Traditional Religon and Moral Reform in Nasarawa 

The Ombatse cult is based on traditional forms of worship practiced by the Eggon ethnic group. The Eggon people of Nasarawa State are roughly divided in their religious allegiance to Christianity and Islam, but many see no contradiction in also following more traditional belief systems. The Eggon speak their own Benue-Congo language (Eggon), though traditional oral histories of the group trace their origin to Yemen. Today, they are concentrated in the Lafia, Akwanga and Nasarawa-Eggon districts of Nasarawa State. 

Though Ombatse (meaning “Time has Come”) has kept a relatively low profile for some years despite occasional clashes with non-Eggon neighbors and police, the traditional religious movement has embarked on a violent campaign of moral and spiritual reform implemented through forced conversions, though the campaign also draws on currents of political frustration and perennial disputes with semi-nomadic herders like the Fulani, who use the same land as sedentary agriculturalists like the Eggon. 

Ombatse was allegedly formed as the result of a revelation received in a dream that called for male Eggons to purify society and rid it of social evils such as promiscuity, adultery, crime, alcohol consumption and smoking (Daily Trust (Lagos), November 25, 2012). One Ombatse member described the group’s focus: “The sect is highly purified and its members are not into alcoholism, sexual intercourse and stealing. Our members are highly moral and dedicated to their cause only” (BBC Hausa, May 10). The group’s founders have been identified as movement chairman Haruna Musa Zico Kigbu, movement secretary Zabura Musa Akwanshiki, Sgt. Alaku Ehe, Shuaibu Alkali, Iliyasu Hassan Gyabo and Abdullahi Usman. 

According to the Ombatse chairman: “The religion had existed since time immemorial with a shrine ‘Azhili’ interceding for the people. Consequently, people linked with the ‘Ombatse Group’ usually ask the shrine for rain, good harvest and many other fortunes. Therefore, Ombatse Group is not a [form of] witchcraft; neither does it have anything to do with fighting wars” (National Mirror [Lagos], December 2, 2012). 

Ombatse spokesman, Zachary Zamani Allumaga, explained the purpose of the movement and its origins in a December, 2012 interview with a Nigerian daily.

The invasion of the Europeans, Christianity and the Islamic jihad, all these influx changed the status quo. Our forefathers had their own way of worship which is the traditional way of worship before the influx. The coming of these foreigners infiltrated the place and consequently affected their style of worship. My father who is still alive practiced both the traditional religion and Christianity and he is still alive. I also have an uncle who is a Muslim and at the same time practices the traditional religion. These have all tested the two divides. I am a confirmed communicant Catholic and at the same time too, a traditional worshipper. Now, what led to us bringing back this traditional worship to our people is because of the complaints we receive every now and then from our people about the evil and vices that have pervaded our society and our state. These things were not there according to what our fathers told us. The society used to be serene and orderly till the advent of the foreigners. Some of those societal ills include murder, theft, rumor mongering, secret society and witchcraft (Vanguard [Lagos], December 22, 2012). 

Ombatse members typically wear black clothing and bundles of charms to provide magical protection from gunfire. There is little place for women in Ombatse and they are barred from entering Ombatse shrines. Both Ombatse leaders and their opponents point out that not all Eggon are members of the traditional cult. Ombatse and all other ethnic militias in Nasarawa State were officially banned in late 2012. 

Spiraling Violence in the Eggon Community 

A pattern of worsening communal and religiously-inspired violence has emerged over the last year in Nasarawa State:

• June 2012 – Communal violence erupts between the Eggon and the Alago ethnic group. The latter took the worst of it, complaining that local security forces were unwilling to intervene against the Ombatse militia (Leadership [Abuja], July 1; Daily Trust [Lagos], January 19).
• Mid-October, 2012 - Several clashes erupt between Eggon and Fulani. Many of the dead were reported mutilated by machetes (Daily Trust [Lagos], January 19).
• November 17, 2012 - An attempt by Nigerian security forces to raid the Allogani cult center in the Nasarawa-Eggon district on November 17 to arrest the Ombatse chairman and secretary while they were conducting an initiation and oath-taking ceremony resulted in a gunfight in which three soldiers were shot. Hours later, cult members set up a barricade on the Lafia-Akwanga road and smashed cars that attempted to evade the barricade. Security forces endured abuse from the drivers of long lines of halted vehicles for their failure to remove the barricades (Sunday Trust [Lagos], November 18, 2012). The raid brought Ombatse into conflict with the state; according to Ombatse spokesman Zachary Zamani Allumaga: “What happened that day at the Azhili shrine when the security operatives invaded us was reminiscent of what terrorists would do by using a suicide bomber to bomb a church. I can’t still imagine” (Vanguard [Lagos], December 22, 2012).
• November 21, 2012 – Violence erupted in Agyaragu, a suburb of the state capital of Lafia, when Ombatse killed at least ten people of the Christian and animist Koro ethnic group (a.k.a. Jijili, Migili) with firearms, machetes and axes. Some 50 homes were also burnt to the ground (Daily Trust [Lagos], November 21, 2012; November 25, 2012). Following the incident, Ombatse chairman Haruna Musa Zico Kigbu denied his movement had anything to do with the communal violence: “As far as we are concerned, our rules forbid members from starting a fight and killing, and as such, we cannot be connected with violence” (Daily Independent [Lagos], December 12, 2012).
• January 9-14, 2013 - Seven Fulani were killed by Ombatse members in a pair of remote villages in Nasarawa State. The Ombatse members also killed a large number of Fulani-owned cattle, which they leave behind in accordance with their beliefs. Dozens may have been killed in the retaliatory fighting that followed (Royal Times of Nigeria, January 14; Daily Trust [Lagos], January 19).
• January 13, 2013 - Five Ombatse members were killed by security forces when they tried to prevent the seizure of a large quantity of arms and ammunition (Royal Times of Nigeria, January 14).
• February 7, 2013 - Four villages and towns in Nasarawa State experience Fulani vs. Eggon violence. Both Eggon and Fulani blamed the other ethnic group for initiating the fighting (Sunday Trust [Lagos], February 10; Leadership [Abuja], March 22). 

The Alakyo Massacre 

If Ombatse had escaped national attention so far by being classed as yet another ethnic militia clashing with its neighbors in a relatively obscure part of the country, the movement seized national and even international headlines with a massive and deadly ambush of state security forces on their way to raid the Ombatse shrine in Alakyo (six miles outside the state capital of Lafia). The May 9 raid was launched to arrest the movement’s leader after local people had complained the religious movement was carrying out forced conversions and oath-taking in regional churches and mosques. 

Ombatse members claimed a total of 95 policemen and state security agents were killed, while police have admitted to 30, with seven still missing (Nigerian Tribune, May 9; AFP, May 9). Most media reports suggested a figure in the range of 55 to 65 dead, but a nurse reported a local hospital had received 90 corpses and was awaiting the arrival of another 17 (Daily Trust [Lagos], May 11). Police later revealed that four policemen were still being held hostage by the Ombatse. According to one report, the failed raid was carried out without proper clearance from Abuja and a local military unit declined to join the police and state security men in the raid on these grounds (Premium Times [Abuja], May 12).

After the slaughter, the bodies of the security men were burned beyond recognition in large fires. One veteran police respondent described it as “the most cold-blooded act I have witnessed against the law enforcement community in my three decades in the force” (Premium Times [Abuja], May 10). Large scale protests by the wives and families of the deceased have paralyzed the state capital as the charred bodies are gradually brought into Lafia.

An Ombatse member described how cult members had heard rumors for days that security forces were preparing to arrest the cult leader. Remaining vigilant, they intercepted 12 trucks full of heavily armed policemen who claimed they were not going to the cult shrine: “We said we did not agree. Suddenly, they threw tear gas at us and it did not affect us. Next, they opened fire and killed nine of our members, and we retaliated by using axes to hack them to death” (BBC Hausa, May 10). Another Ombatse member told a Nigerian news agency: “In self-defense we killed 95 of them, we have no guns. It was machetes that we used in defending ourselves and eventually [we] killed them” (Sahara Reporters [Lagos], May 9).

One officer speaking on behalf of nine other police survivors said it was plain the militia was aware of their coming and had set up an ambush at a particularly narrow part of the road. Perhaps reflecting a common spiritual base with the attackers, the officer recounted that the heavy fire of the security forces was “futile, as bullets were not penetrating them” (Leadership [Abuja], May 10). While the ten survivors, many of them wounded, succeeded in escaping in the last truck in the convoy, other officers who tried to flee into the bush were pursued and cut down with machetes. The attackers seized a considerable quantity of arms that will make them an even more potent force on their home ground. 

Most alarming was the fact that great lengths had been taken to keep the timing and destination of the security convoy a secret, even to the extent that most of the men did not know where they were going. As one police officer remarked: “That the cultists would anticipate and wreck this kind of attack on security people speaks volumes of either infiltration or mission betrayal" (Premium Times [Abuja], May 10). Two police corporals of Eggon origin were eventually arrested on charges of leaking information regarding the raid to Ombatse. At the time of their arrest they were in possession of three AK-47 rifles and a large quantity of charms (Daily Trust [Lagos], May 11). 

Religion or Politics? 

Some Eggon claim to have engineered the election of Nasarawa State governor Umaru Tanko al-Makura (a non-Eggon Muslim) by invoking the intervention of the Ombatse shrine. However, al-Makura has since fallen out of favor with the Eggon. Allumaga and other Ombatse leaders now accuse successive Muslim governors of Nasarawa State of attempting to carry out an “ethnic cleansing” of Eggon from parts of the state (Nigerian Tribune, May 12). Many Eggon are now supporting the candidacy of a fellow Eggon, current state minister of information Labaran Maku, in the 2015 election for governor. 

Ethnic militias have frequently been formed and deployed for intimidation purposes in Nigerian electoral contests and there are some in the state capital of Lafia who believe Ombatse has a political purpose related to the inability of the Eggon to produce a governor from their own group despite their numbers in the state. The militia may in this sense be part of an effort to rally the frequently disunited Eggon behind a single purpose through oath-taking and appeals to traditional norms (Premium Times [Abuja], May 10). 

The Nasarawa Commissioner for Information, Hamza Elayo, has suggested that some Eggon politicians may have recruited Ombatse to further their cause: “It is obvious they are being sponsored by some ambitious politicians... The security agencies have been closing in on such politicians but I don't want to mention names” (AFP, May 9). An official statement by Governor al-Makura confirmed the administration’s view that the Ombatse violence was political rather than religious in nature: “The crisis has no religious [dimension] as speculated by some sections of the media; some people are just bent on destroying the state because they feel they are not in power” (Premium Times [Abuja], May 12). 

Even Ombatse spokesman Zachary Zamani Allumaga has acknowledged the movement has a political purpose. Referring to their self-declared responsibility for the election of the present governor, Allumaga noted: 

There is serious animosity against the Ombatse group simply because they are aware that we went to Azhili [a traditional deity] and prayed for the political landscape of Nasarawa State to change for good, and indeed it changed…  As 2015 is approaching, we are aware that some people are planning to ensure the Eggon nation is dislodged from the political landscape of the state, so they call us all kinds of names so that they can hang us. But I can assure you, we are prepared to pray to Azhili with all legitimacy (Vanguard [Lagos], December 22, 2012). 

Conclusion 

Before the Alakyo massacre, Ombatse spokesmen were united in denying any involvement in the violence in Nasarawa State, often by blaming it on “rogue elements,” but some Ombatse members are now admitting their responsibility for attacks on Nigerian security forces, if not neighboring communities. The Alakyo incident has left Ombatse in control of a large quantity of arms and ammunition, making the cult a significant threat to non-Eggon communities in Nasarawa as well as to state security forces, who will inevitably seek revenge for the horrific slaughter on the road to Alakyo. Whether formed initially by a desire for moral reform, a perceived need for self-defense against aggressive pastoralists or even as an armed adjunct to local electoral politics, Ombatse has entered a new phase of insurgency against the state, giving Abuja yet another security headache in central Nigeria even as it struggles to contain insurgents and terrorists in the northern and southern regions of the country. 

Andrew McGregor is the Managing Editor of Global Terrorism Analysis and the Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world. 

Note 

1. I.D. Hepburn, Ian Maddieson and Roger Blench, A Dictionary of Eggon, Cambridge, January 2, 2006, http://www.rogerblench.info/Language/Niger-Congo/BC/Plateau/South/Eggon%20Dictionary%20full.pdf.

Combining a proclivity for confrontation, inflammatory rhetoric that he broadcasts during his sermons at the Bilal bin Rabah Mosque (located just outside of Sidon in Abra) and a network of online social media outlets, al-Assir has emerged as a polarizing figure in Lebanon. [1] Owing to a militant Salafist worldview that tends to see Shi’a Muslims as heretics and apostates, al-Assir’s oratory is replete with invective targeting Hezbollah and Iran. Al-Assir singles out Hezbollah and its Iranian patron over their activities in Lebanon and the alliance they share with Syria. For al-Assir, Hezbollah and Iran represent hegemonic and malicious forces that aim to divide Muslims and subjugate Lebanon. However, al-Assir, whose mother hailed from a Shi’a family, also claims to distinguish between Shi’a currents such as those led by the Lebanese-Iranian cleric Musa al-Sadr, who founded the Lebanese Amal Movement, and that promulgated by Iranian cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the 1979 Iranian Revolution (al-Akhbar, March 2, 2012).  

Nonetheless, al-Assir’s incendiary politics cater to a conservative Lebanese Sunni constituency that is heavily influenced by sectarianism in the absence of a credible ideological alternative at a time of heightened sectarian tensions in Lebanon. Al-Assir’s rise in prominence has occurred amidst the growing influence of the Salafist current in Lebanon, a trend that has come at the expense of mainstream Sunni-led political parties and movements that have proved, in the eyes of their supporters, to be weak in the face of Hezbollah. The expansion of Salafist influence in Lebanon was accelerated, for example, by the violence in 2008 in Beirut and elsewhere in Lebanon that witnessed Hezbollah and its allies rout militias associated with the March 14 bloc of political movements led by former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri’s Future Movement (al-Jazeera [Doha], May 11, 2008). 

Al-Assir frames the uprising in Syria in sectarian terms in which an heretical and apostate regime headed by an Alawite is waging war against an oppressed Sunni population: “There is a religious duty on every Muslim who is able to do so... to enter into Syria in order to defend its people, its mosques and religious shrines, especially in al-Qusayr and Homs” (al-Jazeera, April 24). Congregants of the Bilal bin Rabah mosque, according to al-Assir, are already active on the Syrian battlefield (al-Akhbar, April 27). Volunteer fighters are reportedly being provided training and other forms of logistical support in Lebanon prior to being dispatched to Syria. The creation of al-Assir’s fighting force is the apparent culmination of earlier threats to muster a militia to represent Lebanese Sunnis. After a series of clashes in November, 2012 between his supporters and those of Hezbollah in the Taamir Ayn al-Hilweh district of Sidon, al-Assir announced his plans to organize an armed wing to counter “the Iranian project” in Lebanon (i.e. Hezbollah) (al-Akhbar, November 13, 2012; Daily Star [Beirut], November 11, 2012).  

The intended destination of al-Assir’s fighters provides critical insight into his wider objectives. Al-Assir affirmed that his force would be joining the fight in the Syrian town of al-Qusayr, among other places. The significance of his reference to al-Qusayr, an opposition stronghold located in Homs Province along the Syrian-Lebanese border, should not be understated. Al-Qusayr and its vicinity has been the site of heated battles between insurgents and the Syrian security forces. In addition to occupying a strategic location between Damascus and the Mediterranean coastal region, the environs of al-Qusayr are host to a demographic that is diverse in its composition and politics – the region is home to villages that include thousands of Shi’a, Sunnis, Christians and Alawites who claim to be Lebanese. 

While the true extent of its operational activities in Syria remains a matter of debate, Hezbollah has been candid about its presence in the vicinity of al-Qusayr. For Hezbollah, the presence of self-identifying Lebanese, many of who maintain family and kinship bonds with Lebanese residing over the border in the Beka’a Valley, warrants their protection (al-Manar [Beirut], October 11, 2012). Hezbollah has since reaffirmed its commitment to defend these villages from the insurgents. Meanwhile, in a seemingly calculated attempt at publicity, video footage that was reportedly recorded in al-Qusayr showing al-Assir firing a weapon beside members of the armed opposition was broadcast a few days after the formation of his militia. Photographs of al-Assir sitting on top of a Syrian tank captured by insurgents beside his son and members of the armed opposition were also published (Daily Star, May 3; LBCI [Beirut], April 30). 

Al-Assir’s dramatic foray into Syria has implications for Lebanon. Lebanese foreign fighters already constitute a sizeable part of the foreign militant force fighting on behalf of the Syrian opposition. At the same time, it is difficult to conceive how al-Assir’s hastily organized militia can tip the scales in favor of the opposition in heavily contested areas such as al-Qusayr. Rather, al-Assir may attempt to leverage his actions in Syria to position himself as a guardian of Sunni interests in Lebanon.  

Owing to political, demographic, socio-cultural, economic and geographic aspects, Lebanon’s fortunes are inextricably linked to events in Syria. Equally important to understanding al-Assir’s role in Lebanon is the human geography unique to his base in Sidon, a predominantly Sunni city whose inhabitants lean strongly toward the March 14 bloc and, increasingly, hardline Salafist currents. The March 14 bloc has led the campaign to support the political and armed wings of the Syrian opposition. Yet Sidon is located in Lebanon’s mostly Shi’a south, a locus of support for political parties and movements that make up the Hezbollah-dominated March 8 bloc. This has not prevented al-Assir from inciting his supporters to provoke Hezbollah in Sidon and elsewhere through public shows of force, including demonstrations and sit-ins in contentious locations such as Shi’a mosques that attract Hezbollah partisans. 

Al-Assir’s actions have resonated beyond Sidon. Hardline Salafist ideologues such as Shaykh Salem al-Rifai, who is based in Tripoli, another sectarian flashpoint city, has also endorsed al-Assir’s call for Lebanese Sunnis to take up arms in Syria alongside the opposition. Al-Assir’s increasingly strident positions are likely to further arouse political and sectarian tensions in Lebanon, raising the specter of violence and instability in the months to come. 

Chris Zambelis is an analyst and researcher specializing in Middle East affairs with Helios Global, Inc., a risk management group based in the Washington, DC area. The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of Helios Global Inc. 

Note 

1. The official website of the Bilal bin Rabah Mosque is available at http://bilalbinrabah.org/. Al-Assir’s official Twitter page is available at https://twitter.com/ahmad_alaseer.

According to the RCMP, the kind of support that al-Qaeda in Iran offered was mostly of a “direction and guidance” nature. As for Iranian involvement, it is not clear how Iran was used in the operation, but most likely it served as a covert meeting place for operatives travelling between Pakistan and Iraq (al-Arabiya, April 26). Chiheb Esseghaier has travelled to Iran in the last two years and is alleged to have been in contact with an al-Qaeda facilitator in Iran (CTV [Toronto], April 25). 

In response, Tehran has denied allegations of any ties to al-Qaeda. Alaedin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Iranian Consultative Assembly’s foreign policy and national security committee, vehemently rejected Canadian claims that al-Qaeda has a presence in Iran and stated that if anyone associated with the terrorist organization was found in the country, he would be arrested by security forces (Hamshahri Online, April 30). Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi described the Canadian allegations as the “most laughable thing I have heard in the 64 years of my life” (Jame-e Jam TV [Tehran], April 23; ISNA, April 23). Salehi added: “We hope Canadian officials show a little wisdom and pay attention to the world’s public opinion and intelligence” (IRNA, April 23). 

In fact, Tehran claims that its security forces have arrested a number of al-Qaeda operatives and have extradited some them to their home countries. The latest arrest took in March, when three al-Qaeda members were arrested by the Iranian regular army at the western border with Iraq (Hamshahri Online, March 14). According to Iranian police authorities, five al-Qaeda members were also arrested in the province of Kerman in September, 2011 while attempting to smuggle large quantities of arms and explosives into Iran (Fars News Agency, September 6, 2011; Payvand.com, September 6, 2011). 

Iran’s rejection of accusations it has ties to al-Qaeda reflects years of rocky relations between Shi’a Iran and the hardline Sunni terrorist group. Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq affiliated with al-Qaeda have frequently attacked Shi’a religious targets, especially places where Iranians congregate for pilgrimage to Shi’a holy places in Iraq. In Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliated militant group, is seeking the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, who is viewed by al-Qaeda as an Alawi Shi’a heretic (Arab News, April 24). Syria is a major ally of Iran; Iranian support for the Syrian government puts al-Qaeda and Tehran at military odds. As the June, 2009 memo by Bin Laden recalls, al-Qaeda views Iranians as “criminals” for their religious beliefs and erratic policies (al-Jazeera, May 5, 2012; Tabnak [Tehran] May 3).  

The Tehran-al-Qaeda connection, if any exists on a substantial level, is likely informal at best. After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban, a number of al-Qaeda members fled to Iran, including some of Bin Laden's closest relatives (al-Jazeera, July 19, 2010). Mostly likely they were first based in Iran’s Baluchistan province and later transferred to a compound in Tehran, with many of the newly arrived al-Qaeda members being detained by the Iranian security forces. One al-Qaeda figure, Mahfouz Ould al-Walid, a Mauritanian who rejected the September 11 attacks, was held under house arrest until 2012, when he was extradited to Mauritania (al-Jazeera TV, October 30, 2012). Bin Laden son-in-law Sulayman Abu Ghaith, now facing terrorism charges in the United States, spent over a decade under house arrest in Iran, beginning soon after his arrival in early 2002 (al-Jazeera, March 11). In detaining al-Qaeda leaders in Iran, Tehran’s objective has been to use them as a bargaining chip in its relations with the United States and certain Sunni militant groups who attack Shi’a targets in Iraq. 

Iran sees the al-Qaeda members as an asset in future negotiations with Washington, however, there is also the possibility that some key members of the movement move around Sunni populated regions like Iran’s Baluchistan province in disguise, roaming freely without the knowledge of Tehran. According to the U.S. government, al-Qaeda “facilitators and financiers” Mohsen al-Fadhli and Adel Radhi Wahabi Harbi have been based in Iran for over a decade, moving “fighters and money through Turkey to support al-Qaeda-affiliated elements in Syria. [1] 

The objective of al-Qaeda operatives in Iran could be to provide financial and logistical support to terrorist activities in Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia, or to facilitate operations in other regions, such as North America. However, the main target of such operatives at the moment would likely be the threat posed by the “Shi’a hegemony” advanced by Tehran and Damascus, a threat greater than that posed by Israel and the United States. In this environment, covert al-Qaeda operatives would seek to strike at the Iranian enemy from within its own territory, possibly with the support of youths drawn from Iran’s Sunni population (approximately 9 percent of Iran’s total). 

According to one report, there is a growing movement toward Salafist ideology in Kurdish regions of Iran, principally in Sanandaj, the capital of Iran’s Kurdistan Province (Ettella’at [Tehran], May 7). The report also describes how al-Qaeda operatives travel frequently in Iran’s Kurdistan and Azerbaijan provinces, perhaps due to their close proximity to Iraq and the Republic of Azerbaijan, where 17 members of an “al-Qaeda-associated group” were sentenced to prison terms in 2012 (Tabnak, April 19, 2012; Euronews, May 15, 2012).  

According to government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, al-Qaeda has a military base in Iran, a claim Iran has denied and may be merely a reflection of the poor relations between the two countries (Tabnak, 19 April 2012). However, it is possible that al-Qaeda has clandestine bases in Iranian Kurdistan and Baluchistan with operational plans for financial, information and military activities intended for both regional and transnational purposes, all without the knowledge of the Iranian government. 

From Tehran’s perspective, al-Qaeda is a threat, though not an existential one. There is, in this sense, the possibility of a tactical alliance with al-Qaeda, with the possible mediation of the Taliban. If such an alliance were possible, it would underscore Iran’s attempt to project anti-American influence in Afghanistan and provide a warning against a possible American attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. 

What we do not know is how or where an al-Qaeda faction in Iran operates, or the extent to which the Iranian government is aware of such activities. This does not mean that Tehran cannot reach out to al-Qaeda on a strategic level for military purposes, as it did in south Lebanon by creating Hezbollah in 1982 while in the midst of a war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, though current conditions would seem to impose constraints on Iran’s ability to seek an alliance with al-Qaeda or other militant Salafist groups. 

If there were any single factor that could deter Iran from seeking an alliance with al-Qaeda, it would likely be the situation in Syria. With the expansion of the Syrian unrest, the al-Qaeda faction in Iran could provide support to Syrian insurgents against the Assad regime, or, with increasing sectarian violence in Syria, possibly even conduct military activities against Tehran inside Iranian territory. In either situation, the apparent revival of al-Qaeda in light of the worsening situation in Syria could pose a major security threat to Iran and other parts of the region, while repercussions could be felt in the West through operations such as the alleged plot to derail a Canadian train with maximum casualties. 

Nima Adelkhah is an independent analyst based in New York. His current research agenda includes the Middle East, military strategy and technology, and nulcear proliferation among other defense and security issues. 

Note 

1. U.S. Department of State, “Rewards for Justice – al-Qaida Reward Offers,” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington D.C., October 18, 2012,

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/10/199299.htm.

Andrew McGregor

New fighting between northern Mali’s Arab community and the Tuareg rebels working with French intervention forces in the region threatens to escalate into a wider ethnic conflict in the run-up to July’s national elections. While efforts are under way to ease tensions between the communities, there is also suspicion that some of these efforts are opportunistic and designed to advance certain personal political agendas. The clashes, centered around the town of Bir, have involved members of the largely Tuareg Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA – a secular separatist movement) and the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), an Arab militia created in February 2012 as the Front de Libération nationale de l’Azawad (FLNA) and formed from members of earlier Arab militias and Arab soldiers of the Malian Army who deserted after the fall of Timbuktu to Islamist groups last year.

The MAA announced it had expelled Tuareg fighters belonging to the MNLA from the town of Bir (30 miles northeast of Timbuktu) on April 22 after 14 to 15 MAA battlewagons entered the town. Movement spokesman Moloud Muhammad Ramadan said the action was taken to protect village residents who were threatened by the MNLA’s presence, though there were later charges that MAA fighters looted Tuareg properties in Bir (al-Akhbar [Nouakchott], April 22). French military aircraft overflew the town several times to observe the situation, though they did not send in ground forces (RFI, April 26). As clashes between Arabs and Tuareg intensified, troops from Burkina Faso and the Malian Army entered Bir on May 6 (AP, May 7). The Arab fighters withdrew, but remained close to the town to observe developments and await an opportunity to return.

Malian troops conducted searches and carried out arrests in Bir, but they and the Burkinabe force withdrew by May 10, leaving the town open to new outbreaks of violence as a column of Arab battlewagons re-entered Bir on May 11, looting homes and shops while searching for Tuareg men. MAA spokesmen Moloud Muhammad Ramadan admitted that the Arab fighters were members of the MAA, but insisted they were operating outside the movement’s control in an effort to retrieve items looted from the Arab community in In Khalil by Tuareg members of the MNLA (RFI, May 12). The local Tuareg community claims to have had nothing to do with the MNLA looting of In Khalil. Ramadan denied charges that Tuareg livestock at Bir were slaughtered by MAA fighters and stated that the MAA “has nothing against the Tuareg, but hunts the MNLA wherever it may be” (Mali Actualités, May 5).

The trouble in Bir has its direct origin in the MNLA’s occupation of the border town of In Khalil in February, which Arab residents claim was followed by wide-scale pillaging and rape. The MAA responded by attacking the MNLA positions in In Khalil on February 23 with a column led by MAA military commander Colonel Hussein Ould Ghulam. The Arab militia was driven off after being hit by French airstrikes in support of the MNLA (Le Combat [Bamako], February 23; see Terrorism Monitor Brief, March 8).

To press their demands for the return of Arab property or cash compensation, MAA fighters kidnapped the son of the Tuareg marabout (Islamic religious scholar) of Bir, who remains missing (RFI, May 9). However, Arab elders in the town opposed the kidnapping, suggesting it would result only in more violence between the communities (RFI, April 29).

Clashes between Tuareg and Arab groups have occurred elsewhere in northern Mali as well. Arab residents of Anefis, a town roughly halfway between Gao and Kidal, complain that Tuareg fighters of the MNLA entered that town on April 24, killing four Arab merchants before cleaning out their shop and charging fees to pass through MNLA checkpoints (Procès Verbal [Bamako], May 1). It is not only the rebel Tuareg that have come into conflict with the Arabs of northern Mali; Arab residents of the town of Taguilalt (60 miles outside of Gao) have complained that Tuareg troops of the Malian Army (presumably part of Colonel al-Hajj ag-Gamou’s command) looted the village on April 16, arresting 12 Arab men and “provoking and humiliating “other Arab residents (al-Akhbar [Nouakchott], April 17). The Timbuktu Arab community is still calling for information on the whereabouts of eight Arab traders and one Songhai member who they claim were abducted by Malian troops on February 14. Malian authorities in Timbuktu claim only one Arab trader was taken (RFI, May 2).

Besides the Arab “self-defense” militias, Malian Arabs seeking reforms through legal and democratic means formed al-Karama (Dignity) last year in the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott, where many Malian Arabs have taken refuge for the duration of hostilities in northern Mali. Though they admit they lack political experience, al-Karama leaders say they will not concede the right to govern to “cunning” and more experienced political operators who rule through “the lie, the plot and the threat” (Mali Actualités, April 12). The leader of al-Karama is Muhammad Tahir Ould al-Hajj, a leading member of the Timbuktu Arab community. The movement’s secretary, Muhammad Ould Mahmud, insists al-Karama opposes all forms of terrorism and drug-trafficking and welcomes the recent establishment of a national Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission (Mali Actualités, May 4).

In a parallel effort to find a political solution to the situation in northern Mali, the High Council of Azawad was formed on May 2 by a number of Kidal community leaders and headed by Muhammad ag Intallah, a son of the chief of the Ifoghas Tuareg of Kidal, Intallah ag Attaher. The mainly Tuareg group says it seeks to unite all the “sons of the Azawad” under a single banner to negotiate with Bamako without recourse to armed struggle, partition or alliance with Islamist groups (RFI, May 7). However, despite accusations that the HCA is nothing more than a renamed version of the rebel MNLA, that movement has announced it wants no part of the HCA and is seeking direct negotiations with Bamako (RFI, April 26; May 8). Bamako, in turn, insists on MNLA disarmament before talks can begin. There are, however, reports that fighters of the largely Tuareg Mouvement Islamique de l'Azawad (MIA) led by Alghabass ag Intallah (another son and designated successor of the Ifoghas chief) are integrating into the MNLA. These reports would seem to confirm earlier charges that the recently formed MIA was nothing more than a way-station for Ansar al-Din defectors seeking to join the secular MNLA before direct talks resume with Bamako (RFI, April 29; for Alghabass ag Intallah and the MIA, see Militant Leadership Monitor, January 30).

The Arab-Tuareg tensions are escalating as the defeated Islamist groups turn to terrorist tactics to prolong their struggle against French “Crusaders,” their military allies and the Malian state:

• On May 4, two Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) suicide bombers killed two members of the Malian military when they attacked a patrol near Gao (RFI, May 5).
• On May 10, three suicide bombers attacked a Malian Army checkpoint in Gossi, while a fourth was killed trying to enter the Gossi military camp. In the early hours of the same day, an assailant tried to drive a car bomb into the camp used by Nigérien troops in Menaka, but was killed when his car exploded under fire from the camp’s guards (Reuters, May 10; AFP, May 10). The Niger deployment has also been struck by the death in Bamako of its senior officer, General Yaya Seyni Garba, apparently from natural causes (Agence de Presse Africaine, May 11).
• Three suicide bombers struck in Gossi on May 11, wounding two soldiers, while a fourth suicide bomber was killed in Menaka before he could detonate his explosives. MUJWA claims responsibility for both attacks (AP, May 11). The continuing attacks bring into question the security of nation-wide elections planned for July.
• While Bamako has escaped most of the violence that has consumed the north for the last year, there are disturbing indications that the dispersed Islamists are preparing new attacks within the capital. In late April, Malian military intelligence arrested seven Malian citizens alleged to be members of a MUJWA cell preparing a bombing campaign in Bamako (RFI, April 29; Jeune Afrique, May 1).

Meanwhile, there are reports that the 2012 military coup leader, Captain Amadou Sanogo, is seeking asylum in Gabon or Nigeria. Sanogo, who has barely left the Kati military base outside of Bamako since the coup, is alleged to now fear reprisals from other members of the military after a number of internal clashes and disputes within the army (PANA Online [Dakar], May 1).

NIGER REVAMPS SECURITY STRUCTURE TO FACE ISLAMIST THREAT

Andrew McGregor

As Niger struggles to expand its uranium industry and exploit potentially rich oil reserves in its northern regions, it has been forced to address the security consequences of being a neighbor to northern Mali, southern Libya and northern Nigeria, all regions experiencing large levels of political and religious violence that have little respect for national borders.

Niger’s army played an important role in Operation Serval, the French-led military intervention in northern Mali. Rather than operating with the rest of the African units that gathered in Bamako but played no important role in the fighting, Nigérien troops entered northern Mali alongside Chadian forces from Mali’s southern border with Niger. Niger now deploys over 650 soldiers in northern Mali at Gao, Ansongo and Menaka (RFI, May 12). The Nigérien base at Menaka was the target of a May 10 suicide attack. A car full of explosives managed to burst through the gates of the camp, but was destroyed by Nigérien troops without any casualties other than the suicide attacker (AFP, May 10).

Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou, who has met three times in the last year with French president François Hollande, is urging a strong mandate for the UN peacekeeping force that is expected to replace the current ECOWAS operation:  “It should not be a classical-type mission like was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Balkans or in the Congo. Considering the nature of the enemy, this mission should be offensive” (RFI Online, May 14).

Niger’s foreign minister, Muhammad Bazoum, recently warned it had obtained information confirming that armed Islamists driven out of northern Mali by Operation Serval had shifted operations to Libya’s lightly-governed southwest, presumably by passing through northern Niger. According to Bazoum, “Mali has been settled, but Libya is far from being resolved, and today we think Libya is one of the biggest international terrorism bases… These bases, because they are terrorists, they will be a threat for Libya's immediate neighbors” (Reuters, May 2). Veteran Nigérien Tubu militant Barka Wardougou also appears to have shifted his base of operations across the border into southern Libya, which has a substantial Tubu population.

Though Niger is usually graded as the poorest nation in the world, it has been forced to increase its defense budget in reaction to external threats and the presence of al-Qaeda operatives in the northern desert. While the minister of defense boasts of increased salaries, expanded recruitment and purchases of military equipment such as tanks, the minister of the interior points out that “this is money that we take from the education and health budgets” (Jeune Afrique, April 29). There are also plans to expand Niger’s internal intelligence agency, which consists at the moment of only roughly 100 men.

Niger’s army, the roughly 8,000 man Forces Armées Nigeriennes (FAN), is dominated by members of the Djerma-Songhai, historical rivals of the Saharan Tuareg of northern Niger, who, like their cousins in northern Mali, have engaged in several rebellions against the southern-dominated government. Though the Tuareg rebels of northern Mali and northern Niger have cooperated in the past, there have been no overt signs of unrest amongst the Tuareg of Niger since the Tuareg/Islamist rebellion began in Mali last year. The army continues to have close ties to France, the former colonial power, but has received increasing levels of U.S. training and assistance in recent years. A new U.S. training mission for African peacekeepers operating in Mali will begin on June 24 and will involve up to 30 U.S. instructors (Reuters, May 16).  There are already roughly 100 American military personnel in Niger, most of them involved with the operation and protection of U.S. drones based in Niamey.

French and American drones began flying surveillance missions out of Niamey’s Hamani-Diori Airport in February and there is speculation that Washington may consider creating a permanent base for drone operations in Niger. Despite Niger’s ever-precarious economic situation, the presence of these unmanned aircraft has created a degree of “drone envy” in the Niamey government and military, which is “seriously considering” the purchase of its own drones. According to President Issoufou: “Without them we are blind and deaf people” (Jeune Afrique, April 22).

Nigeria’s Boko Haram and bandits posing as Boko Haram members continue to pose a threat to security in the areas along Niger’s southern border with Nigeria. To counter these activities, Niger contributes troops to the decade-old Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), composed of troops from Nigeria, Chad and Niger. The MJTF runs operations against Boko Haram groups active in the border region, though Niamey recently denied Nigerian claims that Nigérien troops were involved in an April 19 firefight near Lake Chad in which 185 civilians were killed in the crossfire between security forces and Boko Haram suspects. Niger defense minister Mahamadou Karidjo maintained that “No element of Niger’s army took part in these clashes… Boko Haram is not a direct threat for Niger; we are leaving Nigerians to deal with their own problem” (AFP, April 26). In recent days more than 1500 Nigérien nationals who had been living on the Nigerian side of the border have fled the recurrent Boko Haram-related violence around Lake Chad back into an area of Niger that is already experiencing a food crisis (RFI Online, May 14).

Niger also faces the task of dealing with Nigérien jihadists returning home after being dispersed by Operation Serval. Many are reported to be Fulanis who were offered considerable recruitment bonuses but had little ideological commitment to the Islamist cause (Jeune Afrique, April 29). The best known returnee is Hisham Bilal, a former commander in the Islamist Movement for Unity and Justice in West Africa (MUJWA) who returned to Niger with his men last November after complaining that MUJWA’s Arab leaders used Black African jihadists as “cannon fodder” (AFP, November 9, 2012).

The NYPD study is useful because it is clear, readily available and approaches its topic from a practical, law-enforcement perspective. According to the NYPD report, the jihadist radicalization process may be divided into four stages: Pre-radicalization, Self-identification, Indoctrination, and Jihadization. The report emphasizes that U.S. Muslim communities are not the problem and states that “the Muslim community in New York City is our ally and has as much to lose, if not more, than other New Yorkers if individuals commit acts of violence (falsely) in the name of their religion.” 

The NYPD Model 

Stage 1. Pre-radicalization is the state in which an “unremarkable” person finds himself (or herself) before radicalization occurs. Such a person is likely not particularly religious; has not received formal Islamic training or has recently converted to Islam; is a male under 35 years of age with little or no criminal background; and is a second or third generation immigrant. The most likely candidates tend to be middle class, educated, upwardly mobile and adept at using computer technology. This description also fits the vast numbers of young Muslims who become successful members of society. Such an “unremarkable person” would not be thought of as a likely radical by his family or friends and is not a focus of law enforcement. 

Stage 2. In Self-identification, unremarkable individuals experience a personal change and begin to move away from a former identity toward a new identity in conservative Salafist Islam. Factors, either singly or in combination, that may trigger the self-identification stage include: economic setbacks, a perceived obstacle to economic or professional advancement, some form of social or racial humiliation, perceptions that Western military is at war with Islam, or some personal tragedy like the loss of a family member. Young men who seek Islam on the Internet will find many instances of Salafist Islam and jihadism. They may also join a Salafist oriented mosque or society. Generally, a “spiritual sanctioner” or mentor may enter the self-identified individual's world at this point. 

But one should pause to ask, why Salafism over other versions of Islam? Perhaps the answer is that it promises a distinct new identity for someone in search of one and has sold itself fairly effectively as the authentic version of Islam. It also offers answers to all life's questions and leaves little room for doubt. Violent Salafi-Jihadism, on the other hand, appeals to a subset of seekers because it calls for action. (It also has layers that can appeal to intellectuals.) It plays up the romance of the warrior—jihadists defeated the Soviet Union and can now defeat the greatest enemy, America. Salafi-Jihadism also offers revenge for the humiliated and heroic risk for the romantic. And most of all, it offers validation among the secret few that the seeker has come to admire. 

Stage 3. Indoctrination convinces some individuals to accept the violent Salafi-jihadist ideology associated with al-Qaeda or related jihadist groups. They are encouraged by spiritual sanctioners (who do not provide operational advice) to consider making their convictions the basis of action. At this stage, the radicalizing individual may withdraw from the mosque or confront its leadership if the leaders are perceived to be too moderate or the mosque subject to police surveillance. 

Stage 4. Jihadization moves the individual from a theoretically committed Salafi-jihadist to a politically committed jihadist. Fully indoctrinated in the ideology made famous by al-Qaeda, the individual is ready to act violently on his or her convictions. The NYPD report emphasizes that individuals may stop at any stage in the process or go through the entire process but never commit a terrorist act. The general pattern is known but the outcome is impossible to predict with confidence for any individual. 

The al-Qaeda Perspective 

In general, like the NYPD, al-Qaeda considers Salafi-Jihadism to be its ideology. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia became merely a local jihadist target. Al-Qaeda opposes nationalism, whether it is Chechen nationalism or any other form; the goal of jihad is the universal caliphate. Overwhelming the United States with asymmetrical conflict is the path to that goal. 

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev reportedly told the FBI that he and his brothers learned to make bombs in al-Qaeda's English language Inspire magazine. [3] The first issue of Inspire (Summer 2010) contains the article, “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom,” which gives clear instructions with illustrations of several alternative methods of constructing an effective bomb similar to the bombs used in Boston by using powder from fireworks and a pressure cooker. It does not give instructions for sophisticated remote control detonation; however, the eighth issue of Inspire contains instructions for making a remote detonation device. 

Inspire also offered many other articles that likely influenced the Tsarnaev brothers.  For example, the magazine presents a series of nine articles by the al-Qaeda strategist of jihad, Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, which are translated excerpts from his major work. [4] From the first issue (summer 2010) Inspire serves up al-Suri's ideas in small, repetitive doses that even a relatively ignorant reader could absorb. Even if the Tsarnaev brothers skimmed over al-Suri's articles, however, the major ideas they describe are what al-Qaeda operatives anywhere could have told anyone like the Tsarnaevs because it is part of al-Qaeda doctrine. In the first issue of Inspire, al-Suri gives a brief summary of the results of the three historical “schools of jihad.” Al-Suri explains that the first school of secret, hierarchical terrorist organizations before al-Qaeda that tried to overthrow local autocratic regimes in the Middle East was a complete failure. The author explains that the second school of “open fronts and overt confrontation,” such as those in “Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya,” were militarily successful according to every objective measure but they were unable to achieve their ultimate political goal of establishing permanent Islamic emirates. Finally, in the face of overwhelming power of the United States, the one school of jihad that has proven successful albeit on a limited scale is what al-Suri calls “the school of individual jihad and small cell terrorism”—the home grown threat in the title of the NYPD report. 

In his second article, al-Suri delivers heaping praise on the “exceptional” Chechen fighters and the “military miracles” they achieved that stunned the world. The author writes that the “imbalance of power [with Russia] did not stand as an obstacle for them or for their victories.” But since 9/11, “America has employed her stunning technological superiority, and used it for her strategy of decisive air strikes and complete control over space and the electronic world.” Al-Suri ends by arguing that young Muslim men need to forget the false nationalism of this age and fight for the universal community of Muslims. The author concludes that the only alternative is the “school of individual jihad and small cells”—the subject of the third article in which al-Suri makes a distinction between “blameworthy terrorism” and “praiseworthy terrorism.” Jihadist individual and small cell terrorists are praiseworthy because they are defending the oppressed. For the fledgling terrorist, al-Suri asserts, “We should advise him to pursue his everyday life in a natural way, and to pursue jihad and Resistance in secrecy and alone, or with a small cell of trustworthy people...” In the following issues of Inspire, excerpts from al-Suri's book are translated to prove that a small unit without any ties to a larger organization could be a vital part of the global Islamic resistance by following conclusions drawn from “the books of the greatest theoreticians in military art, for example, Mao Tse-Tung, Guevara, Giap, and Castro...” Attacking in the heart of America was a priority and al-Suri's ninth article advises “targeting human crowds in order to inflict maximum human losses.” 

Conclusion 

By looking at both the al-Qaeda strategy from the limited perspective of the Inspire magazine and the NYPD report on radicalization, one may draw conclusions about the Tsarnaev brothers and potential follow-on threats, which would be difficult to discern from looking at either one alone. The NYPD report is a compelling after-the-crime analysis that gives us a profile of the homegrown jihadist radicalization process but without any way to connect that process to wider al-Qaeda strategy and intentions. Inspire magazine provides that link. Reportedly, the Tsarnaev brothers took the magazine seriously, which compels us to take it seriously as well. 

Various sections of the magazine may be seen as appealing to different stages of the radicalization process with historical and religious articles intended to move the discontented, religiously unschooled young immigrant from an interest in Salafism as a new identity to Salafi-Jihadism as a heroic cause. The magazine also provides articles on current events, which claim the United States is the paramount threat to Islam and oppressor of Muslim communities and, therefore, action against this great oppressor is a jihadist duty. Finally, Inspire provides the link to the stage of Jihadization by what it calls “open source jihad” by providing instructions in the craft of terror and a strategic context in which to operate. This strategic context calls for the young jihadists to stay where they are, act normally, and most of all, to avoid forming or joining a clandestine organizations, which are always vulnerable to police. Instead, they should act alone or with one or two close associates to avoid placing other cells in jeopardy. Furthermore, they should use simple tools, such as a knife, an iron bar, a gun or a bomb against any Americans to make the society overreact, reveal themselves as enemies to Islam, and thereby to inspire other young Muslims to follow their example. 

We should expect the international jihadist movement to encourage others like the Tsarnaev brothers; we should not expect to find a wider organization to which the Tsarnaev brothers belong. If the NYPD and other experts are correct, we should expect to find “spiritual sanctioners” of these brothers (and others like them), who encourage in a general sense, but may have no operational or clear criminal role. Furthermore, although police will not be able to predict which young men are quietly in crisis and are prone to become jihadi terrorists, they can certainly work with American Muslim communities, which oppose al-Qaeda as much or more than other Americans, and many of which have anti-radicalization programs. 

Notes

1. Arvin Bhatt, Mitch Silber, and others, "Radicalization In The West: The Home Grown Threat," The New York Police Department website, 2007. www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/home/home.shtml.

2. For a detailed analysis of al-Qaeda's strategic authors see: Michael W. S. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

3. For virus free copies of all Inspire magazine issues, see Aaron Zelin's magnificent jihadist document clearinghouse, jihadology.net. Zelin also provides a copy of the newest English language jihadist magazine, Azan, which also features a translation from al-Suri.

4. Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, Da‘wah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah al-Alamiyyah (The call to global Islamic resistance), Parts 1–2. (N.p.: December 2004). Al-Suri finished this book in 2004; Pakistani authorities arrested him in 2005.

Although accused by the Syrian opposition of serving the same function as the shabiha (ghosts) paramilitary units that have earned a notorious reputation for committing massacres against Syrian opposition members, the Popular Committees, unlike the shabiha, are not generally deployed in battle outside their area of residence. They are generally armed with light weapons and are organized on the village and city district level. Popular Committee forces man checkpoints, conduct door-to-door raids and occasionally provide support for the Syrian military against the armed Syrian opposition in divided, heavily-contested areas of the country by holding areas cleared of armed opposition members (as-Safir [Beirut], October 12, 2012). A Hezbollah media outlet reports that some Popular Committee forces are being trained in guerilla warfare, surveillance, infiltration and counterintelligence (al-Manar [Beirut, February 2). These military disciplines are widely understood to be specialties of Hezbollah’s armed wing. 

Minorities and the Popular Committees 

The Popular Committees are frequently associated with Syria’s minority communities, including Christians, Druze and Alawites. Both men and women are recruited as fighters in the Popular Committees (AFP, January 21). The committees are typically mobilized to defend specific villages or urban enclaves, such as Christian districts, against armed attacks (Agenzia Fides, September 18, 2012). Syria’s Kurdish community has also organized Popular Committees, particularly in areas where Kurds are concentrated such as Aleppo and the northeastern al-Jazira region (Syrian Arab News Agency, July 28, 2012). There are even reports of pro-government Sunnis forming Popular Committees in restive areas of the country, including in and around the battlefields of Damascus’ southern suburbs (al-Mayadeen [Beirut], October 28, 2012). 

Some of these Popular Committees, such as those formed in the diverse suburban district of Jaramana in southern Damascus, are reportedly composed of local fighters forming pan-sectarian fighting fronts that have been particularly effective in stalling armed opposition offensives (as-Safir [Beirut], October 12, 2012). Palestinian Popular Committees formed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) are also active in fighting against pro-opposition Palestinian factions inside the neighboring Yarmuk refugee camp and against the Syrian armed opposition in the districts of Hajar al-Aswad and al-Midan (al-Akhbar [Beirut], November 9, 2012). According to Filippo Grandi, the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), more than 85 percent of Yarmuk’s pre-civil war population of 150,000 people has been internally displaced in Syria or have become refugees in neighboring countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, due to fighting around Yarmuk (al-Arabiya [Dubai], March 12). 

Cooperation with Other Pro-Assad Forces 

To enhance the ability of the Popular Committees to assume a greater burden of local and regional defense against the armed opposition, the Assad government is seeking to integrate the Popular Committees into a larger National Defense Army (NDA), reportedly trained with the assistance of the Iranian Quds Force (AFP, January 21). Hezbollah, at least in the strategic central-western province of Homs, is also believed to be assisting in the mobilization, training and deployment of Popular Committees (AP, April 14). The integration into the NDA of village and urban district-level Popular Committees (usually composed primarily of one ethnic or sectarian group from the local area) is designed to raise pro-Assad, pro-Syrian nationalist morale over communal group identity (al-Akhbar [Beirut], March 2). 

A potential model for the Popular Committees/National Defense Forces as effective auxiliaries to the Syrian military or its allies, such as Hezbollah, is found in the strategic central-western Syrian governorate of Homs. Currently, this region of Syria is receiving a great deal of international attention as a result of Hezbollah’s involvement in the area and the importance of the Homs governorate to both the Assad government and the opposition (for Hezbollah’s role in the Syrian conflict, see Terrorism Monitor, November 2, 2012). Popular Committees have been raised in several mixed-faith villages in the Orontes River Valley region west of al-Qusayr, where tens of thousands of residents claim Lebanese nationality. 

The Homs region along the Lebanese border is strategically important because it links Damascus to the generally pro-government coastal regions of Syria by highway. Control of the region by the Syrian military, Hezbollah and the Popular Committees prevents the opposition from launching attacks against Hezbollah areas in Lebanon and provides pro-regime forces a route for supply and the transit of fighters from Tripoli and Akkar in northern Lebanon into the battlegrounds of Homs, Damascus and Idlib. Hezbollah’s involvement in the villages of the Orontes River valley, west of al-Qusayr, is the result of clan and familial ties between the Shi’a living on both sides of the border. Hezbollah, both better-armed and more established militarily in the border region than the Lebanese military, is able to provide security for the Lebanese villagers in the area of al-Qusayr. [2] 

The Popular Committees are reported to be among the first in the area to have been incorporated under the NDA (al-Akhbar [Beirut], March 2). Armed conflict between nominally pro-government villagers and armed opposition groups, including militant Salafists, led to the initial organization of Popular Committees in the area west of al-Qusayr (al-Akhbar [Beirut], October 27, 2012). These committees are believed to be fighting opposition forces that include Jabhat al-Nusra, the Farouq Battalions (aligned with the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front) and several other fighting groups aligned with the Free Syrian Army (as-Safir [Beirut], March 1). 

The Battle for al-Qusayr 

Recent fighting in the region was launched by the Syrian military and its allies (allegedly including Hezbollah) with the support of Syrian military airpower in order to seize al-Qusayr from armed opposition forces (al-Arabiya [Dubai], April 21). Popular Committee fighters are reportedly patrolling the Lebanese-Syrian border around al-Qusayr and al-Qasr and to be fighting fierce defensive and limited offensive engagements against committed opposition fighters (AP, April 14; An-Nahar, April 27). These operations are noteworthy as demonstrations of the willingness of the Popular Committees to confront, clear and hold pro-Assad government villages retaken from the armed opposition groups. 

The evolution of the Popular Committees over the course of the Syrian civil war has important implications for the future of civil society in the country. As the Popular Committees in Syria’s most restive regions evolve into locally cohesive divisions of a “National Defense Army,” they have the capacity to present a great challenge to the future military efforts of the armed opposition. Popular Committees, professionally trained in military doctrine and tactics and battle-tested in communal warfare, are demonstrating in Homs and in Damascus’ southern suburbs a readiness to assume the burden of civil defense that the Syrian army increasingly cedes to them. 

Conclusion 

In the event that the Assad government would have to contract its area of control into an Alawite-dominated “rump state” with a capital in Damascus connected to a coastal strip of territory in the provinces of Homs, Tartus and Lattakia, Popular Committees organized on a local level would provide a source of security and manpower to aid police efforts in confronting the armed opposition. The Popular Committee/NDA units could also provide a pan-sectarian, “Syrian patriotic” political veneer and military front for a state likely to remain politically dominated by Alawites but dependent upon a loyal but minority-dominated base of support. In the event of the total collapse of the Assad government, the Popular Committees and the NDA may face severe retribution from the armed opposition and could become major combatants in communal warfare throughout the country. 

Militant Islamist organizations such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the militias of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, including Ahrar al-Sham and the Farouq Brigades, have allegedly been involved in some of the bitterest communal fighting in the country. The potential for communal violence in highly diverse, socially complex regions of Syria, such as Homs, the cities of Damascus and Aleppo and the northeastern al-Jazira region in and around the city of Qamishli, poses immense challenges to necessary transitional processes, including demobilization, disarmament, establishment of the rule of law and the re-integration of militarized communities such as the Popular Committees into a wider Syrian body politic. 

Notes 

1. United Nations News Center, “Both sides in Syria ‘increasingly reckless’ with civilian lives – independent UN panel,” UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, March 11, 2013, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44332#.UYCRako5WzY.

2. Information in this paragraph is based on an interview conducted by the author with a Lebanese Army source with extensive operational experience throughout Lebanon who requested anonymity due to being on active duty. Interview conducted on April 17, 2013.

The overhaul of the armed forces represents one of the pillars on which the transition mechanism brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council is built (Yemen Times, November 22, 2011). Military-security reforms were envisioned as a necessary measure to restore stability and to unify a fragmented army still facing a host of challenges, from the Houthi rebellion in the north to the activities of jihadis and separatists in the south. However, the armed forces’ overhaul had its own political significance, as it could not be achieved without the removal of powerful military figures still loyal to the former regime who were widely considered as a destabilizing force undermining Yemen’s political transition.  

According to Presidential Decree no. 16/2013, the army will be now be composed of seven commands based on geographical districts, with military divisions based on tasks and regional army commanders independent from local military units (Barakish.net, April 11). [1] Most importantly, the Hadi decrees dismissed General Ahmad Ali Saleh, former head of the Republican Guard and eldest son of the ousted President, and General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, former commander of the First Armored Division (Saba News, April 12). Ali Muhsin was a long-time ally of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh before his defection to opposition forces during the 2011 uprising. 

These measures completed the dissolution of two military units largely responsible for the army’s fragmentation and whose rivalry imposed a major obstacle to the country’s transition; the Republican Guard and the First Armored Division. Following the first major military reform process that followed the 1994 civil war, these two units began acquiring a semi-autonomous status within the regular army, gradually surfacing as two power centers in the hands of Ali Muhsin (First Armored Division) and Ahmad Ali Saleh (Republican Guard). [2] Muhsin’s division of some 40,000 soldiers was considered close to the Islamist Islah party (Aloulaye, February 5; Yemen Times, April 25). Muhsin was also the commander of the north-western military region, the site of the almost decade-long battle between the central government and Houthi rebels. 

Under the authority of Ahmad Ali Saleh, the Republican Guard evolved from a small unit protecting the presidential palace to a 130,000 man elite force comprising 18 of the country’s best funded and equipped brigades, a process that changed the balance of power to the detriment of the regular army (Yemen Post, December 14, 2012). Inevitably, the growing ambitions of these two centers of power collided in the midst of the 2011 uprising, when intermittent but violent clashes between the First Armored Division and the Republican Guard erupted in Sana’a following Muhsin’s defection in March of that year.  

President Hadi’s efforts to reform the military began shortly after he took charge in February, 2012. In the following two months, Hadi tried to reassign over 20 senior commanders to other positions, prompting strong resistance from those of Saleh’s allies who were affected by his measures.  

In a sign of how challenging the overhaul has been Air Force Commander Muhammad Saleh al-Ahmar, the former president’s half-brother, openly defied Hadi’s order for several weeks, with his soldiers seizing and shutting down Sana’a Airport for several days before he stepped down on April 25 at the urging of the former president (Yemen Times, April 26). Similarly, Hadi began targeting Ahmad Ali directly in August 2012 by removing some of the Republican Guard’s most powerful brigades from his command. Republican Guard soldiers stormed the Defense Ministry in protest and two civilians were killed and 15 injured in the clashes that followed (Yemen Times, August 16, 2012).    

The major reorganization of the armed forces dates back to the decrees issued on December 19, 2012. These pronouncements established a new structure intended to bring command and control of the army under the Ministry of Defense rather than powerful commanders (Barakish.net, December 21, 2012). Five military branches were created – Army, Air Force, Navy, Border Guards and the Strategic Reserve Force. The Special Forces, previously part of Ahmad Ali’s Republican Guard, and the counter-terrorism unit, previously part of the Central Security Forces headed by Saleh’s nephew, General Yahya Saleh, were integrated into the newly formed Special Operations Command (Yemenipress.com, December 28, 2012). 

The December decrees ordered the dismantling of the First Armored Division and the Republican Guard, although the measures were not immediately brought into effect in the absence of any provisions regarding these units’ commanders, Ali Muhsin and Ahmad Ali (Yemen Times, April 15; April 25). [3] The April presidential decrees served in part to remedy this problem, as Hadi appointed Ali Muhsin the new presidential military advisor and made Ahmad Ali the new ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. Other influential members of the ex-president’s family were also shifted abroad through appointments to the Foreign Service, including Ali Abdullah Saleh’s nephew, Colonel Ammar Muhammad Abdullah Saleh (the new military attaché in Ethiopia), and Ammar Muhammad’s brother, presidential guard commander Tariq Muhammad Abdullah Saleh (Yemen’s new military attaché in Germany)  (Aden Tribune, April 10). 

The appointment of over 20 new commanders in the April decrees further loosened the Saleh clan’s grip on power, whereas the positions of Hadi and Ali Muhsin appear to have been strengthened. Indeed, almost half of the new appointees in the South are considered allies of President Hadi (who comes from the southern governorate of Abyan) while in the north, Ali Muhsin’s associates now control the other half of the military (FnaYemen, April 10; The National [Abu Dhabi], April 15).  

Hadi’s recent decrees mark an important shift towards a more centrally organized Yemeni Army while weakening the personal patronage system that has traditionally entangled the security forces, but questions remain. 

While the removal of the remnants of the Saleh network from command positions will surely diminish the influence of loyalists to the former regime within the military establishment, the balance of power has shifted dangerously towards Ali Muhsin, leaving room for future rivalries along geographic lines. Ali Muhsin’s rise suggests that the exploitation of Yemen’s tribal and patronage dynamics was not just a tactic of the former regime, but also formed a basis for compromises necessary to avoid internal backlash. Although the envisioned aim of Yemen’s military reforms was to reduce the influence of powerful commanders and to create a more unified army, the rise of Ali Mohsin’s associates in the northern districts and the appointment of Hadi’s men in the south risks the creation of further infighting as both forces seek to extend their influence in an increasingly divided country. 

Notes 

1. Yemen Presidential Decree 16/2013, April 10, 2013, https://presidenthadi-gov-ye.info/en/archives/presidential-decree-divides-military-fields-in-yemen-into-seven-geographical-regions-/.

2. International Crisis Group, “Yemen’s Military-Security Reform: seeds of new conflict?” April 4, 2013. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/yemens-military-security-reform-seeds-of-a-new-conflict.aspx.

3. Yemen Presidential Decreee 104/2012, http://nationalyemen.com/2012/12/22/text-of-the-presidential-decree-to-restructure-the-army/. See also the statement of the Ministry of Defense at Barakish.net, December 19, 2012, http://barakish.net/news.aspx?cat=12&sub=11&id=41446.

On February 5, a popular protest in the capital of Dhaka against verdicts issued in the ongoing war crimes trials and growing Islamic extremism in Bangladesh was led by a few online social media activists and bloggers under the banner of the Gano-Jagarana Mancha (Mass-Awakening Forum). The main impetus was the sentencing of senior Jamaat leader Abdul Kadeer Mollah (accused of killing 344 people) to life imprisonment rather than the widely-expected death penalty. Two other senior Jamaat leaders, Abul Kalam Azad (tried in absentia) and Muhammad Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, had already been sentenced to death for wartime atrocities committed during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. 

Since then, thousands of people from almost all walks of life have regularly poured into Dhaka’s Shahabag Square in protest to demand the death penalty for 1971 war criminals and call for proscriptions on the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) political party and its more violent student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), collectively known as Jamaat-Shibir. Though the movement opposed independence in 1971 and was banned for a time, it now forms the largest political party in Bangladesh. The trials of suspected war criminals are being conducted by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a special panel created to investigate and prosecute those believed to have committed war crimes during the events of 1971. 

During the Bangladesh Liberation War, many Jamaat-e-Islami members acted under the banner of shadowy paramilitaries such as al-Badr, al-Shams and Razakar that were in league with the Pakistan army and Pakistani intelligence agencies. Since then, the movement has sided with groups such as the Islamist Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).   

In retaliation for the protests, radical elements led by Jamaat-Shibir activists and the pro-Islamic Hefajat-e-Islam carried out a “Long March” on April 6 to demand the death of “atheist bloggers,” as the Shahabag protesters are termed by their Islamist opponents. The Islamists have threatened to besiege Dhaka in early May if their 13-point demands are not addressed by the Shaykh Hasina-led Awami League (AL) government. Their demands call for prohibitions against blasphemy and foreign cultural practices, such as candlelight vigils and free speech in social media, which the Islamists claim are responsible for the protests in Dhaka. 

The Islamists have also urged the present government to abolish all laws in conflict with the values of the Quran and Sunnah and to reinstate a 1977 constitutional clause calling for “Absolute trust and faith in Allah” that was removed earlier this year in what the Islamists viewed as an attempt to secularize the state. Stressing that Islam is endangered by the Shahabag protesters, whom they accuse of denigrating Islam and the Prophet, the Islamists accuse the government of taking sides with the “atheists and apostates” of Shahabag Square. 

In deference to the Islamists, Prime Minister Shaykh Hasina ordered the arrest of a number of bloggers and reiterated that the country’s existing laws were sufficient to prosecute those who choose to insult Islam or the Prophet Muhammad. At least three known bloggers who are in the forefront of the Shahabag movement have been arrested by the security forces over their allegedly blasphemous postings (Priyo News, April 3). 

The ICT verdict and rival protest rallies have triggered widespread violence in the country since mid- February. On February 15, Rajib Haider, a political blogger who was part of the Shahabag demonstrations, was killed outside his home by Jamaat-Shibir activists, allegedly for his “anti-Islamic” and anti-Jamaat postings (Bdnews24.com, February 16). On February 28, at least 40 people, including civilians, cadres of Jamaat-Shibir and security personnel, died in clashes that broke out in Rangpur, Gaibandha Satkhira, Thakurgaon and Chittagong. More than a thousand people sustained injuries in these clashes, which continued for several days. The Jamaat-Shibir cadres have also vented their anger on minority communities across the country, attacking Hindu and Buddhist houses of worship and torching Hindu and Buddhist-owned homes and businesses in numerous places. One estimate suggests 524 Hindu families were affected in targeted attacks between Feb 28 and April 1 (Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha [National News Agency of Bangladesh], April 1). 

A series of violent incidents occurred on March 31 following the arrest of ICS president Muhammad Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, who was named as a suspect in almost all the recent acts of violence against secular Awami League members and Shahabag protesters (Daily Star [Dhaka], April 1; Daily Sun [Dhaka], March 31). On April 11, four people were killed and a hundred others injured in clashes between Islamists and Awami League cadres in Khulna and Chittagong during a countrywide dawn-to-dusk shutdown (Daily Star [Dhaka], April 12, 2013). Nearly 60 crude bombs went off on April 24 at 20 locations in Dhaka during a strike called by the BNP-led 18-party alliance to protest the denial of bail to seven top BNP leaders (Daily Star [Dhaka], April 24). 

These incidents are evidence of the continuing sectarian divide in Bangladesh, where disputes over the Liberation War of 1971 threaten to lead the country into a civil war.

Amidst this standoff, intelligence agencies fear that the existing volatility could be exploited by clandestine militant groups aligned with mainstream Islamist organizations. However, even a cursory look at the leadership profiles of the Hefajat-e-Islam-led movement shows that leaders of militant groups have already infiltrated the “Defend Islam” movement and are trying to revive dormant militant groups in the country, such as Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B), a militant group formed in 1992 to pursue Islamic rule in Bangladesh. Police have recently taken custody of Afghan war veteran and HuJI-B leader Farid Uddin Masud and 12 others, including Pakistan nationals who were reported to be trying to revive militancy in Bangladesh in coordination with former Afghan war veterans and Jamaat Shibir operatives. They are also alleged to be recruiting members to carry out subversive activities in Bangladesh, including political assassinations (Daily Star [Dhaka], March 31; The Hindu, April 2). 

Bangladesh is not new to Islamist terrorism. International and local jihadi groups have operated with impunity and the active patronage of political and religious parties like the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islami Okiyo Jote (IOJ – Islamic Unity Front), a conglomerate of smaller religious parties. There are at least two proscribed terrorist groups active in Bangladesh, including al-Qaeda/Taliban inspired Deobandi militant groups like HuJI-B and the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), both of which can trace their lineage to Jamaat-e-Islami. Even legal but lesser-known groups like the Chittagong based Hefajat –e-Islam have controversial origins, with suspicious ties to outlawed militant groups like HuJi and JMB. One of the movement’s leaders, Mufti Fayezullah, indicated recently that the group has suicide squads who are prepared to face any situation to uphold Islam (The Hindu, April 2). 

The existence of a new group, the Islamist militant Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), came to light in early March during the interrogation of five students enrolled at a prestigious university in Dhaka. All five were arrested in connection with the brutal murder of prominent blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, who played a key role in organizing the Shahbagh movement by demanding the execution of Islamists on trial for alleged atrocities committed during the 1971 Liberation War. In early April, the detective branch arrested four more ABT members for attempting to murder another blogger, Asif Mohiuddin. (Daily Star, April 2). Police got their first clue of ABT's existence from the Ansar al-Mujahideen English language forum, an al Qaeda-affiliated website that posted news of the arrested students under the heading "Five Lions of the Ummah." A deeper probe into the website revealed the existence of another extremist site, bab-ul-islam.net, founded last year to target young people in English-language colleges and universities for recruitment to Islamist militant groups (Khabar South Asia, April 3). 

Another Hefajat leader, Maulana Habibur Rahman, is a proponent of Taliban-style rule and has connections to militant movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Maulana has admitted in the past that he and eight other Muslim leaders visited the HuJI offices in Karachi and Peshawar in 1998 and met with HuJI-Pakistan chief Saifullah Akhtar and late al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan (Daily Star [Dhaka], April 7). 

While mainstream political parties like the Awami League and the BNP take this opportunity to play vendetta politics ahead of general elections this year, religious parties like Jamaat-e-Islami and Hefajat -e-Islam are attempting to carry out mass mobilization against the government with the support of fringe Islamist groups and formerly subdued militant proxies. The anti-government “Defend Islam” movement is directed at diverting the nation’s attention away from past war crimes and to possibly pave the way for an expansion of religion-based politics and the spread of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh.

ISLAMIST VIOLENCE IN TRIPOLI DEFIES EFFORTS TO RESTORE SECURITY IN LIBYA  

To cope with the rampant insecurity that allowed the deadly Islamist attack on Algeria’s In Aménas gas plant to be mounted from southwestern Libya, Sabha was one of several southern regions declared a closed military zone in December, 2012, with temporary closures to border crossings with Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan (see Terrorism Monitor, January 25).

Sabha – The Disputed Oasis

Located some 500 miles south of Tripoli, the town of Sabha, with a population of roughly  200,000, is dominated by a massive Italian-built fort (Fortezza Margherita, but now known as Fort Elena), a legacy of Italy’s brutal occupation of the Libyan interior in the early 20^th century. Most residents belong to Arab or Arab-Berber tribes, but the Tayuri and al-Hijra neighborhoods belong to members of the Tubu, an indigenous Black African tribe following a semi-nomadic lifestyle in what is now southern Libya, northern Chad and northeastern Niger. Though famed for their traditional fighting skills, the Tubu of Sabha occupy cheap fire-blackened cinder block housing that provides witness to the bitter inter-communal battles that have plagued the oasis town since the Libyan revolution. The Tubu make up only 10 to 15 percent of Sabha’s population, which also includes a number of Tuareg and migrants from Sudan, Chad and Niger who were encouraged to fill jobs in Libya’s oil economy. 

Stripped of citizenship by Qaddafi and denied basic services such as medical care and education by Libyan administrators ordered to treat all Tubu as undocumented aliens, the Tubu see an opportunity to normalize and legitimize their historic presence in southern Libya through specific inclusion in Libya’s new constitution. Earlier this month, the Tubu attempted to educate other Libyans and foreign delegates about the Tubu by holding the first-ever “Festival for Tubu Heritage and Culture” in Murzuk, southwest of Sabha. While the event was attended by a number of members of the GNC, official foreign representation was limited to the Turkish consul and a UN delegate (Libya Herald, April 8). For the Turkish consul, his arrival marked something of a symbolic return to the region: Ottoman troops were beginning to establish posts in the Tubu regions of the Sahara in the early 20^th century prior to being withdrawn after the Italian invasion of Libya in 1912.

A group of Tubu fighters under the leadership of Niger-based militant chief Barka Wardougou (who became close to Tuareg rebel groups in Niger in the last decade) took Murzuk from its loyalist garrison in August, 2011 (Ennahar [Algiers], August 20, 2011). Wardougou and his militia remained in southwestern Libya after Qaddafi’s overthrow (Jeune Afrique, May 17, 2012).

Who Will Control the Borders?

Despite playing a leading role in the expulsion of Qaddafist forces from Libya’s southwest and the southeastern Kufra Oasis region, Libyan Tubus continue to be treated with the suspicion normally associated with pro-Qaddafists. When Sa’adi al-Qaddafi threatened to return from his Niger exile in February, 2012 to lead a new uprising in cooperation with elements of the Libyan military against the “gangs” who controlled Libya, attacks quickly began on Tubu residents of Kufra who were suspected (without evidence) of supporting Sa’adi’s plans for counter-revolution (Jeune Afrique, May 17, 2012; al-Arabiya, February 11, 2012; al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 15, 2012). For now, the Tubu continue to guard the border regions of the southwest, though partly out of self-interest – infiltration by Islamic extremists and narco-traffickers would challenge traditional Tubu control of local smuggling routes. The Tubu are already engaged in a struggle for control of these routes with their local rivals, the Awlad Sulayman Arabs. The Tubu and Awlad Sulayman fought a vicious battle using automatic weapons, rockets and mortars in Sabha in March 2012. The clashes left at least 50 dead and over 160 wounded (Libya Herald, March 28; Tripoli Post, March 29; for the battle, see Terrorism Monitor Brief, April 6, 2012).

In Sabha, incendiary rumors that the Tubu minority are about to take over the city often find a ready audience amongst the Awlad Sulayman and Awlad Abu Seif Arabs. Many Tubu are similarly convinced that the Awlad Sulayman intend to take control of the entire southwest region. Operating under the nominal direction of the Ministry of Defense, Tubu militias remain in control of several sensitive areas in southwestern Libya, including the southern al-Wigh airbase and parts of the Murzuk oil-fields. Calls from the militias for funding and equipment to control the borders have largely fallen on deaf ears. The Tubu not only know the physical terrain, they also know the location of unmarked minefields along the Libyan-Chadian border, deadly relics of the prolonged struggle between Chad and Qaddafi’s Libya for control of the uranium-rich Aouzou Strip.

Return of the Qaddafists

The continued presence of Sa’adi Qaddafi across the border in Niger also contributes to the destabilization of the region. A group of armed men attacked a Sabha police post on April 12, killing a police guard and two others before seizing vehicles and arms from the station.  The next day, over 20 individuals described as supporters of the Qaddafi regime were arrested. According to the head of Sabha’s military council, Ahmad al-Atteibi, the men had confessed to having been infiltrated from abroad with the purpose of setting up a base in the south (SAPA, April 13; News24, April 14). Another police source claimed the assailants were veterans of the Libyan Army’s 32^nd Mechanized Brigade, a well-trained, well-armed and highly loyal unit under the direct command of Khamis al-Qaddafi (a son of the Libyan leader who was killed in a NATO airstrike in late August, 2012 (Libya Herald, April 14). Two vehicles belonging to the attackers were later recovered by the Zawiya Martyrs’ Brigade, a militia hailing from the Berber-dominated Nafusa Mountains of western Libya. Libyan border police also reported arresting a group of Libyans entering the country from Egypt with a large quantity of pro-Qaddafi literature for distribution in Sabha (Libya Herald, April 13).

Libya has been applying intense pressure on Niger to extradite Sa’adi to Libya to face war crimes charges and it is expected that the former soccer player and Special Forces commander will join other members of the Qaddafi family in Oman rather than wait to be returned to an unhappy fate in Libya (al-Shabiba [Oman], March 26; Times of Oman, March 26).

Securing the South

The apparent inability of local security forces to resist attacks on their posts prompted a joint emergency meeting of Libya’s government and the ruling General National Congress (GNC). The meeting was attended by the highest levels of Libya’s administration and security services in an effort to find a solution to the ongoing challenges to government authority in the south (Libya Herald, April 14).

Security forces and militias from northern Libya dislike serving in the south, partly because there are no additional benefits offered to persuade them to serve there. Deployment orders from the Libyan Army command continue to be treated as requests by most of the Libyan militias. Most are unable to cope with the isolation and severe climate of the vast desert expanses south of Sabha, leaving the region largely in the hands of local tribal militias, smuggling bands and roving groups of extremists who may have already established bases in the deserts.

The smugglers, who specialize in arms, fuel, vehicles, subsidized food, narcotics and human trafficking, are usually at least as well-armed and organized as the security forces tasked with their elimination. With under-equipped local security forces often going unpaid for months at a time, it has become much easier to simply purchase free movement through Libya’s ungoverned southwest. Efforts to inhibit the smugglers’ operations can invite retaliation; on March 30, a well-armed smuggling group angered by attempts to restrict their activities attacked the Sabha headquarters of the southern military region command at the Sabha airbase, killing two officers and wounding three other soldiers (Libya Herald, March 30; PANA, April 2).

The Arab-Berber Qadhadhfa, who were regarded as Qaddafi loyalists during the rebellion, have also engaged in deadly clashes with the generally anti-Qaddafi Awlad Sulayman tribe, who experienced rough treatment from the former dictator after he suspected them of planning his overthrow. Libyan army Special Forces units under Colonel Wanis Bukhamada were deployed to stop these tribal battles in early 2012. Bukhamada has since survived assassination attempts in both Sabha and his hometown of Benghazi.

Conclusion

The task of securing southern Libya from Islamist militants, narco-traffickers and arms-traders depends greatly upon efforts to reform Libya’s security services, most notably the National Liberation Army. However, with most former rebels preferring to remain under arms with their rebellion-era militias, such efforts have been painfully slow in obtaining results. Northerners dislike military service in the south and enduring suspicion of Tubu motives prevents the GNA from supplying this group with the arms, funds and equipment they need to secure the borders. As clashes with their Arab neighbors continue, Tubu goodwill towards post-revolutionary Libya is rapidly diminishing, as is the potential for this group to assume security tasks in southern Libya that few others are qualified to carry out. The In Aménas attack is a potent reminder of the necessity of securing the strategic Sabha Oasis and the rest of southwestern Libya before well-armed Islamists fleeing the French-led intervention in Mali can set up new operational bases in the region.