Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation

Will Belarus Build its Nuclear Plant?

Fri, 12 Mar 2010 16:22:00 -0700

Over the past three years, there have been numerous discussions about the future Belarusian nuclear power station. Various sites have been studied and canvassed and in December 2008, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced that the station would be located in the Astravets district of Hrodna region, some ten miles from the Lithuanian border (EDM, April 20, 2009). However, there are increasing signs, not only that the station will be well behind the planned schedule of completion for the first two reactors (in 2016 and 2018 respectively), but also that it may not be built at all. The confusing reports stem from contradictory signals by the main partners, Belarus and Russia, and particularly from comments made by the Belarusian president.

Last May, Belarus and Russia signed a document on cooperation between the two countries on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. At this time, they agreed to work together to complete the construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant. Belarusian Deputy Energy Minister, Mikalay Mikhalyuk, reported that an official agreement would be signed by the end of the first quarter of 2010 (Belarusian Telegraph Agency, February 9). Last December, a government commission resolved the question of location, stipulating that the plant would be built near the village of Mikhalishki, 12 miles from Astravets, and that when completed, the station would provide up to 30 percent of Belarus� electricity output (Belapan, March 5).

In some respects, matters appear to be proceeding normally. For example, at a workshop for government officials held in Minsk on February 9, Director of the Department of Nuclear Energy at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Jong Kyun Park, declared that he and his colleagues were ready to assist the Belarusians to build a plant that would reach 2.4 megawatts in capacity (Belarusian Telegraph Agency, February 9). Belarus must now hold discussions about the environmental feasibility of the plant with neighboring countries and Austria, with key talks taking place with the governments of Lithuania and Ukraine, according to Belarusian First Deputy Minister of Environmental Protection, Vital Kulik, in early March (Belapan, March 5).

However, in other respects, total confusion reigns. Noisy demonstrators interrupted talks on the potential environmental impact of the station in Vilnius (www.naviny.by, March 5). Critics note that the Neris River will provide the water supply for the station, which will likely lead to contamination of its waters, thereby threatening the extinction of the river�s salmon. They also highlighted that there is no immediate provision for a recycling plant for the reactors� nuclear waste, meaning that the burial of radioactive products will take place very close to the Lithuanian border. Opponents of the plant�s construction in Belarus are thus placing their hopes on Lithuania to highlight these potential problems at future meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (The Baltic Course, March 7).

However, it is the partnership with Russia that elicits the most intriguing questions. In late February, Russian government officials attended the ceremonial laying of the first public stone of the Baltic nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad. Moscow is to provide financing for 49 percent of this station, with the rest open to foreign capital. Germany has reportedly expressed interest in becoming an investor. The timetable for the completion of this structure is identical to that proposed for the Astravets station, (completion of the first reactor by 2016 and the second by 2018) (Bellona, March 1). The difference is that construction work is already under way in Kaliningrad, which raises the question as to whether Moscow would be prepared to invest in a second, foreign station, when a domestic one will be completed just as quickly.

On February 25, Mikhalyuk stated that preparatory work on Astravets would entail the expenditure of 350 billion Belarusian rubles ($119 million). The first houses for workers have been built and a road and railway are under construction. The Belarusians are dependent on support from Russia for this infrastructure, but nothing has been forthcoming from Moscow. No contract has been signed with Atomstroieksport, the anticipated Russian builder. Moreover, Aleksandr Surikov, the Russian Ambassador to Belarus, stated that his country was prepared to pay only for buildings at the plant site itself. Everything else must be covered by Minsk (Belarusy i Rynok, March 1).

His apparent reticence becomes more readily understandable if one recalls comments made by Lukashenka in late December 2009. The Belarusian president noted that construction of the Astravets plant was hardly in the financial interests of Europe and perhaps not for the Russians either. Instead, �[our] competitors are ready to pay us not to construct it and purchase their energy instead� (Belorusy i Rynok, March 1). Could the station then be simply a ruse to gain more loans from Russia, and possibly from Lithuania, which is another likely recipient of nuclear-generated electricity from Kaliningrad? Lukashenka has often demonstrated such wiles in the past, but given the time and expense already invested in Astravets, this would be a major ruse indeed.

Whatever his possible machinations, the fact is that the project is behind schedule, of secondary interest to the main partner, builder, and financier Russia, and raises significant questions and concerns in Lithuania, as well as among the anti-nuclear community in Belarus. Evidently, the community in Astravets would welcome the plethora of new jobs at the plant site, but, who is going to pay them? As yet there are no clear answers.

Yanukovych Will Ignore Russian Espionage Against Ukraine

Fri, 12 Mar 2010 16:19:00 -0700

The election of the Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine�s president presents a fundamental shift in the country�s national security culture as outlined by his three presidential predecessors. The most important revision will be Yanukovych�s, and the Party of Regions, view of Russia as not constituting a threat to Ukraine�s national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. There are no national security experts advising Yanukovych of the caliber of Volodymyr Horbulin and Yevhen Marchuk, who headed the National Security and Defense Council (NRBO) from 1994-1999 and 1999-2003 respectively, under President Leonid Kuchma. Horbulin is the co-author of numerous legislative acts pertaining to Ukraine�s national security that are pro-NATO and see Russia as a potential threat, including the 2003 law �On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine.�

Following the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, Horbulin continued to warn about the growing Russian threat to Ukraine, threats which Yanukovych and Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov dismiss. The two approaches reflect different regional political cultures (Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk respectively), social classes and educational levels (Soviet nomenklatura, working class) and competing ethno-cultural allegiances (Ukrainian, neo-Soviet).

One case in point is their different approaches to Russian espionage and subversion in Ukraine. CIS agreements in 1992 banned conducting espionage between member states, an agreement, like most CIS agreements, that is not adhered to. Unlike Ukraine�s three former presidents, Yanukovych and Azarov will likely downplay and ignore Russian espionage activities. An additional factor is Russian military bases. Former President, Viktor Yushchenko, unequivocally saw the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) as a source of destabilization in Ukraine (Ukrayinska Pravda, December 1, 2009). In 2005, Yushchenko and Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, sought negotiations with Russia to prepare for the withdrawal of the BSF in 2017 (EDM, April 19, 2005).

A recent espionage scandal in Ukraine, and the expulsion of two Russian diplomats last summer (EDM, July 31, August 17, 2009), proved Yushchenko�s point and as the Ukrainian newspaper Chas Rukhu noted, it �should lead us to think again about whether it is prudent to have Russian military forces on the territory of Ukraine� (Chas Rukhu, February 23).

Yanukovych and Azarov do not view the BSF as a source of destabilization, and Yanukovych has repeatedly said over the past five years that he supports the extension of the BSF base in Sevastopol. That this would contradict his 2010 election program of seeking Ukraine�s neutrality is presumably, like with Russia infringing CIS agreements, nothing new as Yanukovych�s foreign policy has always been duplicitous (EDM, November 12, 2004).

Implementing stricter security policies ordered by Yushchenko, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) began adopting a tougher approach towards Russian intelligence activities in the Crimea and Sevastopol. Responding to these clandestine activities in southern Ukraine, the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the BSF was ordered to leave Ukraine by December 2009, an order with which they complied (EDM, July 14, 2009). Moscow has demanded that the new Ukrainian president re-admit the FSB back to the BSF and �end all cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)� (Kommersant Vlast, February 22).

Russian intelligence activities against Ukraine have continued from bases located near Ukraine�s borders. On January 27, four FSB officers were detained in Odessa by the SBU after they attempted to obtain secret military information from a Ukrainian citizen. Another three FSB officers provided support to the operation, while a fourth was an officer from the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova (OGRF). One FSB officer was subsequently charged with espionage, while the remainder were deported on January 30 (www.sbu.gov.ua, February 3).

The Ukrainian citizen was an undercover officer in Ukrainian military intelligence (�Ruslan Pylypenko�) who was forcibly recruited during an October 29, 2009 visit to Tiraspol in the Trans-Dniester enclave where the FSB claimed he had been undertaking an intelligence mission. �Pylypenko� was illegally arrested, hooded and taken to a Russian base where his life was threatened in order to compel his cooperation with the FSB (www.ukranews.com, February 3). The threat was accompanied by �Pylypenko� being shown FSB photographs of his family and himself in Odessa taken by Russian intelligence.

�Pylypenko,� an officer of Ukrainian military intelligence, had played along and arranged a meeting in Odessa on January 27 to hand over secret materials of Ukrainian intelligence operations against Russia (Radio Ukraine, February 3). How seriously Moscow considered the operation was evident when it dispatched the head of the FSB in the OGRV, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, to personally oversee the Odessa operation. After the SBU arrested the Russian officers, he fled to the Trans-Dniestr. Another senior FSB officer, �Vladimir Alexandrov,� had flown in from Moscow to help coordinate the operation. During the arrest the SBU found �a whole arsenal of espionage equipment� that included digital microphones, a mini video camera built inside a pen, a miniature container for storing digital data with instructions for �Pylypenko,� a holder for flash drives, and $2,000 (Infotag, February 4). A mobile telephone memory card belonging to FSB Lieutenant Andriy Khort contained photocopies of classified Russian instructions for informants.

The reaction of the Party of Regions to the espionage scandal was the same as when President Dmitry Medvedev sent an inflammatory letter to Yushchenko in August 2009; on both occasions it supported Russia and blamed the Ukrainian side. Prime Minister Azarov accused President Yushchenko of provoking the scandal and thereby adding to the already poor state of Ukrainian-Russian relations (Ukrayinska Pravda, February 2, 4). �We categorically condemn such unfounded accusations,� Azarov said (www.proua.com, February 3).

The deported FSB officers were banned from entering Ukraine for five years. This followed the practice of placing civilian Russians, such as Moscow�s Mayor, Yury Luzkov, banned from entering Ukraine since May 2008, on blacklists because of their subversive activities directed against Ukraine�s territorial integrity.

Senior Party of Regions deputy, Aleksandr Yefremov, described this as a �stupid practice� and vouched for Luzkov as someone whom �I respect very much� (www.ukranews.com, February 17). Luzkov has been the most vocal Russian supporter of Russian sovereignty over Sevastopol and he attended and gave a keynote speech in support of Eastern Ukrainian separatism at a rally organized by presidential candidate Yanukovych in Severodonetsk in November 2004 (EDM, November 29, 2004 and June 24, 2005).

Yanukovych�s election signifies a fundamental revision of how Ukraine defines its national security. An unwillingness to see Russia as any form of threat will have profound implications for Ukraine�s foreign policy and could undermine its territorial integrity.

Insurgent Violence Reported in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria

Fri, 12 Mar 2010 16:18:00 -0700

An empty freight train was bombed and derailed on the outskirts of Dagestan�s capital Makhachkala on the evening of March 11. A source in the transport police department of the North Caucasus branch of Russian Railways told ITAR-TASS that the blast left a crater about 30 centimeters (11.8 inches) deep and damaged a small section of railway. No one was hurt in the incident (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, ITAR-TASS, March 12).

On March 10, the body of a teacher at a local madrassa in the Dagestani village of Yasnaya Polyana was found with two bullet wounds in the head. This was just the latest murder of clergy in Dagestan this year: on January 12, the imam of a local mosque in the village of Buglen in Dagestan�s Buinaksk district, Nazim Magomedov, was shot to death, while on January 11, the deputy imam for a local mosque in Kizlyar, Akhmed Ibragimov, was murdered. As the Kavkazsky Uzel website noted, there were also several attacks on religious figures in Dagestan last year.

Meanwhile, on March 9, personnel of the Dagestani branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and interior ministry jointly carried out an operation in which weapons and ammunition were seized in the city of Khasavyurt. Two people were arrested in the operation, during which two automatic rifles, a pistol, silencers and ammunition were confiscated. On March 8, unidentified attackers fired from a car at a shop along the Babayurt-Khasavyurt road. No one was hurt in the incident. On March 7, bomb disposal experts defused an improvised explosive device (IED) that was discovered in a utility room on the grounds of a cemetery in the Dagestani village of Novomekhelta. On March 6, a suspected militant was killed during a special operation in the Dagestani city of Derbent. The slain militant was identified as 22-year-old Islamudin Alikuliev (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 10, 11; Interfax, March 9).

On March 11, two servicemen were slightly wounded when unidentified attackers fired automatic rifles and a grenade launcher at the Volga-16 police checkpoint, located on the Kavkaz federal highway on the outskirts of the village of Yandare in Ingushetia�s Nazran district. That same day, unidentified attackers fired automatic weapons at a gas station in the Ingush town of Karabulak. No one was hurt in that incident. On March 10, gunmen fired a grenade launcher at the home of Khavadzha Sapralieva, the head of administration of the village of Ekazhevo in Ingushetia�s Nazran district. No one was hurt in that attack (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 12).

A suspected militant was killed in a shootout with police in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, on March 9 after police officers attempted to detain him near a student caf�. A policeman and a passerby were wounded in the shooting. ITAR-TASS quoted an unnamed investigator with the republican prosecutor�s office as identifying the slain alleged militant as 28-year-old Valery Esezov, a resident of the village of Khasanya (www.newsru.com, March 8). On March 5, police discovered and destroyed an IED on the outskirts of the village of Nartan in Kabardino-Balkaria. They also found an antitank grenade and 5.45 millimeter cartridges nearby (ITAR-TASS, March 6).

Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov told journalists on March 11 that four militants were killed during a special police operation near the village of Nokhtch-Keloi in Chechnya�s Shatoi district. Kadyrov said three of the slain militants had already been identified and that no police or law-enforcement personnel were injured in the operation (RIA Novosti, March 11). That same day, in the Chechen town of Argun, a bomb exploded in a car belonging to Akhyad Musanigov, the head of the territorial district police, as he was getting into the vehicle. Musanigov was hospitalized with shrapnel wounds (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 11).

In an interview with the Interfax news agency on March 7, Kadyrov called the killing of rebel ideologist Aleksandr Tikhomirov, aka Sheikh Said Buryatsky, an �exclusively good sign.� Kadyrov added that there is �every reason to be certain that Umarov�s turn has come� � a reference to Doku Umarov, the Chechen rebel leader and �emir� of the Caucasus Emirate.

In the Interfax interview, Kadyrov also claimed that Buryatsky was an agent of Western intelligence services. �Aleksandr Tikhomirov was a religiously well-trained worker of Western special services, and was also a psychologist whose task was to influence a certain part of youth not only in the North Caucasus, but also, via the internet, in all of Russia,� the Chechen leader said (www.newsru.com, March 7).

Laissez Faire, Laissez Passer: NATO Takes Cue From French Warship Deal With Russia

Fri, 12 Mar 2010 16:16:00 -0700

Russia�s military reform is geared to creating a mobile, rapidly deployable force, fully ready for operating in �near abroad� areas and potentially beyond (EDM, March 5). The proposed acquisition of French Mistral-class warships makes eminent sense for Russia in this context. The Russian Navy is certainly not preparing for such old-fashioned combat as artillery duels with other naval powers on the oceans. Mistral-class assault ships are designed for amphibious and airborne landings ashore, using the armored vehicles, helicopters, and marine infantry carried by warships of this class.

Russia�s near and medium-term intentions might be paraphrased as the big �known unknown� even in a moderately optimistic scenario. NATO�s Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, however, describes himself as an optimist in positing the best-case scenario. He says that he �takes it for granted� that Russia would not use these warships for purposes of aggression (Interfax, Reuters, Radio Free Europe, March 3, 5, 8).

The incontrovertible fact, however, is that the French sale would provide Russia with an offensive power-projection capability that Russia does not have and could not through its own means create. This capability is primarily relevant to Russia in the seas to which it is riparian. As Russian officials have repeatedly suggested in public discussions on this issue, the proposed number of Mistral-class ships in this transaction corresponds with Russia�s Black Sea, Baltic, Northern, and Pacific Fleets.

The NATO alliance is taking a number of hits with potential long-term consequences from this Franco-Russian transaction. The Mistral deal is turning NATO, de facto, into a laissez-faire alliance with regard to arms sales. Despite Russia�s conduct as an overtly revisionist power, key NATO officials have chosen to describe the Mistral sale as a bilateral Franco-Russian business, in which the Alliance has no business interfering (Interfax, Reuters, Radio Free Europe, March 3, 5, 8).

Thus, France and several other Allies, are quickly transitioning from �no business as usual� to business better than ever. Overruling any objections (public and non-public), NATO has given a green light from the top to arms sales to Russia (or any country). NATO is not commenting on the further arms sales, which came under discussion between several Allied countries and Russia promptly after the warship sale was announced.

Russia continues negotiating with the Netherlands and Spain for procurement of warships similar to the Mistral class (hedging against a failure of negotiations with France and implicitly pressuring Paris).

Russia has opened discussions with several (unspecified) Western countries for acquiring �a wide variety (vsevozmozhnyie) of targeting devices and night-vision equipment,� according to Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov (Rossiya TV cited by Interfax, March 5).

Moscow is negotiating with the Italian company IVECO Defense Vehicles to procure a �large consignment� of armored personnel carriers (APC�s) of the IVECO M65 LMV type. These have already been tested in Russia and assessed positively. Discussions are ongoing about the price and other terms of sale. Russia�s Defense Ministry apparently considers buying as many as 1,000 APC�s of this type (Interfax, March 9).

Moscow is also discussing the procurement of VBL light amphibious armored vehicles from the French Panhard General Defense company (Kommersant, February 16; AFP, February 25). Moscow considers using these vehicles for its interior ministry troops and �peacekeeping� missions by the Russian ground forces. It is also negotiating an upgrade of dual-use helicopter engines for the Russian Ka-62 (civilian version of the Ka-60 combat helicopter) by Turbomeca of France (Interfax, February 25; Liberation [Paris], March 9; EDM, February 11).

Ahead of all NATO countries, France has rushed to become the first commercial beneficiary of Russia�s military modernization program. By the same token, Paris has created a precedent that other NATO countries are in their turn rushing to follow. A scramble seems to be developing for the Russian arms market. This rush does not seem to be restrained by NATO consultations and procedures. It only seems limited by Russia�s ability to pay for Western-made armaments. Moscow is even fanning competition among Western arms manufacturers by hinting at parallel negotiations with several of them for the same item, as in the case of the warships.

Russia�s foreign ministry values the naval deal with France not only for its intrinsic value to Russia, but also for its precedent-setting merit. According to that ministry�s officials, �it is important to demonstrate that Russia is purchasing arms from a NATO country� (Vedomosti, March 1; Politkom.ru, March 2). Whether or not the Mistral sale goes ahead, and regardless of its commercial terms, it seems already to have broken NATO discipline, potentially unleashing a series of arms sales to Russia, outside the Alliance�s control and consultative procedures.er ammunition can be provided to opposition forces? That�s if, of course, the Constitutional Court doesn�t overturn the law.

The Epoch Times reported that the parliament had �tweaked the constitution.� This is entirely untrue, of course. The constitution itself was untouched because to amend it would take 300 votes � which Yanukovych does not have.

Even the usually reliable Reuters reported that lawmakers had �loosened rules on the formation of coalitions on Tuesday,� without a mention of the constitutional requirements of coalition formation. Instead the agency predicted the rules would �ease� Yanukovych�s attempts to form a new government.

True, this could happen. But at the same time, this move could spur a major court challenge and protest rallies, as the law helps unite the opposition against the new president. Tyhypko may be correct � the unlawful move may represent only a pyrrhic victory.

Regardless, any government formed now will be a government formed using pre-2004 tactics. Those tactics were far from democratic at that time and are far from democratic now.

US Assists Kyrgyzstan in Constructing Anti-Terrorist Center in Batken

Thu, 11 Mar 2010 16:15:00 -0700

During his visit to Bishkek on March 10, the Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), General David Petraeus, reiterated that by helping to build an anti-terrorist center in Batken city, Washington does not seek to open an additional military base. The Kyrgyz President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in turn, argued that most security challenges to Kyrgyzstan stem from Afghanistan and that his regime needs to be better prepared to resist terrorism (Times of Central Asia, March 10). The US government will invest $5.5 to build the center and construction work will begin next year (www.korrespondent.net, March 9).

Apart from his international meetings, President Bakiyev rarely mentions Afghanistan�s role in national security. Rather, different views about potential threats permeate Kyrgyzstan�s military and political officials. Thus far, little is known about the real interests among Kyrgyz military officials who were negotiating with CENTCOM. However, the evidence suggests that some key military leaders see the new Batken anti-terrorist center�s future role as the principal deterrent against possible aggression emerging from Uzbekistan.

As one representative of the Kyrgyz defense ministry told Jamestown, military officials in Bishkek hope to maintain a military battalion in the southern part of the country to respond to �local conflicts.� The terminology assumes that such conflicts would be initiated by Uzbek troops. There is a widely held view among the Kyrgyz military that Tashkent is developing its military forces with the aim of one day acquiring Kyrgyzstan�s water reservoirs and protecting the ethnic Uzbek population living in Osh and Batken by military means.

Training at the Batken anti-terrorist center will be conducted under the auspices of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET programs have already been widely implemented in Kyrgyzstan, including in Tokmok city, where similar training facilities were built. The anti-terrorist center will include advanced medical facilities that have no equivalent in the entire region (www.msn.kg, February 26).

The base is planned to be positioned in a unique part of the Batken area, where the risk of attacks from the air or over land are minimal. Overall, the new military training center will represent the Kyrgyz regime�s continued strategy of strengthening its southern borders by building up its military strength. Negotiations on the construction of the center began in August 2008. One year later, the Kyrgyz and US sides reached an agreement on most issues. Reportedly, Bakiyev�s maneuvering with the US military base at Manas, when he first demanded its withdrawal and then changed his mind, did not affect the final negotiations. The initiative to construct the center mainly came from the Kyrgyz side.

Kyrgyz military officials realize that the center would in many cases serve an important role for the country�s security compared to the prospective Russian airbase in Osh. The Russian base is planned to be constructed within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework and will mostly host Russian personnel. The Batken center will include special training facilities for the anti-terrorist battalion �Skorpion.� It will train specialists to analyze tendencies within terrorism in the Central Asian region. Kyrgyzstan clearly lacks such experts today, and the current Defense Minister, Bakytbek Kalyev, has been pushing for the construction of a special think-tank that would provide cutting-edge analysis on such trends in the Ferghana Valley and beyond.

The prospect that a new class of military and civilian personnel would be trained with the help of US government is another element that interests the Kyrgyz government. So far, US-trained Kyrgyz military personnel have been leaving the military upon returning to service from IMET courses in the United States. Most graduates were frustrated with how the skills they acquired turned out to be largely irrelevant and unappreciated in Kyrgyzstan�s military. �The center will generate a critical mass of US-trained officers,� one Kyrgyz defense ministry representative told Jamestown.

Although most Russian media see the new military center as yet another geopolitical move on the part of Washington, it is important to note that the initiative to build the facility stemmed from the Kyrgyz side (www.gazeta.ru, March 9). The official reason underlying the need for the new center is rooted in the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan, and differs from an unofficial viewpoint that suggests the Kyrgyz elites want to militarily protect the southern part of the country more from their neighbor.

President Yanukovych in Moscow: First Round of Tough Talks?

Thu, 11 Mar 2010 16:14:00 -0700

Viktor Yanukovych�s first visit to Russia as Ukrainian president on March 5 showed that he is no more prone to making concessions to Moscow than any of his predecessors. Yanukovych quickly came to an agreement with Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, and Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, on humanitarian issues, but that was natural, as Yanukovych and his voters in east and south Ukraine share with Russia the same post-Soviet mentality and share views on their common history. However, on economic matters, the Russian duumvirate will have to brace themselves for tough negotiations with Yanukovych on matters ranging from gas to customs regulations.

This was Yanukovych�s second foreign visit as head of state. Unlike Yushchenko, who paid his first foreign visit to Moscow in 2005, Yanukovych first traveled to Brussels to meet with EU officials on March 1. In response, Moscow reportedly considered lowering the status of his visit from official to working (Den, March 4). Yanukovych tried to downplay this, saying that �all roads lead to Moscow,� and that his choice of Brussels simply reflected it being the first invitation (UNIAN, March 5). This was not a comfortable start with a strong neighbor that easily takes offence. In any case, Medvedev told Yanukovych that he hoped that �a black streak� in relations would be over (www.kremlin.ru, March 5). Medvedev had shunned Yanukovych�s predecessor Viktor Yushchenko after August 2008, when Yushchenko had backed Georgia in its war with Russia.

Much was said in Moscow about the need to �turn a new leaf� in relations. Medvedev signaled his readiness to meet with Yanukovych at least twice more this year. Yanukovych said he would visit Russia in early May, and Medvedev stated that he would visit Ukraine in the first half of 2010. Medvedev suggested that he thought about Ukraine every morning (UNIAN, March 5). Boris Yeltsin once also urged Russian officials to think about Ukraine every morning.

Yanukovych and Medvedev agreed to jointly honor Red Army veterans and to celebrate the Victory Day in May together. Yanukovych promised to cancel Yushchenko�s decision to award the hero of Ukraine honor to World War II nationalist leader Stepan Bandera. Yanukovych also reiterated that he would push through parliament the legislation needed to raise the status of the Russian language (Interfax-Ukraine, March 5). These promises cost Yanukovych nothing, being in no way contradictory with his team�s views and his election promises. Regarding Bandera, not only Russia but also the European Parliament condemned Yushchenko�s decision as several EU members including Poland, view Bandera as a Nazi collaborator (www.europarl.europa.eu, February 25).

There was little progress reached beyond humanitarian issues. Commenting on the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol, Yanukovych said that consultations would continue and that Medvedev shared his view: �this issue is complicated� (Interfax-Ukraine, March 5). Moscow wants to extend its navy�s stationing in Sevastopol beyond 2017, as agreed in 1997, but this would contradict the Ukrainian constitution.

The Kremlin duumvirate was reluctant to discuss gas with Yanukovych, who is determined to revise the January 2009 gas contract with Gazprom. Ahead of his visit, Yanukovych had signaled that gas would be among the main issues on his agenda. He said in an interview with the BBC Ukrainian Service on March 1 that he would push for a revision of the contract with Russia, which was concluded by Yanukovych�s arch-rival Yulia Tymoshenko, who was ousted as prime minister on March 3. Yanukovych said the price for Ukraine was not fair.

Ahead of Yanukovych�s visit, the Kommersant-Ukraine daily said on March 5, citing sources in Yanukovych�s team, that his main task in Moscow would be to lower the gas price for Ukraine from the current $305 per 1,000 cubic meters to as low as $205. The daily also predicted that Yanukovych would try to persuade Moscow to either abandon the South Stream gas pipeline project, or correct it to allow the participation of Ukrainian companies. If no agreement was reached, the daily�s sources in Yanukovych�s team said, Kyiv might consider resuming gas exports to central Europe, which were abandoned in the mid-2000�s at Moscow�s insistence, and importing liquefied natural gas from Algeria or Qatar in order to lessen dependence on Russian gas. Despite, Yanukovych�s determination, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko said the gas price issue was not discussed during Yanukovych�s meeting with Medvedev. Shmatko suggested it might be raised once a new Ukrainian cabinet is formed (Interfax-Ukraine, March 5).

Putin invited Yanukovych to join the customs union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. However, Yanukovych told the Russian Vesti TV on March 6 that Ukraine as a World Trade Organization (WTO) member could only join the union on WTO conditions. Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, are only in talks to join the WTO, while Ukraine joined in 2008. In an interview to Euronews, Yanukovych said he could not see a clear picture of what Ukraine would be doing in the customs union and how it might benefit from membership. Yanukovych also ruled out recognition of the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (www.euronews.net, March 5).

Killing of Said Buryatsky Unlikely to Deter North Caucasus Insurgency

Thu, 11 Mar 2010 16:13:00 -0700

A key event in early March, was the death of one of the chief ideologues of the armed resistance in the North Caucasus, Said Buryatsky (Aleksandr Tikhomirov) (www.1tv.ru, March 5). He was killed in the village of Ekazhevo in Ingushetia�s Nazran district during a major Russian joint siloviki operation that involved units of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the interior ministry (MVD) and defense ministry, targeting militants discovered in the home of the Kartoyev family.

The operation itself, which lasted two days, spoke volumes about the significance of the situation. Usually, such government endeavors lasting days are a sign that top leaders of the militant underground are among those targeted, which explains their fierce resistance. The militants involved in the resistance have no chance of being given a fair and democratic trial. In accordance with the traditions of Russian jurisprudence, the captured militant is blamed for all possible actions undertaken against the authorities in recent years. The authorities have their own reasons for doing this, since it allows the police to write off multiple attacks and shootings that remain unsolved. Therefore, it is not surprising that the besieged militant is taken into FSB custody alive. The militant has no choice, and he chooses death.

Multiple MVD, FSB, and defense ministry units were involved in the Ekazhevo village operation. Over the course of the two-day operation, four Kartoyev brothers were killed: Tukhan, Nazir, Akhmed and Magomed. Several more brothers �Tarkhana, Tatarkhana and Beslan� were detained. Additionally, two other village residents were killed, presumably the Dobryev�s. According to eyewitnesses, all three houses of the Kartoyev brothers were destroyed. Two residents of the village were detained �Yakub Aushev and his son. Eyewitnesses report that gunfire was returned only from the Dobryev house, where a firefight broke out between the occupants and members of the security services (www.ingushetia.org, March 3).

Said Buryatsky attracted attention by virtue of his proselytizing activities within the armed resistance. A native of distant Buryatia, born to a Buryat father and a Russian mother, he became neither a Buddhist (Buryats are Buddhists) nor a Christian (like his mother). Buryatsky during adulthood chose Islam as his personal religion and very rapidly (thanks to his YouTube lectures) became popular among the youth throughout Russia. His studies abroad (in Egypt and Kuwait) were not lengthy, thus it is unclear whether or not he received a diploma from al-Azkhara, one of the most important universities of the Islamic world. Well in advance of his decision to join the ranks of the militants, he actively supported the underlying thesis of the militants �a defensive jihad against the unbelievers who occupied territory. Therefore, in accordance with all Islamic laws, not only did he support the militancy, he also criticized those who, in his opinion, intentionally avoided fighting.

Buryatsky arrived in the Caucasus sometime at the end of 2007 or the beginning of 2008, where he provided major ideological support for the Caucasus Emirate, the representatives of which noticeably felt a shortage of such preachers. He often sharply criticized Sufi Muslims, critics of the Emirate, and spoke out against the commanders who disagreed with Doku Umarov�s views (for instance, Emir Arbi Yevmurzayev, better known as Sheikh Mansur, who died on February 23, 2010). His joining the ranks of the militants marked the beginning of a new period in the North Caucasus resistance movement. It resulted in the movement�s internationalization, attracting young recruits from among those living thousands of miles away from the region and demonstrated that the views and ideas of the movement were finding support among Russian youth. It may have played a role in the creation of a multitude of underground militant movement support clubs across the Russian Federation.

Said Buryatsky truly became a hero for many youths when he made a video of a suicide attack on a regional interior ministry (ROVD) building in the city of Nazran. This was received as inspirational, as many at first thought that it was Said Buryatsky himself who sat behind the wheel of the vehicle laden with TNT (http://guraba.net/rus/content/view/630/37/). In reality, he apparently planned the operation and filmed it nearby, which allowed the Russian security services to blame him for the blast. Buryatsky did not even bother to explain himself for having fooled his comrades with this video (www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4wFomfe68Q). But, the incident did not result in him losing any respect from his internet followers.

His death, the details of which have already become public, will likely become a powerful ideological tool in the hands of the armed resistance (www.hunafa.com, August 27, 2009). As it turns out, even in the last minutes of his life, he was preaching to his comrades, telling them to remain calm and to believe that a better world awaited them than the one they were leaving behind (www.kavkazcenter.com, March 6). Meanwhile, the authorities were happy to blame Buryatsky for all the major militant actions in Russia, including the attack on Nevsky Express train in November 2009 (Interfax, March 6).

Details released on the special operation in which Said Buryatsky was killed also contained several interesting revelations. For example, it transpired that among the casualties and those detained were employees of the Ingush police force and the treasury department. These were not youths, as Russian propaganda always tries to suggest. These were people well aware of the choices they made. They were people with ideological convictions, not involved simply by chance. The fact that some of those arrested were from the ranks of the police is a testament to the movement�s growing influence in society, which is permeating governmental structures. In Ingushetia, it was already widely believed that some ministers of the Ingush government were allegedly paid off (and are continuing to be paid off) by the militants. If there is even a shadow of truth in this claim, then it may well be the case that these payments constitute intentional aid, which would indicate a strong and varied support of the armed resistance in the North Caucasus overall.

The death of Said Buryatsky, despite the gravity of the loss, will not become the defining factor in the militants� future tactics. Any loss among the militants is taken painlessly by the movement as a whole and will not likely affect the overall activities of the militant underground. Moreover, the conditions that foster local support for the resistance will continue. Despite his death, the popularity of Buryatsky and his preaching on You Tube will likely continue and inspire a new generation of militants in Russia and elsewhere.

Medvedev Acknowledges Problems in the �New Look� Armed Forces

Thu, 11 Mar 2010 16:12:00 -0700

Last week, President Dmitry Medvedev addressed a gathering of the Russian top brass in Moscow � the so called �extended defense ministry collegium.� Medvedev was upbeat about the military reform that began in September 2008 by presidential decree. According to the Defense Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov: �We presented our achievements in 2009 and the president recognized them as satisfactory.� Medvedev also discussed the details of the next May 9, World War II Victory-Day military parade in Moscow on Red Square (RIA Novosti, March 5).

Medvedev�s opening speech was the only part of the entire �collegium� open to the press. He praised the defense ministry for �successfully changing the organizational structure of the armed forces within a limited time frame.� The number of service personnel was cut from 1,130,000 in 2008 to one million and �more than 80 new brigades have been formed.� According to Medvedev, the reformed units have shown overall good training and combat readiness during extensive military exercises in Belarus in September 2009 (Zapad 2009). �I was present during the exercises and witnessed these achievements,� stated Medvedev, �though there are problems.� Medvedev called for an extensive reform of military education �to train, new well educated, and motivated officers� as well as sergeants. He proclaimed his support for paying officers additional bonuses for good work after 2012, when an overall massive pay boost is planned. Medvedev demanded that all officers entitled to receive free housing must have it by 2012. Equally, he acknowledged there are problems with rearming the Russian military with modern weapons: �We are acting very slowly and not effectively enough.� The president expressed confidence that by 2020 the Russian armed forces will have no less than 70 percent new weapons, including modern computerized command and control equipment. According to Medvedev, Russia does not need to expand its present nuclear arsenal, but must keep a credible nuclear deterrent �to maintain sovereignty� and �help regulate after-conflict situations� (www.kremlin.ru, Interfax, March 5).

According to Serdyukov, in 2008 half the manpower of the armed forces were officers and praporshiki � Soviet-style warrant officers mostly occupying low-level administrative positions. In total there were some 355,000 officers and 140,000 praporshiki. The rank of praporshiki was abolished last year, though some of them stayed in service as sergeants (Interfax, March 5). In 2009, Serdyukov announced, �some 65,000 officers were retired � those who volunteered to go, those who had reached pension age, or could not continue service because of health problems or violated their contract provisions.� Some 135,000 officers must still be fired from the defense ministry armed forces to achieve the planned level of 150,000 active service officers and Serdyukov is sure that this will be achieved �in the coming several years.� Serdyukov announced the defense ministry is doing everything possible to help the ousted officers adapt to civilian life (RIA Novosti, March 5).

In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military began an �experiment� with hiring contract soldiers to supplement and eventually replace conscripts to form a more capable, professional military. Hundreds of thousands of contract solders have been employed, but according to Serdyukov, the entire plan to have a contract armed force has failed: �Conscript soldiers were persuaded in different ways to sign contracts; they continued to live in barracks as conscripts, received low pay and left as soon as they could. With such a system it was impossible to train good specialists.� The draft will continue, stated Serdyukov, and only the navy will become all-volunteer. To achieve positive results, according to Serdyukov, contract soldiers must be paid 35,000 rubles per month (over $1,170), while �young officers� should receive 50,000 rubles per month (some $1,700) (Interfax, March 5).

The Chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Defense Minister Army-General, Nikolai Makarov, has publicly acknowledged that the kontraktniki program has failed to produce good soldiers or stem the constant level of hazing in the barracks. �Too many mistakes were made and the goal to build a professional force was not achieved,� announced Makarov, �Moreover, we will now increase the draft, while reducing the number of kontraktniki � we will sign contracts only with sergeants that will be educated for two and a half years.� Makarov quoted problems with low pay and bad service conditions, as the main reason for the failure of the contract system (RIA Novosti, February 24).

Indeed, the �experiment� with contract soldiers in the Russian army was doomed from the outset, by generals that most likely never wanted it to succeed and believed dogmatically in the Soviet conscript system. Low pay and bad service conditions were not the only problems: since 1992 no one in the defense ministry has bothered to create a professional recruiting system to find potential contract soldiers or candidates to be promoted to sergeants. Most contracts were signed directly within the units, supervised by unit commanders, promoting massive corruption and inefficiency. By 2004, some 80,000 kontraktniki were officers and praporshiki wives, employed as soldiers to bring second salaries to their families. Of course, no one ever intended to send those women into combat. Real service conscripts were forced en masse to sign contracts, but after conscript service in Russia was reduced to one year in 2007, it became much harder to force soldiers to sign up (Novie Izvestia, February 26).

The Russian officer corps is in a state of disarray, anticipating massive forced retirements. The military education system is in the midst of radical change and confusion. The defense ministry still does not have a recruiting system capable of finding good contract soldiers or sergeants. Russia does not possess any experience in educating career sergeants, and has not created a career path or re-education program for sergeants to encourage them to stay in the ranks and professionally develop. The new combat-ready brigades are manned by one-year-serving conscripts and some kontraktniki of dubious value, and it is virtually impossible to form modern combat units with such soldiers. Despite this, the defense ministry officially states there are no plans at present to increase conscript service (Interfax, March 1).

Does Medvedev, as Commander-in-Chief, understand that rearming is not, in fact, the most immediate pressing problem facing the armed forces?

US House Vote Adds New Twist to Turkey-Armenia Diplomacy

Wed, 10 Mar 2010 15:37:00 -0700

A key committee in the United States House of Representatives has once again approved a draft resolution recognizing the 1915 mass killings and deportations of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. The dramatic development, condemned by Ankara and welcomed in Yerevan is widely seen in Armenia as heralding a last-ditched attempt by Washington to salvage the Turkish-Armenian normalization agreements signed in October under American mediation.

Armenian politicians and pundits believe that Washington will now use the prospect of the resolution�s adoption by the full House in its efforts to persuade Ankara to drop its conditions for ratifying the agreements. Yerevan, meanwhile, has reaffirmed its intention to annul the landmark deal if the US pressure on Ankara yields no results in the coming months.

The bill, narrowly endorsed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 4, calls on President Barack Obama to �accurately characterize the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1,500,000 Armenians as genocide.� �The vast majority of experts, academics, authorities in international law and others, who have looked at this issue for years, agree that the tragic massacre of Armenians constitutes genocide,� Howard Berman, the committee chairman, said during the committee debate on the issue broadcast live by Armenian and Turkish television channels.

The Congressional panel has previously passed similar resolutions in 2000, 2005, and 2007. Heavy lobbying by the White House (and uproar in Ankara) kept them from reaching the House floor. Berman seems to have faced no such pressure from the Obama administration. It was not until March 3, almost one month after he scheduled the vote, that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly telephoned the California Democrat and asked him to drop the proposed legislation. Clinton and other administration officials pointedly declined to oppose it until then, adding to Turkish anger. Turkey�s Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, complained that the Obama administration did not lobby hard enough against a bill which is at odds with the official Turkish version of the events in 1915 (Hurriyet Daily News, March 5).

Many in Armenia take a similar view, suggesting that Washington itself engineered the House committee vote to gain a potent bargaining chip in its Armenia-related dealings with Ankara. In the words of Razmik Zohrabian, a deputy chairman in the ruling Republican Party of Armenia, the Americans have �realized that they should talk to Turkey with pressure and force� (www.armenialiberty.org, March 5). Stepan Safarian, a senior lawmaker from the opposition Heritage Party, likewise construed the genocide resolution as a US attempt to �make Turkey sober up� (Haykakan Zhamanak, March 6).

�The American side is clearly trying to � secure the ratification of the Turkish-Armenian protocols by the Turkish parliament in return for preventing a resolution debate reaching the full US House of Representatives,� Haykakan Zhamanak, a leading Armenian daily, editorialized on March 6. An unnamed senior official from the Turkish foreign ministry cited by Hurriyet Daily News made a similar point. Davutoglu also appeared to allude to such a possibility during his March 5 news conference in Ankara. He said his government will not be �pressured� into establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia and opening the Turkish-Armenian border �something which is envisaged by the two protocols.

Turkish leaders, notably Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have for months made clear that Turkey�s parliament will not ratify the accords without a resolution of the Karabakh conflict acceptable to Azerbaijan. �Turkey�s insisting on conditionality, which was not part of the protocols, has led us to where we are today,� Hugh Pope, the Turkey analyst with the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, told the Christian Science Monitor, commenting on the House committee vote.

Yerevan�s swift and highly positive reaction to the genocide resolution was a measure of its growing frustration with Ankara�s Karabakh linkage. �This is additional proof of the devotion of the American people to universal human values and is an important step toward the prevention of the crimes against humanity,� Armenian Foreign Minister, Edward Nalbandian, said in a written statement. Armenian officials were previously more cautious in their public pronouncements on the bill formally introduced by pro-Armenian US lawmakers in early 2009.

During an informal conversation with Davutoglu in Kiev on February 25, Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan, voiced his most explicit threat yet to walk away from the deal, if Ankara fails to honor it �within the shortest possible time� (Statement by the Armenian presidential press service, February 25). On the same day, the Armenian parliament passed legal amendments that make it easier for the Sargsyan government to terminate international treaties before their ratification (Aravot, February 26).

Speaking to Armenian state television on March 5, Nalbandian stood by his view that the international community would blame Turkey for the possible collapse of the normalization process. The authorities in Yerevan have clearly been buoyed by continued US calls for the rapid and unconditional ratification of the protocols. The genocide bill and the increased expectation of stronger US pressure on Ankara seem to have only boosted their confidence.

Some Armenian officials implied, until recently, that the Turkish side has until late March to validate the protocols or face their unilateral repeal by Armenia. But the latest indications are that Yerevan is ready to wait at least until the April 24 annual remembrance of more than one million Ottoman Armenians killed in what many historians consider the first genocide of the twentieth century. Ankara hopes that Obama will again refrain from using the word �genocide� in a statement that he is due to issue on the occasion.

Obama expressed his �firmly held conviction that the Armenian genocide is � a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence,� when he ran for president and sought the backing of the influential Armenian-American community. �As President, I will recognize the Armenian genocide,� he said in a January 2008 statement. Obama broke his campaign pledge after taking office, citing the need not to hamper the ongoing Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

Hillary Clinton, who likewise pledged to recognize the genocide during the US presidential race, made the same argument when she indicated on March 5 that the Obama administration will try to prevent a full House vote on the controversial resolution (www.armenialiberty.org). Justifying this stance will be much more difficult if the stalled normalization process ends in failure. This alone should make the administration keenly interested in its successful promotion.

Salient Issues in Ukraine-Russia Relations and Yanukovych�s Moscow Visit

Wed, 10 Mar 2010 15:34:00 -0700

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych�s visit to Moscow on March 5 (see �Yanukovych in Moscow: More Than Balancing the Brussels Visit,� EDM, March 10) focused almost entirely on bilateral relations, practically overlooking or avoiding international issues. The following issues were discussed in public:

    � Governance model: Yanukovych praised Moscow�s handling of the financial-economic crisis as a worthy example for Ukraine to follow. Political stability has helped Russia to cope better than Ukraine did with the crisis, he observed. �My task is now to catch up with Russia, bring our living standards, pensions and social assistance up to Russian levels,� the gaffe-prone Yanukovych pledged. Sarcastically he offered to send some Ukrainian �demagogues� (politikany, politikanstvo) to Russia, so that the Russian people could even better appreciate the stability they enjoy. When Yanukovych said at one point that he must await the formation of a new coalition, Medvedev retorted: �I do not need to form a coalition to resolve any problems� (BBC Monitoring, March 9).

According to the Levada Center�s latest surveys of Russian public opinion, only 8 percent believe that Ukraine is more democratic than Russia. Conversely, between 50 percent to 65 percent believe that Russia is more democratic than Ukraine and feel compassion for the country because it must live with uncertainty about election results (Vedomosti, March 9). Such findings spell the end of Western assumptions, and Moscow�s fears, that the Orange Revolution might have provided a democratic example to Russia.

    � Language Policy: Responding to the Russian media�s leading questions, Yanukovych assured Moscow that he would keep his presidential campaign promise to implement the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. This will result in conferring official status to the Russian language (apparently on a par with Ukrainian) in many of Ukraine�s regions, particularly in the Party of Regions� strongholds.

Following his return from Moscow, Yanukovych made an appearance at the shrine to Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko, assuring Ukrainians that their language would alone retain the status of the state language on a country-wide basis, while Russian would receive official status in certain regions (Interfax, March 9). This will, however, not allay concerns about linguistic de-Ukrainization and re-Russification in Ukraine�s east and south, resulting from this measure. As a sop, Medvedev and Yanukovych have decided to hold a joint Taras Shevchenko Year in Ukraine and Russia.

    � Russia-Ukraine Interstate Commission: created and co-chaired by Putin and Yushchenko while presidents, the commission has remained inactive. Some of the sub-commissions have met periodically, however, notably the one tasked to delimit the maritime border and discuss contentious issues related to the Russian Black Sea Fleet based on Ukraine�s territory. Both sides now intend to hold a full meeting of the Interstate Commission during the first half of this year in Kyiv, in connection with Medvedev�s planned visit there. Ahead of that event, the new Ukrainian government (if and when it is installed) will prepare an action plan for the commission�s consideration.

    � Black Sea Fleet: Medvedev and Yanukovych agreed that bilateral consultations should continue as before, based on the 1997 agreements on the temporary stationing of the Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory. Characterizing this as a very difficult and complicated problem, Yanukovych implied that it can ultimately be settled by the two presidents among themselves. At the news conference, he promised to help resolve the issue �in a way that would satisfy both Ukraine and Russia,� and even �very soon.� The first part of the answer merely echoes Yanukovych�s campaign rhetoric, when he suggested prolonging the basing agreement beyond the 2017 deadline. The �very soon,� however, is a disconcerting addendum, possibly presaging a quick deal to Ukraine�s detriment.

    � NATO: Russian leaders had apparently hoped for an explicit Yanukovych statement that Ukraine will not seek NATO membership (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 9). At the press conference, a planted question attempted to goad Yanukovych into endorsing an anti-NATO referendum, signatures for which are currently being collected in Ukraine. Instead, Yanukovych merely declared that �Ukraine will develop its relations with NATO as a non-bloc state and in accordance with its national interests� (Interfax, March 5).

    � Soviet Legacy Preservation: Medvedev and Yanukovych agreed to celebrate the Soviet �great patriotic war� together in Moscow on May 8, and to �synchronize� the celebrations on May 9 with Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka on a tripartite basis. This configuration was the only hint at a post-Soviet �Eastern Slavic solidarity� during Yanukovych�s visit.

Yanukovych promised to revoke, before the May celebrations, the Hero of Ukraine titles that Yushchenko had awarded to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukevych, the leaders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the 1940�s. One of the most tactless decisions of the Yushchenko presidency, the award has become an irritant in Ukrainian-Polish relations, given that the UPA had mainly targeted the Polish civilian population and Armija Krajowa units in 1941-44 (and Bandera was an anti-Polish fighter prior to the war). From 1944 onward, however, the UPA resisted against the Soviet authorities, an activity that Russian authorities today continue to regard as criminal, in Ukraine or anywhere.

    � Natural Gas: Yanukovych announced on the visit�s eve that he would urgently raise the issues of Russian gas supplies and transit (Russia-24 TV, March 4), meaning price cuts for Russian gas supplies, in return for sharing control of Ukraine�s transit system with Gazprom in a consortium. The current price is said to be $305 per one thousand cubic meters, with Yanukovych seeking a reduction to $210 (Kommersant, March 5). Key industrialists behind Yanukovych and his Party of Regions need discounted gas to maintain their competitive position internationally. The party itself would promise cheap gas to the populace, if snap parliamentary elections are held in Ukraine this year, as seems distinctly possible. Gazprom control of Ukraine�s transit system would be the price for cheap gas.

Ironically, Yanukovych accused the outgoing Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko of �destroying the contractual basis� of the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade. However, it was Putin who signed the contract with Tymoshenko in January 2009, and Moscow declares itself satisfied with its commercial terms to this day. According to Russian Energy Minister, Sergei Shmatko, after the talks, the gas price and gas transport consortium have not been discussed with Yanukovych. Moscow will discuss this issue after the formation of a new Ukrainian government, and as part of preparations for Medvedev�s planned visit to Kyiv in the first half of the year (RIA Novosti, March 6).

    � Steel: Yanukovych solicited lower tariff barriers and higher quantitative quotas for Russian imports of Ukrainian steel products (Interfax, March 7). This remains a contentious issue in bilateral relations at the state level from the mid-1990�s to date. Former president Leonid Kuchma and his governments (including Yanukovych�s) perennially raised this grievance with their Russian counterparts. Leading Ukrainian steel producers expanded into European markets in recent years, reducing their interests in ties with Russia. The economic crisis, however, has increased again the importance of the Russian market to the Donetsk steel industry. It seeks not only to return there but also to bid for contracts to supply steel pipes for Russia�s Nord Stream and South Stream pipeline projects.

    � Customs Union: Russian leaders had expected Yanukovych to consent, at least in principle, to join the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union and, in a follow-up stage, the Single Economic Space planned by those countries (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 9). Yanukovych demurred twice, citing Ukraine�s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as its overriding choice. This must have irritated the Russian leaders. When Yanukovych spoke afterward of a �complete turnaround in Ukrainian-Russian relations,� Putin retorted curtly: �Then join the Customs Union� (Interfax, March 5, 7).

That remark displays Moscow�s approach to the Customs Union as a Russian-owned project, participation in it being a function of each country�s bilateral relations with Russia. The relevant paragraph in the joint concluding declaration, however, reads: �Respecting the freedom of choice, mechanisms and forms of the countries� participation in economic integration processes, Russia and Ukraine will strive to ensure that this participation does not harm the interests of their bilateral cooperation.� Thus, Moscow desists, at least for now, from asking Ukraine to choose between the WTO and the Russian-led Customs Union.

    � Agriculture: A cryptic remark by Yanukovych in Moscow seemed to allude to a Russian-Ukrainian grain cartel. This idea has tentatively been broached earlier, but was not developed. Yanukovych said in Moscow that Ukraine, always a great breadbasket, �must use the huge potential of our agricultural sector� together with Russia. He suggested that �joint actions in the grain market� be included in the action plan, which is to be prepared for the meeting of the Russia-Ukraine Inter-governmental Commission in the first half of this year (Interfax, March 5).