chechnya�s Urus-Martan district �five of them on the insurgents� side and five on the federal and pro-Moscow Chechen side. The government initially put the number of insurgents involved in the fighting at 15, but subsequently elevated it to 50 (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, February 6). The insurgency�s website claimed 11 members of the Russian security forces were killed in the Urus-Martan clashes. The insurgent news source boasted that the rebels have not stopped fighting, even during the winter period, as they have normally done in previous years in order to survive the cold weather (www.kavkazcenter.com, February 6).

Meanwhile, human rights activists decided it was a time of reckoning for the past crimes committed by Russian government forces in Chechnya. On February 5, the tenth anniversary of the massacre in the Grozny suburb of Novye Aldy, the film �Aldy: With No Expiration Date� was screened in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Grozny. In 2000, members of a special police unit (OMON) from St. Petersburg killed at least 56 civilians, mostly elderly people, women and children.

Aleksandr Cherkasov of the Memorial human rights center stated at a Moscow press conference that the 10-year-old crimes in Novye Aldy were �comparable to the crimes of Hitler�s punitive expeditions in the Great Patriotic war [WWII].� The St. Petersburg OMON, according to Cherkasov, entered Grozny after its defenders retreated and the Russian military took over the city, so that the police commandos committed their crimes in an atmosphere of utter impunity. Despite that, Cherkasov noted, no proper investigation had ever been conducted and no one was punished for the crimes. When the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg accepted the Aldy case, investigators from the pro-Moscow Chechen government started reviewing it and found a suspect in the St. Petersburg OMON, but the investigation was not allowed to proceed beyond that point. Cherkasov pointed out that the numerous scandals involving police abuse in Russia are linked to the fact that many Russian police units were deployed in Chechnya and grew used to acting with brutality and impunity (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, February 6).

Surprisingly, even the pro-Moscow ruler of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, whom some Chechens accuse of committing crimes �worse than the Russians committed,� went out of his usual way in condemning Russian military�s crimes in Aldy. At a Friday prayer in the Aldy�s mosque, Kadyrov said: �February 5, 2000 is a date that echoes with pain in each of our hearts. On that day, people who called themselves military servicemen but in reality were bastards, shaming the Russian army, organized butchery in this settlement. Dozens of Aldy�s inhabitants, mostly old men, women and children, were shot dead in cold blood. I am confident the perpetrators will be punished in the end.� Referring to the reconstruction of Chechnya and his rule, Kadyrov warned that the people of Chechnya must �value the positive changes [in the republic] and never forget the price that was paid for the peace� (www.ramzan-kadyrov.ru, February 6).

Ironically, the prominent Chechen human rights activist Natalya Estemirova was among the first people to start investigating the Aldy massacre. Several of Estemirova�s colleagues have accused Ramzan Kadyrov of being involved in her death in July 2009. So, while Kadyrov practically endorsed the results of Estemirova�s work, he somewhat remained opposed to her personally.

On the tenth anniversary of the killings in Aldy, the Memorial human rights center, the Yabloko political party�s branch in St. Petersburg and the House of Peace and Non-violence in the city launched a website �www.pomnialdy.ru (Remember Aldy). It describes itself as having been designed �to reclaim the good name of St. Petersburg and its inhabitants,� by establishing positive ties between the people of St. Petersburg and Aldy.

Medvedev Approves New Russian Military Doctrine

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 08:03:00 -0700

On February 5, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev finally signed the long-awaited new military doctrine, intended to guide defense policy over the next decade. In the presence of the senior civilian leadership of the government and legislative branches, Medvedev announced that he had signed both the military doctrine and �The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020� (Krasnaya Zvezda, February 6). The military doctrine describes the threat environment facing Russia as complex and dynamic, but not dominated by an imminent threat of war:

    �In the new military doctrine, world development today is characterized by the weakening of ideological confrontation; the reduction in the level of economic, political, and military influence of certain individual states and alliances; and the rising influence of other states that seek all-embracing domination; multi-polarity; and the globalization of various processes.

    Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. The tendencies toward violent solutions of these conflicts, including those bordering the Russian Federation, remains. The existing structure (system) of international security, including international legal mechanisms, does not provide for the equal security of all states.

    However, despite the lowering of the probability of unleashing large-scale warfare against the Russian Federation with the employment of conventional means and nuclear weapons, in a number of directions the military dangers to the Russian Federation have increased (www.kremlin.ru, February 5).�

The document lists both internal and external threats with its primary emphasis on those posed by the actions of the United States and NATO on the periphery of Russia. But the doctrine also recognizes a sliding scale of military conflict that Russia might face. It also addresses the characteristic features of contemporary military conflict, relating to what Russian authors call sixth generation warfare and an extension of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov�s characterization, �the revolution in military affairs, involving precision-strike systems,� and �the mass employment of weapons systems and weapons technology, based upon new physical principles and approaching in effectiveness that of nuclear weapons.� On the role of nuclear weapons in Russian strategy, the doctrine refers to their use as a means of deterrence against nuclear and conventional attacks upon Russia and its allies, but does not explicitly proclaim a doctrine of preemptive attack, which formed part of the debate on the draft military doctrine. It states: �The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is taken by the president of the Russian Federation.�

The earlier reported concept of �preemptive or defensive nuclear strike,� was absent, and may reflect a struggle within the Russian security elite over its final content. On February 5, Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council, once again announced that it would be signed shortly. The same article stressed the point that the doctrine would focus on the role of nuclear weapons in defense of Russia. It did not, however, repeat reports on the inclusion of preemptive nuclear strike in the doctrine (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 5).

Indeed, the doctrine was signed at a time when the strategic situation before Russia began to clarify. Both Washington and Moscow claim significant progress on the START 2 agreement, with commentators suggesting the treaty might be signed during an April summit. Moreover, the US Department of Defense has issued its Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Russian commentators have stressed that the QDR does not focus on Russia as a threat to the US, and seems more focused upon current conflicts and the global struggle against terrorism than upon preparing to fight major regional wars by conventional means. They judge this to be a potential development of significance for Russian security interests. In conjunction with the newly published budget proposal for FY 2011, Russian observers see the Pentagon focused on maintaining the high quality of military personnel and on improving benefits for veterans. Comments on weapons acquisitions, especially missile defense capabilities, did not identify these developments as an explicit threat to Russia. The authors noted, however, that the US will seek to retain the capacity to intervene in all regions of the globe in defense of US interests (Krasnaya Zvezda, February 5).

In this context, Russia�s new military doctrine underscores the basic asymmetry between US and Russian doctrine as they appear to be evolving. Moscow still views the US and NATO as the source of the primary dangers confronting Russia, but not as imminent threats. Both countries now openly recognize terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and local insurgencies as sources of international instability, as they cooperate to deal with the insurgency in Afghanistan. Until very recently, comments from members of the Security Council placed first priority on the inclusion of Russia�s articulation of a posture of �preemptive nuclear first strike� to protect Russian interests, allies, and the survival of Russian statehood at the core of the new military doctrine. Patrushev explained the emphasis on preemptive strike as based upon US and NATO actions: �Continuation of NATO�s expansion, military activization of the Alliance, intensive exercises of the American strategic forces involving strategic arms deployment drills disturbs Russia.� He listed more general trends in the international situation, which were contributing to �destabilization� and affecting the formulation of Russian military doctrine. These included: �the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and germ warfare technologies, continuing production of WMD, battles for energy and other resources.� Earlier, Army-General Yuri Baluyevskiy, (retired) commented on the imminent threat from the US. Baluyevskiy, who served as the Chief of the General Staff from 2004-2008 and is now the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, highlighted the US articulation of a doctrine of �instant global strike,� which would include both conventional precision strike and nuclear weapons as a justification for Russia adopting a doctrine of preemptive nuclear first-strike (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 3).

An article in Trud on the same day suggested a political struggle within the walls of the Kremlin, with outside experts defending and attacking the concept of preemptive nuclear strike. In this regard, the comments of Colonel-General Viktor Esin, (retired), deserve note. Esin, the former chief of staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces and now a leading analyst of strategic issues, stated that the concept was ill-formulated: �It is impossible to forecast the moment when it is high time to be the first to attack a weapon with nuclear weapons in response just to a threat of aggression accurately.� He doubted that President Medvedev would accept the doctrinal formulation of preemptive nuclear first-strike (Trud, February 3). While the Kremlin has published the new military doctrine, no copy of �The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence to 2020� has appeared in the press. Its content will reveal what Russian policy-makers understand nuclear deterrence to mean in the second decade of the 21st century.

Russia Finds Itself Passed its Security Prime

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 08:01:00 -0700

At the annual Munich security conference last weekend, Russia received as little attention as it had attracted at the Davos World Economic Forum in the previous week. The star presenter this year was the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, and hardly anyone reflected upon the sensational speech delivered at this venue by the then President Vladimir Putin just three years ago. Political vogue tends to swing, but Russia�s eclipse is caused by a profound loss of international influence accentuated rather than camouflaged by President Dmitry Medvedev�s efforts to build his profile. Russia has turned out to be one of the worst losers in the global recession, and while China�s model of �market communism� has proven its strength, Putin�s petro-state is struggling on a slow recovery track (Ekho Moskvy, February 5).

Russia�s relations with its Western partners, and even with NATO, have been normalized but the implementation of the �reset� proposed by US Vice-President Joe Biden in Munich last year, has also brought disappointment. Despite many promises, a new treaty on reducing strategic arms was not signed in time to replace the START I (which expired on December 5, 2009), and this dissipation of cooperative momentum might prove to be more significant than diplomats who are ironing out a perfect text tend to believe. Both sides refer to mere �technicalities,� but it is unclear how Putin�s insistence on the linkage between strategic offence and defense, and the US commitment to deploying a multi-layer strategic defense system can be reconciled (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, January 22). A new twist in this intrigue was added by Romania�s unexpected announcement of its readiness to host US interceptor-missiles, which could not fail to irritate Moscow (Kommersant, February 6). The Obama administration is exploring new avenues to reduce �the role and number of nuclear weapons,� as the National Security Adviser James L. Jones restated in Munich, but Putin�s loyal lieutenant, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov expressed no enthusiasm whatsoever about a possible new arms control framework for tactical nuclear weapons (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 5).

The emphasis on nuclear deterrence is quite pronounced in the official rhetoric, but the military doctrine approved by Medvedev last week after a long delay downplays this issue, describing nuclear weapons merely as �an important factor in preventing� both nuclear and conventional wars (RIA Novosti, February 5). Contrary to many leaks about a new guideline on preventive strikes, the doctrine clarifies that nuclear weapons could be used in a conventional war that �threatens the very existence of the state� (www.gazeta.ru, February 5). This condition is probably elaborated in the new confidential document on the Principles of State Deterrence Policy to 2020, but what is strikingly old-fashioned in the doctrine is the list of external military dangers which opens with NATO�s expansion, and deployment of the Alliance�s military infrastructure close to Russia�s borders (Kommersant, February 6). NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen could only say that the doctrine does not reflect the real world and contradicts efforts at improving NATO-Russia relations (www.newsru.com, February 6).

Medvedev tries to draw attention away from these remnants of Soviet strategizing by advertising his pan-European initiative, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov duly made yet another effort to sell it during the Munich conference (RIA Novosti, February 6). The German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle politely reiterated that Medvedev�s idea deserves �a substantive discussion.� However, signals from the US are firm and clear: Europe needs no more institutions, but rather greater commitment to the rules of existing organizations. Moscow has a point in arguing about the erosion of the core structures, yet its own heavy contribution to sabotaging them is undeniable, so Lavrov�s remark about the �atrophy� of the OSCE would hardly amuse even Kazakhstan, since it currently chairs this institution. It is slightly odd that Russian political propagandists now rarely mention Medvedev�s draft new treaty (published in late November 2009), but push the proposition based on the inadequacy of the security system that does not answer the needs of such a key member as Russia. What adds currency to this proposition is the concern in many European capitals (and hopefully in Moscow) that the Obama team has little time for, and scant interest in trans-Atlantic relations, which by default increases Russia�s profile (www.gazeta.ru, February 4).

Washington seeks to dispel such concerns by expanding debates on NATO�s new Strategic Concept, and Russian diplomats were sternly reminded by Madeleine Albright who chairs the group of �wise men� steering these debates that Russia is just one of NATO�s partners and not in any position to lecture the Alliance (Kommersant, January 28). One pivotal matter where Moscow has been far less cooperative than Western advocates of the �reset� had hoped is over the Iranian nuclear and missile programs (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 4). The Munich conference shows, however, that the policy of consensus-building has shifted. Previously, the US and the EU �troika� considered that it was crucially important to keep Russia onboard, and then China would not act as a �spoiler.� They now understand that China�s position is the key, and Russia will follow suit.

Russia�s dwindling security profile is determined by its economic ills, but distinctly sharpened by the weakness of its leadership. Every benefit of the doubt was given to Medvedev by his Western partners, but his message of �modernization� rings increasingly hollow. The Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR), a think-tank working under Medvedev�s patronage, last week published a report on Russia�s desirable future, which portrays a mature democratic state that will upgrade its partnership with NATO to full membership (Vedomosti, February 3). The report provides no roadmap for reaching that barely believable goal, but it strongly emphasizes that innovative economic development is possible only through a profound democratization of the political system. Medvedev�s �modernization� dares not to set any targets in this direction, however, it still comes out as the only politically possible anti-Putin project (www.gazeta.ru, February 1). Putin once enjoyed small moments of cutting Medvedev down to size, but now it is becoming truly necessary for him to remind him who is the boss. Such reminders, however, fail to impress the political elites who observe at close quarters his denial of irrepressible change.

Georgia�s Arduous Attempt to Challenge Moscow�s Broadcasting Monopoly

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 12:56:00 -0700

On January 4, the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) inaugurated its first Russian language television channel: Pervyi Kavkazsky (First Caucasus) or 1-K. It initially operated as a cable television channel available within Georgia with simultaneous live broadcasting on the internet to reach a wider online audience. On January 15, First Caucasus further widened its range of coverage by becoming available on the French-operated satellite provider Eutelsat, reaching a broader Russian speaking audience in the Russian Federation and across almost the entire post-Soviet space. On February 1, Eutelsat discontinued transmitting the channel, which immediately invoked suspicions that the Russian authorities were implicated in the decision.

Television channels in the Russian Federation are almost exclusively owned or at least heavily controlled by the state and, furthermore, they enjoy a near-monopoly on broadcasting in the Russian language throughout the entire post-Soviet space and beyond. Thus, it is not only in the North Caucasus that the Kremlin feared the Georgian channel might challenge its informational monopoly, but among the entire Russian-speaking population across Eurasia.

Oleg Panfilov, the Head of the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations is a leading journalist and host on First Caucasus. An ethnic Russian, he was born in Tajikistan and spent much of his career in various parts of Central Asia, working on human rights and other humanitarian issues. Panfilov, highly respected both in Russia and Central Asia, has recently settled in Tbilisi, after spending several years in Moscow. Another internationally acclaimed individual working for First Caucasus, Alla Dudayeva, an ethnic Russian and widow of the late Chechen President Jokhar Dudayev, is also well-respected in the North Caucasus.

State-owned Russian media reacted critically to the appearance of First Caucasus and became almost hysterical after the Georgian channel started its satellite broadcasts. The Russian newspaper Kommersant immediately highlighted the fact that �First Caucasus transmits using a French satellite, which had been launched into orbit by the Russian rocket-carrier Proton from the space launch facility at Baikonur� (Kommersant, January 18). It also cited Giorgi Chanturia, the Head of GPB, as claiming that �the goal of First Caucasus is to inform the Russian public about Georgia and freely discuss developments in the North Caucasus�We would like to talk about things which are left out by other Russian-language TV channels.�

Pro-Russian forces in the Georgian opposition, including the former Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli�s Movement for a Just Georgia, constantly voiced criticism against establishing First Caucasus. �President Mikheil Saakashvili needs this channel to harm Russia and its people,� said Petre Mamradze, Noghaideli�s associate. Giorgi Khaindrava, another pro-Russian figure in the Georgian opposition, was even more acrimonious: �Since this channel is viewed in Moscow as supportive of separatism in the North Caucasus, [Russian Prime Minister] Putin might order the bombing of central Tbilisi where the GPB is located� (Kommersant, Regnum, January 18).

In an interview on Georgia�s First TV Channel, GPB�s Levan Gakheladze said: �Eutelsat requested that the GPB should describe the content of the programs aired by First Caucasus.� He accused the French satellite provider of being �a tool of Russian censorship� (Georgia�s First TV Channel, February 2).

On February 2, the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili�s spokesperson described the action against First Caucasus as �a very dangerous precedent of international political censorship� and called for the resumption of its broadcasting on the satellite �owned by the country [France], respected worldwide as a home of democracy (The Georgian President�s official website, February 2).

In an interview with the author, Oleg Panfilov mentioned several reasons why First Caucasus is viewed as �dangerous� by the Kremlin. In his opinion, unlike the Kremlin�s own propaganda machinery, the Russian language First Caucasus is aimed at disseminating balanced and objective information concerning Georgia, Russia and its regions, as well as other countries in the former Soviet Union. �The channel conveys a positive message,� he said, with its emphasis on historical, cultural and ethnic issues, human rights and other humanitarian topics. Panfilov also stressed the importance of spreading information about Georgia in Ukraine and in the Central Asian countries where the Kremlin-owned Russian TV channels have traditionally held a heavy influence over the Russian-speaking public. �During the Russian aggression against Georgia in August 2008, ordinary people in various parts of the post-Soviet space could not receive objective information in the Russian language, while the Kremlin enjoyed an information monopoly,� the First Caucasus journalist said. It is also worth recalling that during the war, the entire Georgian cyberspace was under attack most likely by Russian internet hackers, resulting in an almost complete shutdown of the Georgian government and private websites.

In Panfilov�s view, �propaganda is the single most important tool� for the current Russian leadership to influence both domestic and world opinion,� and �there is no doubt that the appearance of the alternative TV channel is seen in Moscow as a moral danger that has to be avoided at all costs.� The journalist argues that in addition to political pressure that the Russian authorities exerted on the French-owned Eutelsat, there was an �important commercial intimidation,� since, he alleges, Gazprom threatened the French satellite provider �to withdraw its 28 or so channels from Eutelsat if First Caucasus continued broadcasting.�

Panfilov who was �forced� to leave Moscow for his political views, sees Georgia as a �viable alternative� in the largely authoritarian post-Soviet space where the Kremlin almost exclusively shapes political trends. Georgia�s liberal political and economic system, in Panfilov�s opinion, could become an information target for the Russian leadership. �I believe that First Caucasus has to have a type of mission Radio Liberty pursued in its first decades, in 1950�s and 1960�s.�

It remains to be seen if First Caucasus will regain its satellite broadcasting rights. GPB has already launched a lawsuit against the French company in a Paris court. Analysts, such as Oleg Panfilov, consider that the French court�s verdict will show whether justice, equality and free speech still matter in international relations or whether �other considerations� have an overriding power.

FSB Accuses Georgia of Aiding al-Qaeda in the North Caucasus

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 12:12:00 -0700

Insurgent violence has continued unabated in the North Caucasus this week, with five federal servicemen dying in a shootout with insurgents in Chechnya yesterday (February 4) and Russia�s security services again accusing Georgia of aiding militants in the North Caucasus.

A source in Chechnya�s security apparatus told Kavkazsky Uzel today (February 5) that five federal troops were killed yesterday during a firefight with insurgents in Chechnya�s Urus-Martan district. The source said the battle between members of a unit of interior ministry internal troops and a group of militants numbering up to 15 took place several kilometers to the south of the village of Komsomolskoe. Four servicemen were killed and another four wounded, including two officers. The federal forces then ordered an artillery strike on the area in which the rebels were blockaded, after which another shootout occurred when the rebels tried to break out of the encirclement. Another serviceman was killed and two wounded during this second shootout.

Yesterday�s battle in Urus-Martan coincided with the Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov�s announcement that a special operation had been successfully carried out elsewhere in the republic �in a wooded area near the Grozny district village of Dachu-Borzoi. According to Kadyrov, during that operation, which was conducted by members of the republican security forces, the republican branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the interior ministry�s �Sever� special operations battalion, six insurgents were killed, including a man described by the Chechen leader as an �Arab mercenary.� Kadyrov met with State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov, the man he handpicked as his successor and put in charge of counter-insurgency operations in the republic, and praised him for the �very successful� operation near Dachu-Borzoi. Kadyrov said the operation was part of the push he announced last month to locate and eliminate the Chechen rebel leader Doku Umarov and his inner circle (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, February 5; Interfax, February 4).

In Dagestan, Gapiz Isaev, the head of the republican interior ministry�s inter-regional department for the fight against extremism, was killed today in a bomb blast in the Dagestani city of Izerbash. ITAR-TASS quoted an unnamed representative of the Dagestani interior ministry�s press service as saying that unidentified persons detonated an explosive device near a market place as Isaev�s Niva car was passing. Isaev died at the scene of the attack (ITAR-TASS, February 5).

On February 3, the head of the FSB directorate for Dagestan, Vyacheslav Shanshin, told Russia�s Vesti-24 state television channel that security forces in the republic had killed an Egyptian militant who was �one of the founders of the al-Qaeda network in the North Caucasus.� RIA Novosti quoted an unnamed FSB spokesman as saying that the 49-year-old Egyptian national, Makhmoud Mokhammed Shaaban, was killed in a shootout with police in Dagestan�s Botlikhsky district on February 2, and that a Dagestani militant and a police officer also died in the gun battle. The FSB spokesman said that Shaaban, aka Seif Islam (the sword of Islam), had seen action in Afghanistan in the 1990�s, and �was also in Sudan, Somali, Libya and Georgia,� as well as arriving in Chechnya in 1992 �to take part in operations against federal forces.� The spokesman added that Shaaban had organized the North Caucasus branch of al-Qaeda with Saudi-born Islamic radical Ibn Al-Khattab, and that he had been behind a series of bombing attacks targeting railway tracks, electricity lines and energy pipelines on the instructions of Georgian secret services (RIA Novosti, Reuters, February 3).

On February 4, a spokesman for Georgia�s Interior Ministry, Shota Utiashvili, denied the allegations that his country had assisted Shaaban. He called the charges �anti-Georgian propaganda� and said Georgia has nothing to do with the violence in Russia�s North Caucasus (Interfax, February 4).

Three policemen were wounded in Ingushetia on February 4 when their vehicle came under fire. The incident took place on the Kavkaz federal highway in the Nasyr-Kortovsky municipal district of the city of Nazran. The attackers reportedly fired automatic rifles and grenade launchers from a VAZ-2110 car and escaped (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, February 4).

A source in Ingushetia�s interior ministry told ITAR-TASS on February 4 that a terrorist attack had been averted in the city of Karabulak that day. The source said that an improvised explosive device (IED) had been found in an area where military convoys frequently travel near the city�s market and that the IED was defused by bomb disposal experts (ITAR-TASS, February 4).

On February 3, a UAZ truck carrying police K-9 teams came under fire in the village of Barsuki in Ingushetia�s Nazran district. No one was hurt in the attack (Interfax, February 3). On February 2, an unknown attacker fired a grenade launcher at Nazran�s railway station. The grenade landed on the second floor of the building, where the offices of the railway police and other security forces are located. No one was hurt in the incident (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, February 2).

On February 1, a booby-trapped grenade launcher went off on the grounds of a kindergarten in Nazran. The grenade launcher had been aimed at a building nearby housing a unit of the FSB border guard service and an explosive device attached to it detonated when bomb disposal experts tried to disarm the grenade launcher. Six people were injured in the blast, including four police officers, an investigator and a civilian. One of the policemen later died. RIA Novosti quoted an interior ministry official as saying that a grenade was launched from the weapon during the blast, but is not thought to have caused any damage (RIA Novosti, February 1).

Can Nabucco be Married Off to Gazprom?

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 12:11:00 -0700

Unexpectedly, the US State Department�s Special Envoy for Eurasian energy affairs, Richard Morningstar, seems to embrace the idea of allowing Gazprom to become a user of the Nabucco pipeline. Speaking in Washington at the Center for American Progress (a think-tank associated with left-leaning constituencies in the Obama administration) on January 28, Morningstar suggested inviting Gazprom to use part of the Nabucco pipeline�s capacity, for Russian gas. The suggestion was not included in Morningstar�s prepared speech (http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2010/01/morningstar.html), but came during the question and answer session. The Interfax news agency cited Morningstar�s remark at some length, as follows:

�It may make sense to invite Russia as a supplier country into the Nabucco pipeline. Russia could perhaps supply gas through Blue Stream to Turkey [for Nabucco]. This would make it possible for Russia to participate in the project, not as a controlling party, but as one participant; and considering the global financial situation, this would be a fully rational way to proceed. If we talk about this to the Russians candidly, we may receive interesting answers� (Interfax, January 29).

The Russian rendition does not clarify the proposed form of Gazprom�s participation (whether as a shipper or stakeholder). Meanwhile, Russia faces a widely anticipated gas shortfall (stagnant production versus growing supply commitments), as also recognized already in 2008 by Gazprom itself. This is now hidden from view by falling external and internal demand for gas during the economic recession. But this temporary reprieve will end with the post-recession recovery, when the shortfall will loom again. With its heavy financial indebtedness, moreover, Gazprom is unable to finance new export pipelines, hoping mainly for international funding of its export pipeline projects. Gazprom�s latest board meeting half-admitted to this situation. Nevertheless, it scheduled continuing expansion of pipeline projects, without financing any significant new field development to fill the proposed pipeline capacities (EDM, January 29).

Sharing the Nabucco pipeline�s capacity with Gazprom would practically amount to European financing of pipeline capacity for Russian use, to the extent of Gazprom-booked capacity in Nabucco�s open-season tender (see Nabucco Gas Project Retains Political and Business Momentum, EDM, February 5). On the other hand, should the Kremlin draw on its cash reserves for a portion of Nabucco�s construction costs, it will have defeated this European and Caspian energy security project; and it will have achieved that goal by invitation.

From a supply standpoint, Russia could hardly find extra gas volumes for Nabucco from Russia�s own resources, except perhaps by diverting some volumes via Blue Stream away from another Black Sea country (Ukraine). This theoretical possibility could increase pressure on Ukraine to relinquish control of its gas transit system to Gazprom on penalty of seeing transit volumes diverted away from Ukraine. The South Stream project functions as Russia�s leverage on Ukraine for that purpose, and an expanded use of Blue Stream would add to that leverage against Ukraine.

It also seems highly counterproductive to invite Gazprom into Nabucco before ensuring that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan obtain access for their gas to the Nabucco pipeline. Otherwise, Gazprom�s gas volumes may preempt the pipeline�s capacities to the detriment of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. If these two countries are not connected with Nabucco as a matter of overriding priority, then Russian gas volumes delivered into Nabucco could be volumes bought by Gazprom from those Caspian countries, or swapped with those countries for re-routing into Nabucco.

Nabucco is the centerpiece of the more ambitious Southern Corridor plan, which the United States supports politically. Morningstar reaffirmed that support in his January 28 speech and is known to be working on the diplomatic level to advance the Southern Corridor plan. It would be compromised, however, by inviting Gazprom into Nabucco.

Given the financial and supply hurdles to Gazprom�s participation in this project, conversations about such participation may prove academic. However, some European parties insist that Gazprom cannot be excluded under European law from this project, even though Gazprom is a massive violator of European anti-trust and unbundling laws and regulations on EU territory.

Discussions about Russian participation in Nabucco can produce an effect similar to that of Russian hype of South Stream, generating confusion about EU purposes and policies, and raising more question marks for potential investors in Nabucco as a diversification project. South Stream serves as an anti-diversification project, specifically against Nabucco. US policy supports diversification more consistently than many West European governments and energy champion companies, including those of Austria and Turkey. However, the inclusion of Gazprom in Nabucco could also become an anti-diversification step.

Those proposals, if implemented, would negate the Nabucco project�s strategic rationale, practically turning this project on its head. The rationale has all along been to reduce European dependence �and the Nabucco countries� overdependence� on Russian gas; and also to forestall the extension of Gazprom-imposed business models and Gazprom-shared control of infrastructure in Europe. Sharing the Nabucco pipeline with Gazprom would defeat those goals.

Nabucco only makes sense as a strategic project of supply security for Europe. It would lose that sense if used as a vehicle for certain companies� narrow interests (OMV or Turkey� Botas) in special deals with Gazprom through Baumgarten or Blue Stream. The Nabucco project would also risk forfeiting its raison d�etre, and even feasibility, if entangled politically with the US-Russian �reset.�

Nabucco Gas Project Retains Political and Business Momentum

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 12:08:00 -0700

On February 3, the Bulgarian parliament ratified the inter-governmental agreement on the Nabucco gas transport project, as signed in July 2009 by the five stakeholder countries (the German company RWE being the sixth stakeholder) (BTA, February 3). The Bulgarian ratification vote was unanimous, implicitly confirming the country�s preference for the Nabucco project over Gazprom�s South Stream. The previous, Socialist Bulgarian government had joined South Stream in 2008; but Russia�s January 2009 gas supply cut-off (which targeted Ukraine, but hit Bulgaria the hardest) caused even the Russia-friendly parties in Bulgaria to lose confidence in the country�s reliability as a supplier.

The new conservative government under Boiko Borissov, in office since July 2009, took it one step further by questioning the South Stream project�s intrinsic terms and ordering a re-examination. In the parliament�s ratification debate, the socialist opposition fully supported Nabucco, but also called for Bulgaria to continue participation in South Stream. Other countries in the Nabucco project are also retaining a South Stream option. They see EU-backed alternatives being slow to materialize, US leadership fading, and national electorates expecting their governments to demonstrate a proactive approach to energy security (EDM, February 1).

At the same time, Bulgaria and Greece are finalizing the construction of an inter-connector between their respective gas transmission networks. The link can serve to supply Bulgaria in emergency situations with gas volumes from the Turkey-Greece-Italy inter-connector. Bulgaria and Romania are scheduled to link their networks in 2011, creating additional supply options in emergencies. These are hedges against possible Russian supply cut-offs, but are neither alternatives, nor significant complements to Russian-delivered gas until Nabucco becomes reality.

Hungary was the first country whose parliament ratified the Nabucco inter-governmental agreement. Nabucco tops Hungary�s official energy policy priorities, with LNG from the Adriatic coast as the second priority, and South Stream third. The Austrian parliament has also ratified the Nabucco inter-governmental agreement. Turkey�s energy ministry has announced that the parliamentary ratification in Ankara is imminent (Platt�s Commodity News, January 22, February 4). The Romanian ratification has been delayed by the country�s lengthy government crisis and its recent presidential election; but ratification is a foregone conclusion, as the country stayed out of the South Stream project, despite Gazprom�s entreaties to join it. Moscow is inviting the Austrian government even more insistently to join South Stream.

The Austrian OMV company originated the Nabucco project nearly a decade ago and OMV executives have, all along, led the project company although the latter is a separate entity, with OMV�s Gas and Power division being one of the six Nabucco stakeholders. On January 28, at the European Gas Conference in Vienna, the OMV Gas and Power Head, Werner Auli, declared that the Nabucco pipeline would not be built without sufficient demand from gas shippers to use the pipeline�s capacities; and this would have to be determined by the end of 2010. Some mass media reports created considerable confusion by focusing on the statement�s introductory, negative proposition and overlooking the remainder. In fact, Auli went on to note a high probability of plentiful demand from shippers to book capacities in the planned Nabucco pipeline (Wiener Zeitung, January 28).

The Nabucco consortium has scheduled an �open season� (the tendering process whereby gas shippers book pipeline capacities) to be held from July to October 2010. If successful, the open season should be followed by the final investment decision by the end of the year. In accordance with European Union legislation, the Nabucco company may not sell gas to other parties, but only transport it. Under the same legislation, 50 percent of the pipeline�s transport capacities must be tendered out in the open season. According to Auli and the Nabucco project managing director (formerly OMV executive) Reinhard Mitschek, Nabucco will offer long-term transportation contracts of 20 to 25 years, so as to reassure financial investors (Dow Jones, February 1).

OMV, as well as Turkey, have all along favored allowing Russia�s Gazprom to use some capacity in the planned Nabucco pipeline. OMV and the Austrian government have agreed to share Nabucco�s terminus and distribution center at Baumgarten near Vienna in parity with Gazprom. For its part, Ankara encourages Gazprom to increase deliveries via the Blue Stream Two pipeline on the seabed of the Black Sea to Turkey, and connect with the Nabucco pipeline, as well as using part of Nabucco�s capacity to pump Gazprom�s gas to Europe. These proposals could, however, compromise the Nabucco project�s significance for energy security to the region and as a centerpiece to the EU-planned Southern Corridor.

Kyrgyzstan Relaxes Control Over Drug Trafficking

Thu, 04 Feb 2010 15:59:00 -0700

Last October, the Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev disbanded the Drug Control Agency (DCA) responsible for intercepting illicit drugs transiting through Kyrgyzstan from Afghanistan and destined to reach Russia and Europe. Instead, the president assigned the interior ministry to control drug trafficking in the country (www.government.gov.kg, October 26, 2009). Since Bakiyev�s decision, little is known about how effectively Kyrgyzstan is now combating drug trafficking.

Bakiyev�s disregard for the DCA shows that the president is centralizing illegal control over the drug economy, one of the most lucrative sources of shadow capital. It also reveals that Bakiyev is disinterested in international initiatives to control narcotics, and has little real desire to contribute to the stabilization of Afghanistan.

The drug economy in southern Kyrgyzstan is controlled by powerful entrepreneurs and government officials. Overall, roughly five identifiable criminal groups control drug transit through Kyrgyzstan. Although they are known to the security structures, these groups have ties to the government, or at times represent government and therefore are free to carry out their activities with impunity. Reports suggest that one of the president�s brothers is allegedly involved in controlling most drug transit through Kyrgyz territory.

According to analysis by the opposition leader Bakyt Beshimov, who was recently stripped of his parliamentary seat and forced to flee the country, Bakiyev has formed a powerful bloc of military men around him. �In essence, inside the power sector in the country a junta has been formed, united by vast material benefits and [joint] crimes,� argues Beshimov (www.ferghana.ru, February 2). He also alleges that the drug economy is potentially among the most lucrative for Bakiyev�s regime.

The problem of drug trafficking through Kyrgyz territory surfaced soon after the country gained independence. Indeed, after 2001, the volume of narcotics being transited through the country increased by 58 percent. In reaction to the increased drug trafficking, the former President Askar Akayev created the Drug Control Agency in 2004, with the UN�s strong support. Similar agencies were also launched in all other Central Asian countries.

According to expert estimates, Kyrgyzstan transfers over 25 tons of drugs, most of which originate in Afghanistan. One former member of the Kyrgyz military told Jamestown that the following routes are known to be most lucrative for transit of Afghan heroin through Kyrgyz territory:

1. Badakhshan (Afghanistan) � Gorny Badakhshan (Tajikistan) � Osh (Kyrgyzstan) � Sumgait (Azerbaijan) � Bosnia � Croatia � Western Europe.

2. Badakhshan (Afghanistan) � Gorny Badakhshan (Tajikistan) � Osh, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) � Samara, Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Saransk (Russia) � Estonia � Sweden � US.

3. Badakhshan (Afghanistan) � Gorny Badakhshan (Tajikistan) � Osh, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) � Moscow (Russia) � Shulyai (Latvia) � Europe.

These are further divided into smaller routes. The bulk of the drugs arrive in Russia. Since its creation, the DCA has confiscated roughly 6 tons of narcotic and psychotropic substances and precursors. The agency also participated in over 50 regional drugs operations. In 2008 alone, it intercepted 20 tons of acetic anhydride used for producing opium products, as well as 28 tons of other chemicals in Kyrgyzstan and neighboring countries.

While Kyrgyz security forces are notorious for their high levels of corruption, the DCA had a reputation for being a �clean� institution, since it was financed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. By catching only �small fish,� most security officers presented an image of combating drug trafficking, avoiding any confrontation with the larger narco-barons (www.kyrgyznews.com, October 1, 2009). As one policeman responsible for fighting drugs in northern Kyrgyzstan told Jamestown, often the security services fulfill unofficial quotas by arresting a certain number of criminals. While persecuting lower-key drug dealers, officers often benefit from bribes paid by the criminals. Since the policeman was mainly targeting marijuana, he also added that, �if I were to be stationed in southern Kyrgyzstan, I would be driving a Lexus,� implying that his current job in the northern part of the country allows him to drive only a cheap car and bribes in southern regions are much higher.

Warnings that the Bakiyev regime is involved in large-scale drug trafficking, surfaced soon after the president took office five years ago. While the evidence suggests that the drug economy was more decentralized during Akayev�s reign, today it is becoming clear that the senior political echelons have become the major player. Given that no special agency is currently responsible for controlling drug trafficking through Kyrgyzstan, the level of illicit transit is likely to increase. At the same time, control over the shadow economy will continue to be centralized in the hands of the ruling regime.

Appointment of New Kremlin Envoy to the North Caucasus Causes Concern for Kadyrov

Thu, 04 Feb 2010 15:55:00 -0700

The appointment of Aleksandr Khloponin to the position of presidential envoy to the newly formed North Caucasus Federal District marked the beginning of a new era for the North Caucasus elites, represented primarily by the presidents of that region�s republics �Ramzan Kadyrov (Chechnya), Mukhu Aliev (Dagestan), Arsen Kanokov (Kabardino-Balkaria), Boris Ebzeyev (Karachaevo-Cherkessia), and Taymuraz Mamsurov (North Ossetia). Those leaders are anxiously expecting new steps from the Kremlin�s freshly appointed permanent representative �Aleksandr Khloponin. The country�s high-ranking officials have been assuring Russian audiences from Moscow that they are ready once and for all to put an end to corruption, clannishness, separatism, and criminal elements in the region. Khloponin�s first actions �whom he leaves in power, sacks (or perhaps he will leave all the leaders in place try to sort out the situation without substitutions)� will signal either alarm or calmness to the local officials.

The issue of consolidating regions was urgent from the outset. Khloponin believes that actions of this kind are quite attainable. Above all, this can make the Chechen Republic and Ingushetia nervous, given that the two were part of one republic during the Soviet period (www.rosbalt.ru, January 22). Theoretically, the only other republics that can be integrated are Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. This move will deprive the Cherkess nationalists of a trump card. They are demanding unification of the related peoples (the Cherkess, Adygs, and Kabardians, who today reside in three different republics) into one Circassian Republic, while the Balkars and Karachays make up the major Turkic ethnic grouping. Finally, Northern Ossetia-Alania and Dagestan are difficult to integrate with any other republics.

The fact that Ramzan Kadyrov has continued to criticize the Kremlin�s new prot�g� in the North Caucasus speaks volumes about his inability to hide his disappointment concerning the possible reformation of relations with Moscow. According to Moscow�s most recent statements, all leaders of the North Caucasus republics are advised to maintain contact with the authorities exclusively through Khloponin, which of course can only upset those leaders, who thus far have enjoyed direct access to the Kremlin and the Russian government. The prominent and odious geo-politician, philosopher and the leader of Eurasian movement, Aleksandr Dugin, believes that the creation of a new district is directed above all against Ramzan Kadyrov. It is highly unlikely, however, that even Byzantine Moscow would create a whole federal district only to weaken the positions of a single (albeit the most loyal) leader of the North Caucasus. However, the move may be part of a complex attack by the federal center on one of the most problematic and dangerous regions of Russia.

Meanwhile, every local leader is trying to display his loyalty and desire to be useful. As far as the Chechen Republic is concerned, the best gift for Moscow would be the capture or elimination of a leader of the North Caucasus resistance movement, Doku Umarov. However, even the murder of one of the most notorious emirs (commanders) Abdul-Malik (Chingiskhan Gishaev) on January 19 near the village of Chushki in Chechnya�s Grozny rural district (the village is located at the entrance to the Argun gorge) did not create the effect that Ramzan Kadyrov counted on. The fact that emir Abdul-Malik was one of the closest people to Doku Umarov was known to very few people in Russia and in the Chechen Republic. In Russia, the difference between the various rebel commanders is not well understood. They are killed monthly and it is presented as a big victory over the resistance, although the militants for some reason are not diminishing in their numbers. This time, in order to eliminate the leader of the opposition movement, Kadyrov placed his entire arsenal involved under the command of the person most close and loyal to him, State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov (Chechnya�s Grozny TV, January 21). The elimination of an insurgent leader of the caliber of Doku Umarov would be an enormous gift to the FSB, the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin.

Following Putin's suggestion to provide protection for human rights activists (www.last24.infor, January 24), Kadyrov immediately spoke out with a sensational statement that Boris Berezovsky was behind the murder of the well-known Chechen human rights activist, Natalia Estemirova (http://www.eurosmi.ru). However, colleagues and friends of Estemirova said immediately that this accusation was absurd and could not stand up to scrutiny (http://chechnya.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/164789/). It again proves the point that Kadyrov reacts very quickly to what Putin wants to hear from him. Therefore, all of Kadyrov�s statements should be viewed as if they were planned by Putin�s inner circle, or at least, as if they were Kadyrov�s attempt to please Putin.

Kadyrov�s ambitions are grandiose and, for the time being, they are, thanks to Putin, partly realized. For example, Kadyrov�s recent decision to construct a world-class skiing resort in the Chechen Republic �any doubts about the possibility of realizing such a grand project notwithstanding� is seen as an attempt to create the perception that there are no militants in the Chechen Republic (www.chechnya.kavkaz-uzel.ru, January 28). But then the question arises as to who Kadyrov�s loyalists are fighting in the mountains? Kadyrov and the militants have completely opposite goals. Kadyrov on the one hand is trying to convince the world that everything is calm in Chechnya and that there are no militants there. On the other hand, the militants are attempting to convince the world that their insurgency remains strong and that their numbers, despite recent combat losses, are not decreasing. This can also be supported by an interview that Vakha Umarov, the brother of Doku Umarov, gave to Reuters. In that interview Vakha indicated that there are up to 3,000 militants in Chechnya, and up to 5,000 militants in all of the North Caucasus. Moreover, another point worth noting about the interview is that he noted that the militants are being helped by Ramzan Kadyrov�s inner circle. It is absolutely clear that militants are trying to create a problem personally for Kadyrov by making the Kremlin distrust him.

In any case, despite the numerous statements that Moscow is making these days about the North Caucasus, it is apparent that it does not have any reasonable solution for the North Caucasus problem. All we see now is another military campaign filled with the fantasies of Kremlin officials. On the other hand, such moves as the appointment of Khloponin as presidential envoy to the North Caucasus Federal District may be part of Medvedev�s efforts to bring in his own people to create his own team, one independent of Putin�s.