At least 30 rebels were killed during the government's response, an offensive through the Gao and Kidal regions of north Mali that included a three-hour battle at Tin Essalek on January 19 (Le Malien [Bamako], January 22). A prisoner who later succumbed to his wounds was identified by the Malian press as Shaykh Abdul, a Lebanese mercenary (Le Malien, January 19). Ag Bahanga proclaimed, "Today, the only alternative offered to us is the counter-thrust and armed warfareË (El Khabar [Algiers], January 25). U.S. Special Forces training missions are based in Mali as part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, but there are no reports of direct U.S. involvement in the government offensive.

The offensive was led by Colonel Elhadj Gamou, a Tuareg, and Colonel Mohamed Ould Meïdou, an Arab from Timbuktu (L'Indépendant [Bamako], February 4). The combination of these two hardened officers with an intimate knowledge of northern Mali's barren and inhospitable terrain shattered Ag Bahanga's forces in a matter of weeks. At the risk of pitting Tuaregs against Arabs, Bamako has allowed Colonel Meïdou to assemble a force of several hundred Bérabich Arabs for the work of eliminating Ag Bahanga's rebels (Jeune Afrique, January 27). Hama Ag Sidahmed, an ATNM spokesman, alleged that Mali's regular army has yielded its place to combined Arab-Tuareg militias designed to fight the Tuareg rebel movement (L'Indépendant [Bamako], February 4). The Bamako government is dominated by the southern Bambara, part of the larger West African Mande group.

Security forces reported the capture of 22 rebels and quantities of vehicles, fuel, food, arms (including heavy machine guns), and ammunition as they swept through the Tuareg camps. A Malian government official claimed that "All the operational and logistical bases of the group of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga have been taken and are under the control of our army and security forces" (Independent, February 11; L'Essor [Bamako], February 11). A spokesman for Ag Bahanga later denied in an interview that any rebel bases had been captured, claiming that the only bases taken by the military belonged to Algerian traders (BBC, February 11). Ag Bahanga's main base was at Tinzaoutin, close to the Algerian border. Other bases were located at Tin Assalek, Abeïbara, Boureïssa, and Inerdjane (L'Essor, February 11). From these locations his men took scores of soldiers hostage and planted land mines on routes likely to be used by the military.

Ag Bahanga has repeatedly rejected participation in the Algerian-brokered peace talks that have brought most Tuareg rebels back into the national fold. Under pressure from the military offensive, Ag Bahanga had a sudden change of heart and appealed to Bamako and Algiers to reopen the peace process, but Mali's government has run out of patience with Ag Bahanga and clearly stated there would be no further negotiations (El Watan [Algiers], February 12; L'Indépendant, February 4). The government in Bamako described Ag Bahanga's appeal as a typical delaying tactic employed whenever things began to turn badly for the rebel leader (Afrol News, February 5). The last of Ag Bahanga's hostages were released on January 25, 2009, after mediation from Libya and Algeria (Afrique en ligne, January 26).

The July 2006 Algiers agreement calls for greater development efforts in the northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal on the part of the national government in return for Tuareg rebels abandoning their demands for regional autonomy. A key part of the negotiations focused on the creation of mixed security units of former rebels and government troops to keep order in the north. Ag Bahanga's rapidly diminishing group of rebels appears to have little public support in the region, possibly confirming speculation that the ATNM is only a front for Ag Bahanga's smuggling activities (Le Malien, January 22; BBC, November 5, 2007).

On February 6, a Malian army officer spoke to the French press from the remote northern region, stating that Ag Bahanga was "no longer on Malian territory" (AFP, February 6). Algerian officials monitoring implementation of the Algiers agreement confirmed Malian reports that Ag Bahanga had crossed into Algeria with Malian troops in a pursuit as far as the border (Ennahar [Algiers], February 6). As the government offensive continued, ATNM fighters and members of Ag Bahanga's own family began to pour into camps where former members of the dominant Tuareg rebel group, The Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC), were gathering for a disarmament ceremony in the town of Kidal rather than follow Ag Bahanga across the frontier (Radio France Internationale, February 12). One of the leaders of those seeking reconciliation with the government is Lieutenant Colonel Hassane Fagaga, who twice deserted the army to join his rebel cousin, Ag Bahanga (L'Essor, September 18, 2007).

The Ag Bahanga rebellion is the latest in a series of Tuareg uprisings in Mali and Niger since those countries gained independence from France in the 1960s. In a promising sign of surrender, nearly 600 former rebels met with authorities in Kidal on February 17 to lay down their weapons and return arms and vehicles seized from government forces (Elkhabar, February 17). The Tuareg rebellion has been exhausted for now, but continuing oil exploration on Tuareg lands in northern Mali promises to provide a new point of contention between the vastly different peoples of northern and southern Mali.

Since 2003, four independently motivated forms of violence have defined Iraq's security environment: the anti-Coalition insurgency, terrorism, sectarianism, and Shiite-on-Shiite violence. As of 2009, the threat posed by these four fronts has been dramatically alleviated due to the formation of the Sunni Awakening councils, Muqtada al-Sadr's self-imposed militia ceasefire, and the U.S. adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy of clearing and holding territory. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has taken advantage of the improved security regime to consolidate and centralize his power. However, Maliki's efforts have hastened a new form of instability many have characterized as inevitable, an instability that has emerged at the intersection of differing strategic interests held by Iraq's two formal governmental institutions: the KRG and the national government in Baghdad.

There are five political issues that characterize the KRG-Baghdad rift:

• Kurdish foreign oil contracts
• Redistribution of oil revenues
• The role and size of the Kurdish peshmerga (militia) forces
• The growing debate over centralization and federalism
• Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution dealing with disputed territories

Last November, five committees consisting of members from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Prime Minister Maliki's Dawa Party, and the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) were formed to tackle most of these unresolved issues. Though progress seems somewhat fruitful when dealing with differences on the gas and oil laws, progress on Article 140 seems to be gaining no traction.

Article 140 is the most contentious issue behind the rising tensions. The article refers to a constitutional provision that sets forth a framework-normalization, census, and referendum -for dealing with territories disputed between the KRG and national government. Its implementation deadline of December 2007 was not met by Maliki, which has frustrated the Kurds. During the former Ba'athist regime, the government executed an "Arabization" campaign in Kurdish territories, expelling Kurdish families from their homes while providing financial incentives for Arab families to replace them. Today, Article 140 represents a symbolic justice to many Kurds who call for a reversal of the Arabization campaign. Though Article 140 represents 30 to 40 territories in dispute in Iraq, most emphasis is placed on the city of Kirkuk. With an ethnically mixed population of Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Christians, the Kirkuk region holds 13 percent of Iraq's known oil reserves (Middle East Times, February 18). Turkey, Iran, Syria, and many in Iraq believe that Kurdish acquisition of Kirkuk will sustain the economic base for a future declaration of statehood, and fear that it may provoke their oppressed Kurdish populations to secede as well.

During a November 20 press conference, Maliki claimed that the Iraqi constitution was put together too hastily and supported amending the governmental provision for federalism. Maliki openly called for greater centralization and for more powers to be allocated to Baghdad. The KRG immediately condemned this idea, warning that the Prime Minister planned to suspend the constitution. Maliki's remarks led the Director of Kurdish Intelligence, Masrour Barzani, to make an early January visit to the U.S. Department of Defense. Barzani told his American hosts that the Kurds planned to fight any changes to the country's constitution, pointing to the implementation of Article 140 as a critical solution to Iraq's political problems (Kurdish Globe, January 9). Today, many Kurds fear that Maliki will use his upgraded political clout to call for a stronger central government, which Kurds fear would undermine Kurdish regional autonomy and any hopes of Article 140's implementation.

Regarding the Iraq Army's January military deployment around Kirkuk, peshmerga leader Mustafa Chawrash said, "The movement of the division is not normal and it is a planned agenda" (UPI, January 22). The army intends to create "a military belt" encircling the city, constraining contact with the Kurdistan provinces of Sulaymaniyah and Erbil and reducing the presence of Kurdish forces in Kirkuk (Kurdish Globe, January 22). Acording to Chawrash, the commander of the Iraqi 12th Division is General Abdul-Ameer Ridha, an ex-Ba'athist who led the same division against the Kurds during the Saddam Hussein regime. The U.S. military imprisoned him for four months before he returned to his post. The division consists of about 9,000 soldiers - 70 percent Arab, 20 percent Kurdish, and 10 percent Turkmen. The Kurdish press claims some Kurdish officers from the 12th Division, like the 9th Brigade and 2nd Battalion commanders, were transferred from Kirkuk to Tikrit city and replaced by Arab and Turkmen officers (Kurdish Globe, January 22).

Last December, then-President George W. Bush signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq, creating a legal framework for a continued U.S. presence in Iraq. In effect since January 1, the SOFA requires U.S. forces to pull out of Iraqi cities by July 2009, with complete withdrawal from the country by the end of 2011. Many Kurds are uneasy about the prospects of the American safety-net disappearing. This fear is in large part inspired by Maliki's use of the Iraq Army for political ends. Last summer, under the pretext of Operation Bashaer al-Kheir-a military campaign directed towards militias and terrorists in Diyala province-Maliki ordered the Iraqi Army to invade Khanaqin (See Terrorism Focus, September 18, 2008). An oil-rich city, Khanaqin is a disputed territory under Article 140. Many Kurds found this military decision provocative and dangerous since Kurdish peshmerga soldiers had occupied the area since 2005.

Dangerous rhetoric has also accompanied the expected American withdrawal and Maliki's use of the military (Azzaman [Baghdad], December 2, 2008). Kurdistan PM Nechirvan Barzani recently suggested the possibility of an Arab-Kurdish civil war if Article 140 was not implemented (Middle East Times, February 18). Kamal Kirkuki, the KRG Deputy Speaker, went so far as to call al-Maliki "a danger to Iraq and to democracy; he is a second Saddam" (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 19). The growing Arab-Kurdish divide is also intensifying on the basis of a classical security dilemma: as a power vacuum develops in accordance with U.S. disengagement, both sides will unilaterally attempt to fill power gaps because neither side can afford to trust that the other's future behavior will be benign. As a senior Kurdish official put it while speaking on condition of anonymity, "Kurds have made a judgment that he [Maliki] cannot be trusted and that's the worst part of this-it's not about the technicalities of oil law and this and that-this issue of trust was shattered" (CSM, December 11, 2008).

While the Obama administration seeks to disengage from Iraq, the transition of power is likely to increase tensions between Baghdad and the KRG as factions compete to out-leverage one another. Maliki's consolidation of power and provincial electoral gains have lessened his dependence on the PUK, KDP, and ISCI-the three factions that once saved his government from collapsing in August 2007. This may provoke a realignment of power amongst Iraq's domestic players. The surprising performance of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi in the January provincial elections will provide an adequate challenge to Maliki in national elections later this year. This circumstance may lead the PUK, KDP, and ISCI to form a common alliance to save Iraqi federalism. Conversely, strong nationalists-like Shiite firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sunni Arab tribesmen-may adhere to an alliance of convenience with Maliki.

AL-QAEDA AND OIL FACILITIES IN THE SHADOW OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

By Murad Batal al-Shishani

In its latest issue, Bahraini weekly business magazine The Gulf reported that Middle East oil companies are spending billions of dollars on security every year and the cost is rising fast, with Saudi Arabia alone expected to spend $14 billion over the next six years (The Gulf, February 21-27).

In the shadow of the global economic crisis-a time when oil prices have seen a great decrease over the last couple of months-it seems that the threat of targeting oil interests by al-Qaeda and affiliated Salafi-Jihadi groups is currently on the rise. Two factors explain the increase in such risks: (1) the Salafi-Jihadi switch to a strategy of waging a war of attrition against their "enemies" in the global economic crisis; and (2) the decrease in oil prices, which al-Qaeda and affiliated groups believe should stay high.

One of the major aspects of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's latest audio tape (January 14, 2009) was a threat to wage a war of attrition against US interests:

The real question is: can the United States persist in its war against us during the coming decades?...[ex-President George W. Bush] created a grave inheritance for his successor, and left him with two unattractive options-like being forced to swallow a double-edged sword that will wound him however he deals with it...If he withdraws from the war, it will be a military defeat. If he continues it, he will drown in the economic crisis. How will he act, having inherited two wars, not one of which he is capable of continuing? And we are in the process of opening new frontlines, God willing (For a full transcript of his speech in English, see http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefabinladen0109.pdf).

Furthermore, the decline in oil prices is not preferable for the Salafi-Jihadists, as the oil is the "entire nation's property" and the ummah (Islamic community) typically benefit from its high prices. In 2004 Osama bin Laden declared that the price of a barrel of oil should reach $100, considering that oil is subject to looting by the United States and its allies. After the foiled attempt to attack the Abqaiq refinery in 2006, al-Qaeda issued a book that legitimized the targeting oil pipelines and oil workers who facilitate the looting of the ummah's wealth, but forbade the targeting of oil wells and fields, as they belong to the ummah (See Shaykh Abd-al-Aziz bin Rashid al-Anzi, Hukm Esthdaf al-Masalih al-Nftiah [The Religious Rule on Targeting Oil Interests], 2006).

According to this understanding, it seems that the targeting of oil facilities by al-Qaeda or affiliated Salafi-Jihadis is designed to affect the flow of oil: raising fuel prices in the midst of a global economic crisis seems to be important for al-Qaeda's war of attrition against the West.

SOMALIA'S AL-SHABAAB LAUNCHES SUICIDE STRIKES AFTER AL-QAEDA CALLS FOR ATTACKS ON AU PEACEKEEPERS

Eleven Burundian peacekeepers were killed in a two-man suicide assault on an African Union peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on February 22, 2009. Shaykh Mukhtar Robow "Abu Mansur," the spokesman for Somalia's radical Islamist al-Shabaab movement, claimed responsibility for the attacks shortly afterwards (Radio Garowe, February 22). Al-Shabaab has made extensive use of suicide attacks since 2006, a tactical innovation in Somalia.

The bombings followed a communiqué issued earlier this month by leading al-Qaeda strategist Abu Yahya al-Libi that called for renewed attacks on AU peacekeepers in Somalia (As-Sahab Media Productions, February 13). Abu Yahya frequently provides advice or direction to al-Shabaab, urging them to reject all efforts at reconciliation, even with fellow Islamists deemed to lack sufficient enthusiasm for a relentless jihad against secularists, nationalists, and foreign troops (muslm.net, June 23, 2008). In turn, Abu Yahya has been praised by al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Ahmad Abi Godane and greeted in the martyrdom videos of Somali suicide bombers.

Abu Yahya's message opened with congratulations to the "brave, well-born tribes" of Somalia and its "courageous heroes of jihad" for their "splendid victory" over the Ethiopian military after it withdrew from its occupation of Somalia in January. The senior al-Qaeda leader points out that the withdrawal was not achieved as a result of diplomatic efforts, but through a jihad carried out by patient and serious men: "It was impossible for those [Somali] men to flee the heat of the battle while seeing the forces of the Abyssinians [Ethiopians] raiding their homeland, raping their women, tyrannizing their elderly people, massacring their youth, and boasting on their land."

Describing the peacekeeping mission as a kind of concealed occupation, Abu Yahya urges al-Shabaab to attack the AU peacekeepers with all the determination they applied to attacks on Ethiopian forces:

[Concealed occupation] has been adapted by the West as a new method to control Muslim countries by flashing slogans like "Peacekeeping Forces" and others that belong to either the UN, the African Union, or other regional or international organizations. Therefore, you should continue to carry out your attacks on the Ugandan [and Burundian] forces that occupy your territory, so you would inflict them with what you have done to the crusader Ethiopian forces. Kill them everywhere you find them without distinction. Take them on, close in on them, and disable them through ambushes.

Abu Yahya also urges al-Shabaab to do everything it can to avoid internal disputes (a constant problem in the radical organization) and avoid needlessly antagonizing the Somali people (another problem stemming from al-Shabaab's crude application of a version of Shari'a law). Somalia's new Islamist president, Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, is denounced as "one of the Karzais [Quislings] of modern times" that have begun to proliferate in Muslim countries. According to Abu Yahya, the "enemies of Islam" seek to bring Somalia "within their orbit and control it as they please, forcing you to believe its legitimacy and adhering to the decisions of their organizations, while wasting your efforts, burying your sacrifices in its graveyards and looting the wealth of your country."

The cross-border Haqqani network currently poses the most serious threat to Coalition forces, having expanded its suicide operations from east Afghanistan into Kabul and Afghanistan's southern regions (see Terrorism Monitor, March 24, 2008; Terrorism Focus, July 1, 2008). The network is led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran jihadi leader in his late 70s believed to have close ties with Taliban supreme leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. His son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, alias Khalifa ("the Successor"), is considered to be the mastermind of most suicide attacks inside Afghanistan for the last two years. The network is based in Danda Darpa Khel, a town near Miran Shah, the headquarters of the North Waziristan tribal agency in Pakistan, close to the border with Afghanistan. Sirajuddin, who is in his early thirties, is highly influential on both sides of the border, especially among the new generation of young and aggressive Taliban fighters. The United States has placed a $200,000 bounty on his head.

Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) is a Pakistani militant group which was established in 1985, aiming to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. However, at the end of Soviet-Afghan war in 1989, the group entered Kashmir to fight Indian troops. It is suspected that during the past few years HuM has once again started exerting influence in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan's tribal areas and the NWFP. The United States has added HuM to its list of designated terrorist organizations (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 30, 2007).

The continuing suicide attacks inside Kabul have gained momentum at a time when the new administration of President Barack Obama is planning a troop surge in Afghanistan and possibly a new counterterrorism strategy. A suicide bombing in Urozgan Province that killed 27 policemen at the same time the NDS was announcing the roundup of the Kabul cell demonstrates the difficulty authorities face in eliminating the threat of suicide attacks (Voice of Jihad, February 2; Afghan Islamic Press, February 2).

The clear loser in the elections is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). A pro-Iranian Shi'a party that was part of the Shaheed al-Mihrab list (a coalition of Shiite political parties), ISCI lost considerable support following allegations of corruption, mismanagement, and incompetence in recent years (al-Jazeera, February 5). With the loss of seven Shia regions that it took in the 2005 elections, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's party is now one of the weakest parties on the political map (Middle East Online, February 5). The news comes as a major blow to the leaders of the ISCI, who hoped that a victory in the elections would help them create a nine-governorate federal region in the south of the country. Meanwhile, Sunni politics saw an increase in voter participation along with the rise of new tribal-political factions in Anbar province like the Awakening Alliance, which won 17 percent of the votes, and the anti-al Qaeda faction of Sunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq, with 17.6 percent of the votes (Niqash, February 12; al-Jazeera, February 5).

Accordingly, the Salah al-Din province, with a large Sunni population, claimed the highest level of voter participation (65 percent), a sharp contrast from 2005, when Sunnis boycotted the elections to protest the American influence in Iraqi politics (Fars, February 1). In another example, the Sunni al-Hadba bloc came out on top of the Kurdish factions in the ethnically mixed province of Nineveh, taking away the Shi'a and Kurdish hegemony in Baghdad and the central provinces (Middle East Online, February 5). With 51 percent overall voter participation, the elections have been described as a major success for a country still undergoing a significant transformation after years of single-party rule (IRNA, February 5).

The election results, however, involve a number of salient implications, which can be more complex than early readings suggest. In a sense, the elections signal a shift away from the project of regionalization (federalism) that, according to many Iraqi nationalists, put the country's political stability at risk with the promotion of ethno-sectarian identity politics (Niqash, February 3). But what the results primarily verify is the growing fragmentation of the Iraqi political landscape, marked by major splits between larger Shia parties (like ISCI) and the Dawa. Furthermore, divisions have also emerged within Sunni parties, especially inside the Tawafuq Front, with several parties pulling out of the coalition due to the overwhelming domination of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) in the Sunni coalition (Niqash, February 3). There is also the newly formed nationalist faction, the Iraqi National Project, which mainly ran on nationalistic rather than sectarian agenda (Middle East Online, February 11). On the Shi'a front, new political trends can be detected with the appearance of independent groups like the Yusuf al-Hububi party in Karbala and the decline of more established pro-federalist Shi'a parties like Fadhila in Basra, winning only 1.3 percent of votes (Aswat Al-Iraq, February 5).

Some troubling signs that merit serious attention have emerged from the election outcome:

• First of all, the latest results of the elections hardly indicate that the State of Law coalition (al-Maliki's faction) has won a sweeping victory, especially in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a provinces where Sadrists still maintain some level of influence, despite the fact that Muqtada al-Sadr's group was banned from participating on the grounds that it maintains a militia (Middle East Online February 9). In Karbala, for instance, where al-Maliki's Dawa party won a clear victory in 2005, the independent Yusuf al-Hububi party surprised many when it beat out many famous Shi'a competitors in the province. So, in many ways, al-Maliki's grip on power still still seems shaky. This is partly because of the way some Shia voters are beginning to see Maliki as someone who backs certain former Ba'athists, a perception promoted by the ISCI ahead of the general elections. Thus, al-Maliki's true degree of success is still unknown.

• Second, there is the possibility of a backlash from the pro-federalist factions, especially the Kurdish bloc, which may lead to the emergence of a more centralized state and a considerable threat to their regional or party interests. This may complicate the political situation even more with regards to the Kurdish claim over Kirkuk, where, due to major differences between Baghdad and Erbil, the provincial elections never took place (al-Jazeera, February 1). In the southern regions, the province of Misan has already begun to see a pro-federalist backlash. More than a week after the elections, a total of 25 parties formed an alliance to launch a civil disobedience demonstration to protest the results of the polls (Aswat al-Iraq, February 12).

• Third, the elections shed light on a deepening rift within the Shi'a bloc, which could enhance competition and a potential outbreak of violence for control over territories. While the ISCI will likely seek to repair its losses in the general elections by becoming more competitive on the local level in provinces like Basra and Diyala, the Sadrists, who appear to have been largely marginalized as a result of Baghdad's political and military tactics in the previous year, could see the current situation as a threat and reconstitute the Mahdi Army. In fact, the Sadrists are already alleging voter fraud in the provinces of Maysan, Najaf, and Dhi Qar, while Sadr has issued a new statement that rejects negotiations of any sort with Washington, recalling the group's commitment to armed resistance (Middle East Online, February 9; Fars, February 1). In many ways, the Sadrist factor is still relevant and the elections bring to light how intra-Shi'a politics are entering a new stage of competition, rather than coming to an end.

• Fourth, the latest string of coordinated attacks southwest of Baghdad, Karbala, and Nasseriya suggests an existing organized insurgent movement that seeks to interrupt the fragile political situation on the ground (Aswat al-Iraq, February 12).

• Finally, there is Iran. For the most part, Tehran's hardliners are aware of their loss of influence in Iraqi politics as a result of the ISCI's decline in popularity and the advent of Iraqi nationalism with the victory of al-Maliki. Yet Iranian newspapers maintained a low-key position on the rise of Sunni political factions and, in some instances, described the latest results as a clear victory for "Islamist" groups with the aim of keeping religion as the basis of the Iraqi political order (Fars, February 5). The ISCI's defeat in the elections was described as a major "victory," while the decline of Shi'a voter participation, especially in the province of Diyala, was primarily blamed on a lack of security in the southern regions (Fars February 1; IRNA, February 5).

Despite the latest setbacks, Iran remains defiant. On the day the initial results of the elections were announced, Mohsen Rezaee, the Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council (a consultative council to Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenini) and a leading hard-line politician in the Islamic Republic, asserted that Iran still remains the most influential force in the region (Fars, February 5). The remark could be interpreted as a warning to Washington. It remains unclear how Tehran could change its strategy in Iraq, but the Sadrists, whose leader resides in Qom, could play a vital role in such a process.

Of course, most of the above security factors and their impact on Iraq's security situation will depend on whether or not stable alliances will emerge in the post-electoral period and how such coalitions might affect the parliamentary elections later this year. If the Sadrists, for instance, join forces with al-Maliki's ruling party, the chances of internal Shi'a conflict may be reduced if the ISCI seeks to build a coalition with Kurdish factions (Middle East Online February 11). The political landscape could also look very different if ISCI forms an alliance with the faction of Iyad Alawi, signaling the rise of a major political competition between exiled Shi'a factions (both secular and religious) over key positions in the parliament (Niqash, February 12).

In sum, the elections have exposed a sense of national stability that appears to revolve around the rejection of a decentralized and fragmented form of governance, which many Iraqis fear will put the country's fledgling democracy at risk of a resurrection of unruly militia politics. The advent of a centralist-nationalist mood underscores Iraqis' desire for restored sovereignty in a state that is efficient, centralized, and capable of providing its citizens with security and economic stability without the help of foreign forces.

The biggest loser in the provincial elections was the Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) party. The ISCI went from being the hegemonic party in Iraq's southern provinces to an embarrassing second- or even third-place showing in most southern provinces. Iraq's Shiite prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, emerged in turn as the elections' biggest winner, greatly improving on the weak following his Dawa party attracted in previous elections. Al-Maliki even seems to have attracted significant numbers of votes from outside his Shiite sectarian base by downplaying religious themes in favor of Iraqi nationalist slogans and the promise of security and strong government - issues with appeal to Sunni Arabs, secular voters and even Christian Iraqis. Where he was once regarded by many as an ineffective compromise choice for Iraqi Prime Minister, al-Maliki has now managed to shape his image into that of the strong leader many Iraqis believe they need.

Iraqi Kurds view these results with concern. In Iraq's federal level of government, the ISCI has generally worked closely with the Kurdish parties and shared their goal of a highly decentralized Iraqi federalism, with a weak central government in Baghdad. If the provincial elections indicate what the national-level parliamentary elections will look like when they are held in late 2009, Iraq's Kurdish parties will need a few more political allies to compensate for the ISCI's decline. If Arab Iraqi leaders think they can get more votes and support with a platform of Iraqi nationalism and strong central government, as Al-Maliki seems to have done, such political allies may become increasingly hard to find.

Part of al-Maliki's ascendance seems to be occurring at the expense of the KRG. Kurdish relations with al-Maliki went from reasonably positive in 2006 (when Kurdish parties saved al-Maliki's government from collapse as Shiite and Sunni parties withdrew their support), to increasingly tense in 2008 and early 2009. Much of the Iraqi Arab electorate appears resentful of Kurdish gains since 2003, and displays little patience or understanding for Kurdish demands. Politicians like al-Maliki have moved to capitalize on this resentment and burnish their Iraqi nationalist credentials. Al-Maliki and his ministers now increasingly criticize the KRG; at a press conference on November 20, 2008, al-Maliki questioned the activities of the Kurdish peshmerga militias and accused the KRG of violating Iraq's constitution by developing an independent oil industry and opening diplomatic offices in foreign countries (IHT, December 2, 2008).

The KRG struck back by citing what it described as the Prime Minister's own violations of the constitution:

It is unfortunate and deeply regrettable that the [November 20] press conference of Iraq's Prime Minister illustrates efforts being made to take the people of Iraq back to a period we are desperately trying to get beyond. It was a period where the excessive concentration, or centralization, of economic and political power condemned all Iraqi peoples to unimaginable suffering....Though the Prime Minister has taken the oath to promote and protect the Constitution of Iraq - as it currently exists - it is, indeed, disconcerting when he cites the Constitution in attacking others while apparently violating it when taking unilateral decisions. The Prime Minister is obligated to act within the limits of the current constitution and not in accordance with a future constitution he may prefer (KRG.org, December 1, 2008).

KRG leaders have also condemned al-Maliki's move to recruit and arm "support councils" in their region and the disputed territories south of it. According to the KRG, al-Maliki has approached Arab tribal leaders in northern Iraq (including those who had collaborated in Saddam's military campaigns against Kurdish rebels) in an apparent effort to create a militia directly loyal to him (KRG.org, December 1, 2008). KRG President Masoud Barzani has also accused al-Maliki of marginalizing Kurds in the Iraqi army while appointing his own people to head each of Iraq's 16 army divisions, rather than following the legal parliamentary procedure of choosing such commanders by consensus (Los Angeles Times, "Interview with Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani," January 12).

Additionally, al-Maliki has deployed Iraqi army units northwards to areas the Kurds want to incorporate into their autonomous region. The Kurdish Autonomous Region of today consists simply of the areas from which Saddam Hussein withdrew his forces in 1991, and does not include many predominantly Kurdish areas just south of 1991's "Green Line." One such mostly Kurdish town south of the autonomous region is Khanequin, where al-Maliki suddenly sent an Iraqi army brigade in August, 2008, to "help with security." The Arab Iraqi army unit nearly traded fire with the Kurdish peshmerga sent to intercept them before mediation led both forces to agree that neither group would enter the town.

For towns just south of the Kurdish autonomous region's accidental borders - like Khanequin, Makhmour, Kalar, and Chamchamal - the significant oil resources around them only add to the determination of both Baghdad and the KRG to control them. The multi-ethnic demography of larger towns like Kirkuk and Mosul - with Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, and Christian populations - further complicates the issue. Kurdish leaders who would negotiate away historic claims to areas like Kirkuk or surrender any measure of Kurdish autonomy would undoubtedly be committing political suicide. Although Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution stipulates that these areas must have a referendum to decide whether or not to join the KRG region, several deadlines for the referendum (the first in December 2007) have already come and gone. Kirkuk did not even get to vote in the 2009 provincial elections, as disagreements over who gets to vote in that province still await resolution (the three KRG provinces of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniya did not have provincial elections either, since they are functioning under a separate KRG electoral calendar). A deadline of March 31, 2009, for a special parliamentary committee to table a new Kirkuk election law will probably be missed as well. In Diyala and Nineweh provinces just south of the KRG, Kurds largely controlled the provincial councils (as they do in Kirkuk) due to a 2005 electoral boycott by Arab Sunnis. Last month's electoral results mean they will be expected to relinquish control of Nineweh (Mosul) to the Sunni Arab Hadba party (which garnered 48.4 percent of the vote to the Kurdish Alliance's 25.5 percent) and control of Diyala to the Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party (which garnered 21.1 percent of the vote to the Kurdish Alliance's 17.2 percent).

These developments, combined with Prime Minister al-Maliki's increasingly tense relations with Kurdish leaders, seem to foreshadow a difficult year ahead for Iraqi Kurds and their leaders. As the security situation in the center and south of Iraq improves, an increasingly confident al-Maliki-led government appears less conciliatory and more aggressive towards Iraqi Kurdistan. According to The Economist, "Mr. Barzani is said to have recently told Mr. Maliki to his face: ‘You smell like a dictator'" (November 27, 2008). Arab Iraqi voters in turn appear to be rewarding al-Maliki for his assertiveness.

Iraq's Kurds may hope that divisions among the Arab Iraqi political parties remain serious enough to force some of them to maintain Kurdish allies. Failing the emergence of a fractious, weak, and inward-focused political scene in Baghdad, Iraqi Kurds risk a difficult time ahead. If the government in Baghdad continues to consolidate, KRG leaders may find few friends in the region (besides the mountains) to turn to in case of political difficulties, especially given the current plans to withdraw U.S. troops within two years.

Fiercely attack the enemies and intensify attacks against the occupiers. Cut and blow up their communication lines, destroy the bridges and roads they use, but don't interfere in social issues such as women's head cover[s], satellite dishes and other controversial social issues until further notice. Be careful not to kill Sunni civilians who didn't support apostate tribesmen. Concentrate your efforts on killing the real enemy to avoid starting new battlefronts with Sunni Arabs and don't close the door of repentance in the face of those who turned against us.

EGYPTIAN ISLAMISTS URGE AL-QAEDA TO DECLARE A TRUCE

Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah (JI - The Islamic Group), once one of Egypt's most feared Islamist terrorist organizations, has issued a statement urging al-Qaeda to observe a ceasefire to better assess the intentions of the new Obama administration in Washington (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 24).

JI has observed its own ceasefire agreement with the Egyptian government since March 1999. The agreement followed a number of spectacular terrorist attacks by the group, such as the 1997 Luxor attack that killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians. These attacks, however, only succeeded in alienating the movement from public support. The targeting of tourists and the tourism infrastructure proved highly unpopular in a nation that relies heavily on revenues from these sources (up to $4 billion per year in much-needed foreign currency). The group's often pointless attacks on Egypt's large Coptic Christian community inflamed sectarian divisions within the country while doing little to further the Islamist cause. In August 2006, al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Egyptian national Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced the merger of JI with al-Qaeda, but this development was immediately denied by JI leaders within Egypt (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 14, 2006).

The JI's chief theorist, Shaykh Najih Ibrahim, was released in 2004 after spending 24 years behind bars following his conviction as a ringleader in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. Since then he has adopted a more conciliatory role in Egypt while rejecting the violence of al-Qaeda: "Their aim is jihad and our aim is Islam."

Shaykh Najih rejected a call from al-Qaeda strategist Abu Yahya al-Libi for immediate attacks on Britain and other Western nations as retaliation for the Israeli assault on Gaza: "We fear that the al-Qaeda organization might carry out operations that will turn Obama into another George Bush and turn the good [in President Obama's stated intention to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and close Guantanamo Bay], albeit small, into evil from which only Israel will benefit" (Al-Arabiya TV [Dubai], January 23; Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 24).

Isam al-Din Darbalah, a long-time JI leader, also issued a statement addressed to all levels of al-Qaeda's leadership and membership. Noting that President Obama appears ready to abandon "Bush's dead-end and crazy path," Isam al-Din urged a four-month ceasefire designed to test American intentions: "Say [to the Western states] without fear: 'We will not start fighting you in the next four months, unless in self-defense, awaiting fair and practical stands on the part of Obama. We welcome a peace based on respect for the Islamic identity and our peoples' right to live independently under their creed and shari'a and on the basis of common interests with America and the world for the good of humanity, away from the conflict of cultures.'" While still in prison, Isam al-Din collaborated with Najih Ibrahim and several other imprisoned JI leaders in a reassessment of religious extremism entitled "Correcting Concepts." He later contributed to a book-length study of al-Qaeda's strategy that criticized the group for a flawed understanding of reality and the capabilities of the Muslim nation.

AL-QAEDA'S LEADER IN AFGHANISTAN RETURNS FROM THE DEAD TO THREATEN INDIA

Despite Pakistani claims to have killed al-Qaeda's commander in Afghanistan last summer, the veteran Egyptian militant Mustafa Ahmad "Abu al-Yazid" (a.k.a. Shaykh Said al-Misri) appeared in a 20-minute video last week threatening India with a repetition of last November's terrorist outrage in Mumbai. Al-Yazid spoke of the shame India endured through its inability to contain the Mumbai attack and warned India that it could expect more of the same if it dared to attack Pakistan: "India should know that it will have to pay a heavy price if it attacks Pakistan... The mujahideen will sunder your armies into the ground, like they did to the Russians in Afghanistan. They will target your economic centers and raze them to the ground" (Press Trust of India, February 10; BBC, February 10).

Lest anyone think the al-Qaeda commander was in league with Pakistan's government, al-Yazid urged the masses of Pakistan to overthrow the government of President Asif Ali Zardari and declared that former president Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on the order of al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Abu al-Yazid is a former member of al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad group and served several years in prison before leaving Egypt for Afghanistan in 1988. Already under an Egyptian death sentence issued in absentia for terrorist activities in that country, Abu al-Yazid spent two years in Iraq before being appointed leader of al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan in May 2007. The 54-year-old appears to be primarily a financial and logistical manager for jihad activities (in the original intention of al-Qaeda) rather than a military leader (see Terrorism Focus, July 3, 2007; March 18, 2008; July 29, 2008).

Reports of Abu al-Yazid's death in an August 12, 2008, Pakistani airstrike were carried widely in the international press at the time, though Pakistani authorities offered no evidence for their claim. A spokesman for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) denied the reports of Abu al-Yazid's death (AFP, August 11).

One of Pakistan's largest newspapers carried a report saying intelligence experts had determined Abu al-Yazid's statement was actually the work of India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (Jang [Rawalpindi], February 11). The intent was to "defame Pakistan and show that it has links with Al-Qaeda."