Twenty percent of Mongolia’s imports today are petroleum products. Mining Minister Davaajav Gankhuyag, a well known supporter of resource nationalism, has commented "In order to get rid of petroleum supply from one route (Russia), we are negotiating with third parties that brings some positive results” (InfoMongolia, March 21). This is not, however, a new Mongolian oil strategy. Back in 2009, Dashzeveg Amarsaikhan, then-Chairman of the Petroleum Authority, stated “We shall have more leverage once we manage to diversify our sources and reduce captive dependence on one supply source. The Government is clear about this and has been working to achieve that objective. Things will get better once we extract enough oil at home and also have a refinery here” (en.mongolianminingjournal.com, October 8, 2009). Mongols have claimed for years that the Russian supply has been interrupted for political reasons, such as in May 2011, and that these products are increasingly expensive and fail to meet soaring consumer and industrial demand. Although Mongolia is sensitive to Chinese activity in the mineral sector, it is willing to let China become a significantly larger supplier of oil products, at least in the short term, to break the back of its dependency on more expensive Russian petroleum products. This temporary strategy may work in China’s favor to ease the bilateral tension generated by Mongolia’s increasing concern over the large volume of Chinese investment in its minerals. While certainly a more positive development from China’s point of view, Mongols are clear that they see the future of their petroleum supply in creating their own refinery infrastructure.

For decades, Mongolia was over 90 percent dependent on Russian imported petroleum products, mainly acquired from Rosneft Company.  In 2012, it imported a total of 1.2 million tons of oil, of which petroleum products comprised 1.1 million tons—64 percent of which was imported from Rosneft. As of the first three months of 2013, imports from Rosneft have been decreased by another 30 percent, so, in the first quarter of 2013, Mongolia has imported 50 percent of its monthly supply from Switzerland’s Gunvor Group (the fourth largest crude oil trader in the world which obtains much of its crude oil from the Russian Federation), South Korea’s SK Energy and Hyundai Oilbank, in addition to the China, at prices that average $100-200 per ton cheaper than Rosneft. So far, however, these lower prices have not been reflected at the gas pump. In fact, Speaker of the Mongolian Parliament Zandaakhuu Enkhbold, back from a March U.S. trip, complained that Mongolian consumers pay more for gasoline than Americans (mongoliaeconomy.blogspot.com, March 18).

Mongolian Oil Sites Move from the Soviets to the Americans to the Chinese

Historically, petroleum production and drilling with a small refining operation were initiated by the Soviet Union in the 1960s, although the first find was in 1947. Petroleum operations ceased in 1969 because of well pressure decline, the refinery destruction by fire, and the discovery of giant oil fields in western Siberia. With the collapse of communism, the Petroleum Authority in 1991 began granting foreign exploratory licenses in order to obtain technical and financial assistance from Western companies and purposefully barred China from such licenses in its oil sector. The trend over the years, however, has been for the private western companies to sell out to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with the Mongols powerless to stop it. Exploration studies first were carried out by British Petroleum and Philips Petroleum between 1990 and 1993.  Through Mongol Gazryn Tos (MGT), the state-owned petroleum company, the Mongolian government signed a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) in 1993 with SOCO International of Fort Worth, Texas and its first exploration well was drilled in Dornod province near the Chinese Manchurian border in 1994. Later, PSC agreements were concluded with two other Texas-based U.S. oil companies—Nescor Energy Company of Austin and Medallion Petroleum of Houston to work with existing production capacity in the southeast Gobi desert and the Tamsag Basin in the northeast [1]. SOCO partnered with Huabei Oilfield Services of China, which provided drilling services, and trucked its crude to China before finally selling out completely in 2005 to SOE PetroChina Daqing Tamsag (PCDT)—much to Mongolia’s shock.

Nescor Energy, between 1994 and 1997, conducted exploration and appraisal operations in the southeast Gobi with a U.S. Trade Development Agency grant, and, in February 1997, the Mongolian government gave up to Nescor its 50 percent stake in these fields, which covered 13 million acres, (New Straits Times, February 27, 1997). The next year a Joint Venture of Gulf Canada and ROC Oil (Sidney, Australia) acquired all Mongolian rights and assets of Nescor Energy. Crude then was exported by truck, pipeline and train into China.  In January 1999, Gulf Canada withdrew from the JV due to the oil price downturn. Later in June 2001, ROC Oil sold out its interests to Dongsheng, a subsidiary of SINOPEC.  This action and the PCDT buyout enabled China to take control of Mongolia’s oil sector, a result that has made Mongolian policymakers uncomfortable ever since. With so much Chinese investment in the oil sector and with China being the major customer for Mongolia’s exported crude, the Mongolian public also has raised concerns about the ramifications of massive Chinese investment. Publicly, Mongolian officials have claimed that they “do not choose an investor on the basis of its country, but look for the most competitive offer and one that offers the maximum benefit and profit to Mongolia. These are our criteria, nothing else. We work for our national interests and considerations like a company’s base country are immaterial. Geopolitical factors do not affect our decisions” (en.mongolianminingjournal.com, October 8, 2009). The government of Mongolian President Tsakhia Elbegdorj, however, has implemented plans to diversify petroleum sources in the near-term while developing domestic production through new oil refineries. For example, in accordance with the Government's Action Plan for 2012–2016, construction will start on a Mongolian-Japanese joint venture “Darkhan-Petroleum” refinery with annual capacity of at least 2 million tons in Darkhan-Uul province, about 150 miles north of Ulaanbaatar. The Feasibility Study has been finished, so work will commence this year with a completion date by the end of 2015.

The Petroleum Authority of Mongolia has estimated that there are four to six billion barrels of recoverable oil in Mongolia: “Despite the scarcity of exploration data on Mongolia’s petroleum potential, caused by interruption of exploration activities for the last 25 years, positive geological and geophysical data, reported oil seeps throughout the sedimentary basins and recent discoveries of oil and the geologic similarity…of hydrocarbon basins of Mongolia to adjacent Chinese producing basins indicate the high probability to find substantial petroleum reserves in Mongolia” (www.pam.mn, 2013). Now, there are 30 petroleum fields, 21 of which were established through product share agreements. Of these 21, only 3 sites actually are productive, while the rest are in the exploratory stage under the direction of 14 different companies of which only 4 are Western. These companies include Swiss company Manas Petroleum through its subsidiary Gobi Energy Partners LLC in the east Gobi Basin, Australian Central Asia Petroleum LLC, Canadian Shaman LLC and Canadian Sunwing Energy (Mongolian Mining Journal, September 20, 2012).

Mongolia’s  only three oil producing fields are managed by Chinese majors PetroChina and Sinopec. These are Zuunbayan, Tamsag-19, and Tamsag-21, which in 2012 produced a total of 482,000 tons of crude oil (3.6 million barrels), an 11 times increase in production over the last five years (wolfpetroleum.net/Mongolia). Chairman Ulziiburen also announced that in 2013 the Mongolian government intends to increase volume from these three sites up to 660,000 tons or about 5 million barrels for export to China. Zuunbayan is in the south of the country not far from Mongolia’s giant coal-uranium deposit of Tavan Tolgoi and its Rio Tinto-controlled large copper-gold deposit of Oyu Tolgoi. The other two sites are in the northeast near the Chinese Manchurian border. Recently the Mongolian Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy determined that the reserve at the Toson Uul deposits at Tamsag Basin amount to 119.02 million tons and estimated economically recoverable reserves will amount to 13.67 million tons (Montsame, March 19, 2013). Among the important Chinese companies now actively exploring in Mongolia is Mongolia Energy Corporation Limited (MEC) (menggu nengyuan youxian gongsi), a mining and energy development holding company operating in Mongolia and Xinjiang in northwestern China. MEC’s exploratory concessions are in western and southern Mongolia in cooperation with CNPC Daqing Petroleum.  Yet another Chinese company, Gold BC LL, has been working in Mongolia for three years.

Conclusion

This new agreement to exchange crude oil for processed end-products does not mean that Sino-Mongolian relations are dramatically deepening. This new purchase plan, however, does indicate that the two nations can find new ways to cooperate despite the potential for  serious problems in the existing Sino-Mongolian petroleum relationship. Mongolia has been a minor exporter of crude oil to China since the late 1990s. When Petro China acquired received the right to conduct mining operations for the next 20 to 30 years from the SOCO sale, it claimed that 40 million of the 177 million barrels of crude oil reserves in its sites were economically recoverable reserves. PCDT projected it would excavate 93.3 million barrels of crude oil between 2010 and 2019. The original deal included the promise by the Chinese side to build roads between the Tamsag fields and the Bichigt border crossing point by 2011, but, despite increasing exports, no road has been built. In 2012, 500 of its 521 drilled wells were operating and produced 410,000 tons of oil. This is carried in 80 to 100 trucks per day along 31 eroded dirt tracks. PCDT—the largest of four oil exploration companies in the province—has announced that it plans to produce 650,000 tons more this year, because it will constructed new transmission pipelines. The company also is extracting oil in a neighboring province, but transports that crude via a pipeline to the Chinese cross-border refinery instead of by tanker trucks. In a move reminiscent of Mongolian threats to use non-compliance/performance in certain clauses by Rio Tinto in its Oyu Tolgoi contract as the reason to reopen negotiations over the entire contract, this March Speaker of Parliament Enkhbold visited the oil fields of Dornod province and threatened that “If the company [Petro China] fails to build road transportation, their permit is not allowed [to continue]” (english.news.mn, April 8, 2013). This would indicate Mongolian authorities are seeking to reopen the existing contract with PetroChina to seek more favorable terms.

Notes:

1. John C. Wu, “The Mineral Industry of Mongolia, 1999” in U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook—1999, Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey, 1999, pp. 15.1–15.4, available online, <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/asia.html>.

A confluence of elements centered on Iraq’s energy sector, especially its oil component, is aligning to shape a strategic partnership between Baghdad and Beijing. The rapid evolution of Sino-Iraqi ties will have far-reaching implications for both countries and the Middle East as a whole. Chinese investments in the Iraqi energy sector have been instrumental in helping to restore the country’s energy production. Iraq’s return to energy prominence—it surpassed Iran in December 2012 as the second largest producer of oil in the Organization of Petroleum of Exporting Countries (OPEC) and is now the world’s third largest oil exporter—has occurred as China continues its campaign to secure reliable oil and natural gas resources. Iraq achieved over 3 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil production in March and is now regarded as the world’s largest source of new oil. The predicted structural decrease in U.S. demand for imported oil over the long term is also affecting the thinking in Baghdad and Beijing (Financial Times, March 4; Reuters, March 5; December 12, 2012). In this evolving market, major energy producers such as Iraq are determined to enlist new and stable customers as demand for oil from traditional markets such as the United States wanes. China, meanwhile, is positioning itself to absorb available market supply. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has projected that up to 80 percent of Iraqi oil will eventually be exported to Asia in general and China in particular. In the long term, Iraq also hopes to satisfy China’s large demand for natural gas (International Energy Agency, Iraq Energy Outlook, October 9, 2012; McClatchy, March 27).

Measuring China’s Oil Footprint

China’s interest in Middle Eastern energy is well known. It depends increasingly on major oil producers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran to meet its oil needs, and is estimated to import around half of its oil from the Persian Gulf region alone (National [Abu Dhabi], April 4). Despite the inherent risks in dealing with complex and unstable markets such as Iraq, Chinese investors have been gaining a foothold in the country’s energy sector and in doing so have begun to face a unique set of challenges. In addition to having to navigate a tumultuous political and security environment, China is engaging a country that for a long period of time remained effectively under U.S. military occupation even as the central Iraqi government operated under a framework of limited sovereignty.

Under these circumstances, China was able to secure the first major oil accord between the Iraqi government and a foreign entity since 2003 (al-Jazeera [Doha], August 28, 2008). In 2008, China’s state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) concluded a $3.5 billion deal with Iraq’s North Oil Company (NOC) to develop the al-Ahdab oil field—a relatively small oil field by Iraqi standards—in the province of al-Wasit. The agreement negotiated between CNPC and NOC allowed the Chinese energy giant, in concert with its partner Zhenhua Oil to develop and manage the field for a 22-year period (Oil and Gas Journal, September 8, 2008). The 2008 agreement revived an earlier accord signed between Baghdad and Beijing in 1997 that governed Chinese exploration rights in the area. The importance of the agreement to develop al-Ahdab extends beyond timing and provides a glimpse into China’s approach toward investing in the Iraqi energy sector. A Chinese oil executive admitted that the economic fundamentals underlying CNPC’s investment in al-Ahdab was outweighed by the prospect of being able to “get a foot in the door” in Iraq (New York Times, June 28, 2011). With its eye on the future, China appeared to prioritize gaining an early foothold in the Iraqi oil sector that would lay the groundwork for future dealings on larger and more lucrative projects.

Numerous Chinese energy concerns have since concluded a series of major deals governing a range of activities in Iraq. In 2009, CNPC and British Petroleum (BP) signed a joint agreement with Iraq to increase production at the Rumaila oil field, Iraq’s largest oil field. Also in 2009, a consortium led by China’s largest oil producer and CNPC subsidiary PetroChina concluded an agreement with Baghdad to operate Iraq’s Halfaya oil field (AFP, June 28, 2011). The China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) entered the equation through its multibillion dollar purchase of Addax Petroleum, a Swedish energy concern with operations in Iraq. In 2010, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) partnered with Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to sign a 20-year agreement to develop upstream capacity at the Missan oil field (Caixin Online, May 18, 2010). China has concluded numerous upstream and downstream deals with Iraq valued in the billions. China’s presence in the Iraqi oil sector goes beyond exploration and extraction as well. The China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering Corporation (CPPE), a CNPC subsidiary, is reported to have been awarded a contract by Iraq’s Missan Oil Company (MOC) to build a 300-km pipeline to deliver oil extracted from the Missan oil field for export (Azzaman [Baghdad], January 30). According to some assessments, China’s position in the Iraqi oil industry is such that at least one third of all future production of Iraqi oil will be derived from oil fields owned outright or co-owned by Chinese concerns (McClatchy, March 27).

The perception surrounding China’s activities in the Iraqi energy sector in the context of the decade-long U.S. presence in Iraq is also worthy of note. In light of the widely-touted opinion that the United States invaded Iraq, in large part, to dominate its energy reserves, it is important to highlight the tremendous inroads made by China in the Iraqi energy sector following the fall of Saddam Hussein. While U.S. and other Western oil majors have reaped substantial profits in Iraq, it would appear that China, for numerous reasons, was able to realize disproportionate gains in the Iraqi energy sector (al-Jazeera, January 7, 2012). Yet in contrast to similar activities around the globe, China’s expanding profile in the Iraqi energy sector has appeared to receive far less attention. The ongoing violence and instability that typify the situation in Iraq has seemed to allow China to operate relatively below the radar.

Navigating the Geopolitics

China’s growing profile in Iraq also has thrust it into a geopolitical morass of intra-Arab rivalries. Iraq’s reemergence as an energy power has important geopolitical implications that transcend its impact on global supply and demand dynamics. Major oil producers within OPEC—particularly Saudi Arabia, currently the world’s largest producer and exporter of oil as well as the host to the world’s largest known oil reserves—are threatened by the prospect of a resurgent Iraq that is once again attempting to stake its claim as an energy superpower. Much like Iraq, Saudi Arabia also looks to China and Asia more broadly as prime destinations for its energy exports. China surpassed the United States as the top importer of Saudi oil toward the end of 2009 (“Shifting Sands in the Gulf: The Iran Calculus in China-Saudi Arabia Relations,” China Brief, May 13, 2010). In many respects, China’s growing reliance on Iraqi oil threatens to upend a delicate regional balance of power among key energy producers. Specifically, China’s prominent role in helping underwrite Iraq’s resurgence in the energy sphere will be viewed through a prism of suspicion in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia does not relish the prospect of having its preeminent position as an oil power challenged by Iraq, a country it has long seen as a rival. In addition to feeding Saudi concerns, the notable scale and scope of Chinese involvement in Iraq also may elicit unease from China’s other partners in the region. For example, Saudi Arabia’s allies in the energy-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), to varying degrees, are also wary of Iraq’s rising influence. Even in a period of sustained global demand for oil, major energy producers in the GCC are fearful of seeing their influence as energy suppliers diminish as a result of the availability of Iraqi oil on the international market. Reliable access to Iraqi oil, in essence, provides consuming nations with more choices.

China’s deepening involvement in Iraq is also raising trepidation among Iraq’s neighbors because of its potential to impact the course of Iraqi foreign policy. Iraq’s rehabilitation as a major energy producer is viewed as a precursor to the emergence of a more assertive foreign policy. In this context, Iraq’s relationship with Iran is the cause of particular consternation. The conservative Sunni monarchies led by Saudi Arabia are alarmed about what they see as an emboldened Shi’a-led Iraq that has tilted toward Iran. The fact that China continues to view Iran as a strategic partner and vital source of oil and natural gas adds another layer of complexity to the regional climate. China also frequently sides with Iran on international actions concerning Iran’s nuclear program. Yet even as it benefits greatly from its friendship with Baghdad, Iran also understands that the availability of additional oil supplies furnished by Iraq to world markets may leave it more susceptible to harsher economic sanctions over its nuclear program. One of the many criticisms of the U.S.-led economic sanctions on Iran highlights the impact of energy supply gaps due to the removal of Iranian energy supplies from the global market. In theory, Iraqi oil can fill supply gaps resulting from a decrease in exports of Iranian oil. Given this logic, the expansion of Sino-Iraqi relations over energy may cause unease in Tehran, as it must recalibrate its own position to account for the fact that it can be replaced in its role as a major world supplier of oil and, eventually, natural gas.

China’s activities in Iraq also raise important issues relevant to U.S. influence in Iraq and the U.S. position in the wider region. The United States may have withdrawn its military forces from Iraq, but a formidable U.S. military presence remains in place throughout the Persian Gulf. Even as the United States has declared its pivot toward Asia and its desire to work toward energy independence, Washington is not prepared to abandon its presence in the broader Middle East. The U.S. influence in the region provides Washington with a valuable lever of strategic influence over its competitors and rivals alike. These circumstances present important challenges for China down the line, especially as its reliance on the region’s energy resources continues to grow.

As its reach extends further into Iraq, China’s rising profile also threatens to entangle it in a multitude of domestic political disagreements that have widespread ramifications for the future of Iraq and regional stability. The sensitive internal disputes festering between the central authorities in Baghdad and the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) promise to pose a number of challenges to Chinese interests in Iraq down the line. These disputes raise existential questions over the parameters of Iraqi territorial sovereignty and national identity. The Iraqi constitution guarantees the KRG’s autonomy under a federal structure. A series of rows over the status of the disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk, foreign policy, security, revenue sharing and natural resource extraction, however, threaten to unravel Iraq’s fragile unity (al-Monitor, April 4). The KRG has leveraged the relative peace and stability of the northern Iraqi territories under its control to lure foreign investment and engage with its neighbors independent of the central government. Baghdad interprets the KRG’s behavior as an attempt to circumvent its authority in an ultimate bid for independence. Consequently, Baghdad has punished foreign energy majors for their direct dealings with the KRG by excluding them from lucrative contracts in central and southern Iraq. For example, in 2012 Baghdad banned Chevron and other energy majors in retaliation for their direct dealings with the KRG (Financial Times, July 24, 2012). Exxon Mobil, which is operating in Iraq’s massive West Qurna 1 oil field, angered Baghdad when it signed an oil exploration accord with the KRG. Exxon Mobil reportedly has considered selling its stake in West Qurna 1 in favor of focusing on its prospects in Iraqi Kurdistan. Meanwhile, PetroChina has been mentioned as a candidate to buy Exxon Mobil’s assets at West Qurna 1 if it decides to abandon southern Iraq for the KRG or to develop the field jointly with Exxon Mobil if it were to renegotiate its position in Iraq (Reuters, March 25; Reuters, March 5). Moreover, a number of Chinese companies operate in Iraqi Kurdistan. China also has committed itself to establishing a consulate in Erbil in a bid to foster closer ties with the KRG (eKurd.net, January 8). That said, Beijing has been careful not to overstep its bounds in Iraqi Kurdistan by flouting Baghdad’s authority when engaging the KRG. At the same time, it is unclear whether China can remain relatively unscathed by Iraq’s domestic political turbulence for too much longer.

Conclusion

The convergence of mutual interests between China and Iraq over the buying and selling of oil will serve to underpin a long-term strategic partnership. At the same time, the geopolitical realities of a resurgent Iraqi energy sector will present China with an array of difficulties. China has steered these circumstances successfully until now with relative ease. The future may not be as forgiving. The overlapping and divergent interests that are at play in Iraq are likely to compel China to make difficult choices down the line. China has strived to build multifaceted relationships with Iraq and its neighbors through pragmatic diplomacy and lucrative trade while deftly avoiding alienating any of them in the process. But it is also reasonable to expect that China’s partners will someday seek to leverage their respective relationships with Beijing to further their own interests at the expense of their competitors and rivals. As China’s influence and presence in Iraq and the wider Middle East grow commensurate with the scale of its energy interests, regional players may seek to play China off against the United States or other key actors in an effort to strengthen their own positions. To what extent that China is capable of maintaining its delicate balancing act in Iraq and beyond in such an environment remains to be seen.

When speaking to foreigners, senior PLA leaders often say something like what Minister of Defense Liang Guanglie told U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates in January 2011, “The gap between us and that of advanced countries is at least two to three decades” [1]. The senior leadership understands the PLA has made progress in many areas over the last 15 years, especially in some important, well-publicized capabilities, but internally they emphasize the need to educate and train PLA personnel to execute a new doctrine that they have never tested in combat. 

Acknowledging the force’s shortfalls and focusing how to overcome these deficiencies reflect a professional approach to the task of military modernization. It also is the basis for the multi-decade timeline extending out to 2049 that the PLA has set for itself to complete the modernization process. At its most basic level, the recognition of shortcomings is consistent with Sun Tzu’s guidance to “Know the enemy and know yourself.” 

The PLA Constantly Evaluates Its Capabilities and Shortfalls 

Critical analysis of problems in PLA personnel quality, organization, training and logistics can be found in the writings and quotes from operational commanders and staff officers responsible for unit readiness published in Chinese military newspapers and journals. They are almost always in Chinese, directed at the PLA itself or Communist Party members. These evaluations are often buried in longer articles and usually follow the pattern of recognizing improvements that have been made, identifying shortcomings and recommending actions to overcome these problems. Many articles contain descriptions of units learning basic lessons that all militaries confront in training. Many articles, however, describe systemic problems that apply to more than just the individual unit involved and are published as lessons for others in the PLA. This type of analysis is not a new practice and can be traced back through decades of military reporting.

Significant problem areas are identified for all the services. The following sections provide a few examples across three categories from Chinese reports published since 2010. Often reports are couched in terms of “some units,” so it is difficult to assess exactly how widespread the problems are. The difficulties, however, must be common enough throughout the force to merit such public attention. 

Personnel Quality 

The goal of improving the quality of officers, noncommissioned officers, and conscripts has been at the top of the PLA agenda for many years, going back to Jiang Zemin’s guidance in the 1990s: “Though we’re unable to develop all high-technology weapons and equipment within a short period of time, we must train qualified personnel first, for we would rather let our qualified personnel wait for equipment than the other way round” (“Chinese Military Logistics: The GAD System Part II,” China Brief, October 14, 2004). Despite this emphasis, the PLA leadership still sees major shortcomings in the performance of many commanders, staff officers and troops in all services. A few examples of this type of evaluation include the following: 

• Then-President Hu Jintao said “The military is facing prominent difficulties in recruiting soldiers, retaining professionals…Therefore, we must find the solution to these problems by adjusting and reforming related policies and institutions” (Outlook, March 28, 2011); 
• A PLA Daily staff commentator article stated “We must be aware that the overall level of talented personnel in our army is not compatible with the requirements of fulfilling the historic mission in the new century, and the quality of information technology personnel is not compatible with the requirements for the development of combat effectiveness” (China Military Online, April 19, 2011) [2]; 
• Another PLA Daily article focused on the Navy noted “It must be understood that the incompatibility between the requirements to build naval personnel and to build an informatized navy and win informatized maritime wars remains a relatively obvious contradiction” (China Military Online, May 11, 2011); 
• Writing about the state of the PLA’s joint operations capabilities, Major General Chen Pinghua, political commissar of the 14th Group Army, said, “currently there is still a gap between the Party committee’s [unit commander, political commissar, and their deputies] tactical command capability and the requirements to win an informatized warfare in some troop units” (China Military Online, December 22, 2011 in Chinese and December 23 in English).

Old-Style Thinking 

Closely related to the quality of personnel is the need for more innovation in thought and action. Much of the problem traces back to a reluctance to change old practices. Some units must be encouraged to “change their thinking” to actually use the new weapons and equipment issued them. Even recently there have been reports of soldiers who are afraid of using new equipment for fear of breaking or losing it, or because they have not been properly trained in its operation and maintenance (this situation is often referred to as “Lord Ye’s love of dragons,” Yègōng hàolóng). 

• A PLA Daily staff commentator article observed: “Some units have long been mired in the conventional mentality…These units handle issues arbitrarily and in accordance with their personal preferences, and they replace laws and regulations with governance, power, order and personal feelings…a small number of units still exhibit the phenomena of disobeying laws, orders and regulations” (China Military Online, June 7 and 8, 2010); 
• A year later another staff commentator article repeated, “The problem at present is that the phenomenon of failing to obey regulations and/or failing to enforce laws or rules rigidly still exists in some units in one form or another. Some people pay more attention to the rules of men than to the rule of law” (China Military Online, March 21, 2011); 
• Nanjing Military Region commander and political commissar Cai Yingting and Zheng Weiping told party leaders, “At present, due to the long peaceful environment, a small number of military personnel relax readiness in their thinking and mentality…Our forces are short of experience in fighting actual operations under informatized conditions, and there still exists a gap between their military capability and the requirement of winning in war” (Qiushi, March 1).

Training 

Currently, the PLA is experimenting with its training system to implement a new doctrine that incorporates the new and old equipment in the force. Commanders and staff officers recognize problems in both the content and form of training. They seek to conduct realistic training so that their units will “train as you fight and fight as you train” (China Military Online, May 4, 2012). Some personnel, however, take “shortcuts,” like using unauthorized civilian radios or cell phones, which undermine realism and could jeopardize actual operations. Units are trying to find the best way to standardize, monitor and evaluate training and eliminate the problem of “fakery” in order to get good results. 

• Major General Xu Jingnian, commander of the 20th Group Army (a corps-level organization) said “The basic campaign corps face many problems carrying out joint training under current conditions” (China Military Online, January 21, 2010); 
• Major General Chen Zhaohai, director of the General Staff Department Military Training and Arms Department (now the Military Training Department) assessed: “Currently, the PLA’s military training under informatized conditions is still at the initial phase” (Xinhua, January 29, 2010); 
• A PLA Daily staff commentator summarized, “…military training in our army is still generally mechanized. Traditional ideas and habitual practices have not been drastically changed…The level of training support is not sufficient for training under informatized conditions” (China Military Online, March 31, 2011); 
• Major General Zhou Xiaozhou, commander of the 14th Group Army, stated “Some units do not pay attention to training quality and efficiency, waste valuable resources, which affect the scientific upgrading of unit combat effectiveness” (China Military Online, July 24, 2011); 
• After acknowledging progress in military modernization, Lieutenant General Li Shaojun, deputy commander of the Beijing Military Region, reported to the National People’s Congress, “there is a gap between the overall combat effectiveness of the PLA and the requirements of fulfilling new historical missions” (China Military Online, March 13, 2012); 
• Rear Admiral Qiu Yanpeng, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, said, “No matter whether it is in comparison to the navies of other world powers or looking at the needs of the construction and development of the Chinese Navy, there is considerable room for improvement in terms of the strength and results of our distant sea training” (Xinhua, December 11, 2012).

The “Two Incompatibles” 

Most of the examples above come from senior Army personnel in positions of operational authority and responsibility. Similar assessments are found in the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery newspapers. In addition to the areas mentioned above, organizational shortcomings have been a common theme over the past 15 years as the PLA has become smaller, but more technologically advanced. Operational and tactical headquarters have discovered they are not structured adequately to command and control joint and combined arms operations and have undergone significant structural and equipment changes. Likewise, the PLA leadership understands the requirement for its logistics system to keep pace with the changes in its combat systems. The problem of logistics support is complicated by the existence of multiple types of similar equipment in the force. For example, the Army has at least five types of main battle tanks (each with variants) and 12 types of helicopters in its inventory. Each different type of equipment brings with it different maintenance and supply requirements, increasing the complexity of the logistics effort. 

The challenges the PLA faces in its modernization program have been clear to the senior leadership for many years. While they simplify their assessment for foreigners by speaking of a 20 to 30 year gap in capabilities, for their own internal consumption they speak of the “main contradiction” (zhuyao maodun) or the “two incompatibles” (liangge buxiang shiying). This evaluation of PLA (and People’s Armed Police) capabilities has been attributed to Hu Jintao and was first published on January 1, 2006 in a PLA Daily editorial. Though it has been translated in many ways, the statement usually follows these lines: 

Nearly all senior PLA leaders have repeated the “two incompatibles” assessment in speeches or writing. It continues into the Xi Jinping era, found as recently as April 4 and 16, 2013 in PLA Daily. Like other assessments, it is usually buried deep in a Chinese-language article after acknowledging progress in some area has been made. Its purpose is to motivate the troops to continue the difficult task of military modernization. It also may be used within the government bureaucracy to justify continued increases to the defense budget. An accompanying explanation often bears these points out: 

In short, for the senior Chinese leadership, the “Two Incompatibles” are the measure of PLA modernization and a framework for evaluating China’s military capabilities. They understand that although the PLA has made great progress and looks much different from 15 years ago, there remains much work to be done to achieve across-the-board advanced military status. This self-awareness on the part of the PLA leadership suggests that many senior military officials may not be as “hawkish” as they are frequently portrayed. It is possible that their understanding of the many shortcomings in the PLA may embolden them to urge caution in the use of force when advising the senior Communist Party leadership in private. When ordered by the party, however, they will seek to accomplish the missions using all the forces and capabilities at their disposal. Moreover, the professionalism signaled in these self-assessments suggests the PLA may employ these capabilities in ways we do not expect. Discipline and necessity can be the parents of invention. 

Some readers may be skeptical and assume this evaluation is part of a grand strategic deception plan (Sun Tzu said, “All warfare is based on deception”), but nearly all instances of the “Two Incompatibles” and most functional assessments are found in newspapers and journals directed at a Chinese audience. They have not been included in any of the externally-oriented defense white papers. More importantly, such evaluations reveal the practical problems a military will encounter as it moves from the book-learning phase to live training in the field. It is more likely that the “two incompatibles” assessment is related to Sun Tzu’s instruction to “Know the enemy and know yourself.” Successful execution of a deception plan or operations order is unlikely without accurate knowledge of both the enemy and your own capabilities…and weaknesses. 

Notes:

1. Department of Defense, “Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates and General Liang from Beijing, China,” Press Release, January 10, 2011, available online <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4750>.
2. Staff commentator articles in the PLA Daily, published by the General Political Department, “speak for the paper as an institution.” See, Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6, April 2013, p. 32.

The heart of the nation’s zhengfa establishment is the Central Political Legal Commission (CPLC), which is headed by Politburo member and former-Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu. Meng reports to Xi, who is the first General Secretary in recent memory to exercise direct control over the police apparatus (“All the General Secretary’s Men: Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle Revealed,” China Brief, February 15). That the powers of the CPLC have been enhanced was evidenced by the April appointment of Wang Yongqing as the commission’s Secretary General. Wang, aged 53, who is a former director of the General Office of the State Commission for Public Sector Reform, simultaneously was named a Deputy Secretary General of the State Council. This was the first time that a top CPLC cadre was given a senior slot in the central government (Xinhua, April 23; Chinapeace.org [Beijing] April 23). The concurrent appointment means that the CPLC, which is a party organ, can better supervise and coordinate the activities of zhengfa-related central government units, particularly the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security. Until this development, the linkage between the CPLS and government departments mainly manifested itself in the fact that the Minister of Public Security—or national police chief—doubles as the CPLC’s Deputy Party Secretary.

More powers are being given the Ministry of Public Security. In the topmost echelon of most State Council departments, there is only one senior cadre—usually the minister—who is a member of the CCP Central Committee. In the MPS, Minister Guo Shengkun as well as two of his deputies, Yang Huanning and Li Dongsheng are Central Committee members (“Centralized Power Key to Realizing Xi’s ‘China Dream’,” China Brief, March 28). Yet efforts are at the same time being made at least at the regional level to introduce checks and balances so as to combat abuse of power. This is partly as a result of high-level soul-searching in the wake of the scandal involving former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun. In February last year, Wang, a much-decorated officer, sought asylum in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. Seven months later, the former ace policeman was sentenced to 15 years for crimes including taking bribes and perverting the course of justice. During the same period, a number of senior provincial police officers were detained on graft-related charges (People’s Daily Online, September 25, 2012; Xinhua, September 24, 2012).

Xi and CPLC Secretary Meng have decided to speed up the process, which first began in the late 2000s by ex-president Hu Jintao, of phasing out the practice of appointing the same cadre as both regional head of police as well as secretary or deputy secretary of the provincial or municipal zhengfa committee. Up to 2008, police chiefs doubled as the zhengfa secretaries of more than half of China’s 31 provinces and directly-administered cities. By the end of 2002, this personnel tradition only existed in eight provinces. After the National People’s Congress held last March, only the five provinces of Anhui, Hebei, Gansu, Ningxia and Hunan have stuck to this convention of “double appointments” (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong] May 2;  Sina.com, May 2; Govlaw.com.cn [Beijing], August 7, 2012) Under the new scenario, the heads of provincial or municipal police departments are under the supervision of both the zhengfa secretary of the same jurisdiction as well as Beijing-based MPS leaders.

That constraints have been put on the authority of regional police chiefs also is evidenced by the growing number of provincial and municipal police chiefs who have concurrently been appointed assistant governors and assistant mayors. Before the 18th Party Congress, the bulk of regional heads of police enjoyed the higher ranking of deputy governors or deputy mayors. After the NPC, the heads of the provincial public security departments in the provinces of Guizhou, Liaoning and Jiangsu— respectively, Sun Licheng, Wang Dawei and Wang Like—were named assistant governors of these provinces. Similarly, Bai Shaokang, the head of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau, was given the concurrent title of Assistant Mayor of Shanghai (Xinmin.cn [Shanghai], April 11; China News Service, April 3; China Daily Online, April 3).

At the same time, the professional qualifications of central- and provincial-level zhengfa personnel have been raised. Take, for example, the newly-appointed CPLC Secretary General Wang Yongqing. A native of Jiangxi Province, Wang is a graduate of the Law School at Jilin University, where he obtained the degree of Doctor of Laws. In 2006, Wang spent a semester at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Among the newly-appointed regional police chiefs, Guizhou’s Sun Liping stood out as another cadre who had received training in a U.S. university. While Sun, aged 50, was not a law graduate, he spent more than 20 years at the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, which is China’s highest-level anti-graft organ. In 2004 and 2005, Wang attended public administration courses at Duke University (CCTV News, April 23; People’s Daily Online, April 2).

Higher professional requirements also apply to several other senior appointments elsewhere in the labyrinthine zhengfa establishment. Take, for instance, the new President of the Supreme People’s Court Zhou Qiang. A graduate of the Law School of Southwestern University of Politics and Law, Zhou, aged 53, spent a decade in the Justice Department in the 1980s and 1990s (Court.gov.cn [Beijing], April 2; China News Service, March 15). He is thus much more qualified than his predecessor, Wang Shengjun, a former provincial police chief who had never attended law school or held a professional legal position.

While the new zhengfa team has made significant personnel and organizational changes, it is basically cleaving to established practices regarding operational doctrines and approaches. In line with the imperative that President Xi has put on upgrading the technological standards of both the army and police, more resources are being spent on developing and procuring state-of-the-art equipment. Under new chief Guo Shengkun, the MPS is speeding up the five-year-old national “informatization drive” that is geared toward using IT-enabled mechanisms to crack down on crime as well as to boost surveillance over destabilizing social elements (“Informatization Drives Expanded Scope of Public Security,” China Brief, April 12). By early this year, the informatization drive had reached the remote Tibet Autonomous Region. In a recent speech, Tibet Zhengfa Secretary Deng Xiaogang pointed out that “the construction of an informatization system is essential to raising [the region’s] ability to safeguard stability and manage society in the new era” (Chinapeace.org.cn, March 24; Tibet Daily, March 23).

More emphasis than ever is being put on adopting a masses-oriented approach to weiwen. Taking a leaf from Chairman Mao’s “people warfare,” the public security (police) and state security (intelligence and counterespionage) apparatus has since the 2008 Olympics been encouraging ordinary citizens to help improve law and order through means including reporting potential criminals and “suspicious characters” to the police. In a recent inspection trip to Hebei, CPLC Deputy Secretary General Chen Xunqiu asked local zhengfa cadres to do their utmost in encouraging grassroots-level and masses-based units to participate in regional weiwen projects. Chen indicated “grassroots village organizations, self-government organizations of the masses as well as [rural] economic cooperatives” should play a bigger role in supplementing the police in enhancing social harmony and rooting out destabilizing elements (Chinapeace.org.cn, April 12; Jschina.com.cn [Nanjing], April 1).

While touring Zhejiang Province last month, CPLC Secretary Meng also laid stress on using the “mass line” approach to upholding law and order. “We should raise our ability in working with the masses,” he told local police and judicial cadres, adding “We should further consolidate the construction of a grassroots foundation for zhengfa-related [tasks] as well as the comprehensive rectification of law and order.” Meng in particular lauded the “Fengqiao Experience.” This is a reference to how cadres in the town of Fengqiao, Zhejiang Province, managed to defuse “contradictions within the people” as well as disputes between cadres and the people by quickly resolving them on the spot. 50 years ago, Mao was so impressed with Fengqiao that he instructed security units nationwide to learn from the small town’s cadres and police officers. Following Mao’s spirit, Meng summed up the Fengqiao experience as “preventing small incidents from being heard outside the village and preventing big incidents from spreading beyond the town” (Legal Daily, April 28; People’s Daily, April 28). Given that China is hit annually with more than 150,000 instances of riots and civil disturbances, local officials who fail to prevent “mass incidents” from snowballing into headline-making national crises are liable to be demoted or fired.

Despite apparent measures taken by zhengfa authorities to minimize “contradictions among the people,” the past few months have witnessed a plethora of cases that seem to point to police brutality and the miscarriage of justice. For example, security personnel guarding Liu Xia, the wife of Nobel Prize-winning dissident Liu Xiaobo who has been illegally been put under house arrest, have routinely roughed up Hong Kong and foreign reporters who try to visit her. Last February, police tried to put pressure on Anhui-based dissident Zhang Lin by preventing his ten-year-old daughter Zhang Anni from going to school. Last month, judicial and prison officials in Shandong Province refused to give medical treatment to Chen Kegui, the nephew of blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng. The younger Chen, who was serving a three-year jail term that is widely interpreted as indirect punishment for his uncle, badly needed an appendicitis operation (Ming Pao [Hong Kong] April 30; VOA Chinese Service, April 29). In a teleconference with zhengfa cadres soon after the 18th Party Congress, Xi urged them to achieve goals including “a peaceful China, a China that is ruled by law, and building up a corps of officials that pass muster.” The party chief also made pledges about “rectifying the police force with severity and resolutely combating [the phenomenon of] unjust law enforcement” (Xinhua, January 7, China News Service, January 7). Given these abuses, the onus, however, is on both Xi and Meng to show that personnel and policy changes in the zhengfa system will serve to promote social justice rather than merely ensuring the CCP’s monopoly on power.

The first example of where the Propaganda Department seems out of kilter with Chinese policy is Xinhua’s problem with the Pentagon report’s statement that “China’s military modernization is designed to ‘improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflict’” (Xinhua, May 7). This language, however, is borrowed almost directly from Chinese-language publications. For example, China’s most recent defense white paper stated “China’s armed forces firmly base their military preparedness on winning local wars under the conditions of informatization” (Xinhua, April 16). At the 11th National People’s Congress, Premier Wen Jiabao in a speech to PLA cadre noted the need for the Chinese military to “continuously improve their ability to fight and win local wars under informatized conditions” (People’s Daily Online, March 5, 2012). Finally, former President Hu Jintao and the Central Military Commission issued an assessment of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities in January 2006 that stated that the PLA’s inability to fight and win local wars was part of the “principal contradiction” (zhuyao maodun) that military modernization needed to resolve (“The Pentagon-PLA Disconnect: China’s Self Assessments of Its Military Capabilities,” China Brief, July 3, 2008; PLA Daily, January 1, 2006). These are not off-the-cuff statements or remarks of questionable authority; yet, they seem to reflect a Chinese policy of which the propagandists are ignorant or denying.

The second example where Chinese propaganda runs counter to China’s self-defined interest is the area of military-to-military engagement. Xinhua stated “The essence of the report contradicted the U.S.-China common understanding on developing military ties” (Xinhua, May 7). Ironically, Xinhua quotes the same joint U.S.-China affirmation by presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao in January 2011 invoked in the Defense Department’s report to support its statement that “the need for a robust U.S.-China military-to-military relationship that builds trust and helps manage friction continues to grow” (p. 61). The report also highlights dramatic transformation from “a poorly equipped, ground forces-centric military into a more capable force that is assuming diverse missions well beyond China’s shores.” This is explicit recognition that China is taking on a justified role in the world and that the latest defense white paper, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, provides a usable set of principles for understanding the evolution of the PLA (Xinhua, April 16).

Chinese press statements suggesting that a “groundless report” has failed to address China’s transparency are nothing new, but Xinhua’s repudiation of concerns about PLA budget transparency and cyber-espionage is akin to calling someone a liar before listening to a single word. U.S. interlocutors have engaged China on the military budget issue at an official level and in Track II discussions. Moreover, knowledgeable analysts have explained in clear terms where such transparency on Beijing’s part is desirable and have done so in ways that do not jeopardize China’s security (“The 2013 Defense White Paper in Perspective,” China Brief, April 25). If this problem is reflected elsewhere in the Chinese analytic community, the presumption that the U.S. Government willfully is going to distort its public analysis of China may be one of the greatest barriers to any sort of “New Type of Great Power Relationship.”

Perhaps because of the Western media’s focus on the cyber-espionage elements of the report, propaganda officials thought it necessary to issue separate articles dealing with just the cyber allegations. This response, however, misconstrued and distorted the nature of the evidence against at least some Chinese involvement in computer network exploitation internationally. None of the major reports on Chinese activities in cyberspace—ranging from the GhostNet report in 2008 to the Mandiant report released earlier this year—relies solely on IP address identification as analysts with the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS) suggest (People’s Daily. May 8; Xinhua, May 7). In at least one case, the evidence includes the transfer of documents on a computer to which Chinese officials did not have physical access but, nevertheless, found their way into the hands of border officials. Dismissing these reports and foreign concerns as the so-called “China Hacker Theory” (zhongguo heike lun) eliminates the possibility for any meaningful discussion, even as cyber has become a topic for the highest-level bilateral discussions (Shanghai Evening Post, May 7; Chongqing Morning Post, February 21). Propagandists’ adoption of “China Hacker Theory” marks a dangerous shift. In contrast to the “China Threat Theory” of years past, the “China Hacker Theory” dismisses the evidence available rather than inviting an objective assessment of China’s behavior.

Using AMS professionals to shill on the cyber issue also is a little disingenuous and a misuse of their expertise due to the academy’s work on assessing the requirements of military intelligence. In the Science of Military Intelligence—a textbook for PLA officers—published more than a decade ago, AMS researchers noted in their chapter on the future of military intelligence that information relevant to military decision making was increasingly going on networks (xinxi wangluohua) [1]. Gaining access to them would be one of the biggest technical challenges for military intelligence to remain relevant going forward. Moreover, two of “basic characteristics” (jiben texing) of intelligence are, one, its continuous nature (lianxuxing or bujianduanxing) and, two, its diversity (duoyangxing). In the explanation of these characteristics, the AMS authors are directing readers to recognize that intelligence collection methods and process must follow the movement of information relevant to decision makers and that constant adjustment is necessary [2]. By China’s own standard of what their intelligence agencies, especially those under the General Staff Department, should be doing, if they are not involved in getting access to networks, then they are negligent. Judging from the movement of intelligence personnel throughout the PLA, this probably is not the case (“PLA Personnel Shifts Highlight Intelligence’s Growing Military Role,” China Brief, November 5, 2012).

In sum, many of the Chinese criticisms of the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military developments either are contradicted by Beijing’s stated policy or do not invite further discussion, contravening the spirit of U.S.-China relations. Although the civilian control over the PLA may be a more interesting topic for speculation, it is the propaganda apparatus that may be the rogue elephant. Given Beijing’s commitment to engaging the United States on a “New Type of Great Power Relations” and to a mutually-beneficial U.S.-China relationship, the vitriolic response to one of the most objective Pentagon assessments seems out of place. Assuming the U.S. Government and other foreign analysts are unable to read Chinese policy statements gives the impression that Beijing is talking out of both sides of its mouth. In this respect, the Chinese commentary seems—to borrow Xinhua’s language—both baseless and counterproductive.

Notes:

1. Zhang Xiaojun, chief ed., Junshi qingbao xue [Science of Military Intelligence], Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2001, pp. 173–202.
2. Ibid., pp. 11–12.

China’s unease at the state of one of its most important bilateral relationships should come as no surprise. Since Burma began embracing reform and openness in 2011, Beijing has seen its traditional dominance steadily erode. Concurrently China feels that its interests are threatened as Western countries enter the fray while the increasingly vocal population turns against it (“Burma and China: The Beginning of the End of Business as Usual?” China Brief, November 30, 2011). Some Chinese officials now openly admit they initially massively underestimated the democratic turn in the country and overestimated their own influence there (The Irrawaddy, April 9).

In response, over the past few months, China has embarked on a strategic recalibration campaign in Burma. By revising its diplomatic approach, increasing its leverage in the ethnic conflicts the government in Naypyidaw is facing and adjusting to the changing business landscape, Beijing is seeking to use its resources and influence to adapt to a fast reforming Burma in order to preserve its critical interests there in the coming years.

China and Burma often refer to their ties as a paukphaw (sibling) relationship, which conveys both its deep and asymmetric nature. Burma was the first non-socialist country to establish ties with the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and then Chinese premier minister Zhou Enlai and his Burma counterpart U Nu enjoyed a close relationship (The Irrawaddy, April 10). Relations soured in the 1960s when Beijing supported communist rebels in Burma, but they improved quickly after the military junta seized power in 1988. Faced with Western sanctions, an impoverished Burma increasingly turned to China for support, and Beijing obliged as border trade officially opened in 1988 and military assistance began in 1989. Over the past few decades, China has emerged as Burma’s largest foreign investor and trading partner, and both sides inked a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2011 during then-President Hu Jintao’s first meeting with President Thein Sein (Xinhua, May 27, 2011).

China’s currently has several important interests in Burma. First and foremost, China desires stability in its 2,200km border with Burma which is both frequently plagued by ethnic conflict, drug trafficking and HIV/AIDS and also hosts the multi-billion dollar border trade critical to its southwestern Yunnan province as well as the over two million estimated Chinese nationals in Burma. Second, Beijing wants to protect its lucrative investments in Burma. China alone accounts for nearly half of Burma’s foreign direct investment and more than a quarter of its trade, with Chinese companies involved primarily in the country’s extractive and hydropower sectors critical to Beijing’s development (China Daily, January 16). Third, China views Burma as significant geopolitically, because it is a gateway to the Indian Ocean, thereby mitigating Beijing’s overreliance on the Straits of Malacca. The ultimate prize in this regard is a $2.5 billion, 800-kilometer Sino-Burma oil and gas pipeline project from the west coast of Burma into China, which is expected to start pumping gas on May 31. This pipeline should reduce China’s dependence on the Straits of Malacca by one third and cut 1,200 kilometers off the normal route through the Straits, across the South China Sea and up the coast to Chinese ports (China Daily, January 22). Lastly, Burma is also a vital partner within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Beijing has looked to it for support on regional issues like the South China Sea and joint patrols along the Mekong River (“China Pushes on South China Sea, ASEAN Unity Collapses,” China Brief, August 3, 2012; “Mekong Murders Spur Beijing to Push New Security Cooperation,” China Brief, November 11, 2011).

Each of these four key interests has been directly threatened since Burma’s reformist turn in 2011. Billion-dollar infrastructure projects backed by Beijing, like the Myitsone dam and the Letpadaung copper mine, have been suspended due to rising anti-Chinese sentiment among opposition parties and the public at large, spooking some firms and causing Chinese foreign direct investment into Burma to plummet by nearly 90 percent last year. Stronger U.S.-Burma ties—as evidenced by the gradual lifting of sanctions and Naypyidaw’s participation in the Cobra Gold military exercises this year—have reinforced Chinese fears about Washington’s desire to contain it (The Irrawaddy, April 9). Meanwhile, the Kachin conflict flaring in northern Burma has been a growing border stability concern for Beijing with artillery shells landing inside China earlier this year leading to strong rebukes from the government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 18).

In light of these setbacks and their impact on its strategic interests, China has been recalibrating its strategy in Burma over the past few months. First, Beijing has made some important personnel shuffles in the last few weeks, which indicate a shift in its diplomatic approach. On March 11, Beijing appointed retired 71-year-old Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan as its first ever special envoy for Asian affairs, with a specific mandate to prioritize Burma because “there have been too many issues recently” (China Daily, March 12). Wang has since been meeting opposition politicians and civil society groups as well as speaking with unprecedented candor about the need for Beijing to reform its image in Burma as part of a broader effort to diversify China’s relationships there (The Irrawaddy, March 18). Beijing also replaced its ambassador to Burma, Li Junhua with Yang Houlan, an experienced Asia hand who presented his credentials to President Thein Sein on March 29 in Naypyidaw (Xinhua, March 29). Some say Yang’s appointment is designed to signal a new Chinese strategy to engage with the reforms happening in Burma after years of failure under his predecessor Li (The Irrawaddy, March 22).

Second, China has adopted a more aggressive approach to dealing with the ethnic groups waging rebellions against Naypyidaw to increase its leverage in Burma relative to other players. On the one hand, after shying away from such a role for years, Beijing played an unprecedented role in facilitating peace talks between Naypyidaw and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in February, partly to preempt potential efforts by the United States to otherwise do so (Asia-Pacific Bulletin, February 20). China has since hosted two rounds of talks since then, and Beijing has sent senior officials and played a major role in both. Some reports suggest the third round of negotiations were postponed earlier this month because China leaned on the Kachin rebels to decline the meeting, fearing potential involvement from the United Nations, Britain and the United States and desiring a stronger tripartite role for itself which would constitute interference in Burma’s internal affairs (The China Post, April 17; Eleven Burma, April 10).

 As a stick to accompany the economic carrots it has used to entice the Burmese government, Beijing also has supported certain ethnic-based rebel groups to further its security interests. In a clear example, despite vociferous Chinese denials, observers have noted that Beijing has scaled up its secret military assistance to the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—the largest rebel group in Burma. While analysts have long suspected that China unofficially has been supplying weapons to the UWSA, Jane’s Intelligence Review suggested in a December report that new, larger transfers—which include surface-to-air missiles and, for the first time, 12 armored vehicles known as “tank destroyers”—were designed to prevent Naypyidaw from launching a full-blown military offensive there against Burma’s most powerful ethnic militia, which could spill over into Chinese territory as the Kachin case clearly illustrated (Voice of America, January 25).

Third, despite recent setbacks, Chinese companies are demonstrating their capacity to adapt to Burma's changing political climate. Big Chinese firms—e.g. China National Petroleum Corporation, which is in charge of Beijing’s prized oil and gas pipelines—are now trying to invest more in helping local communities build hospitals, schools and other facilities (Financial Times, April 16). Companies also are launching public relations campaigns to improve their image. Since controversy erupted over the Letpadaung copper mine near Monywa in central Myanmar, the usually low-profile Wanbao Mining Ltd. has initiated an intense lobbying initiative. These steps have even included taking risks such as allowing interviews with Western media outlets featuring its president Chen Defang (Wall Street Journal, March 25). Bidding strategies are also shifting as demonstrated by China Mobile uncharacteristically teaming up with Vodafone to bid jointly for Burma’s lucrative telecom licenses (South China Morning Post, April 5).

Chinese firms clearly are receiving encouragement from Beijing in their efforts. China’s newly-installed special envoy for Asian affairs Wang Yingfan has attempted to help stem local discontent in Burma by repeatedly admitting that Chinese firms need to improve their weak public relations record and that some of the concerns Naypyidaw has about specific infrastructure projects are well-founded (The Irrawaddy, March 18; Eleven Burma, March 17). Meanwhile, on March 1, the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection jointly released new guidelines to help Chinese firms engage in corporate social responsibility in overseas markets like Burma amid growing criticism they had received on that score (China Daily, March 1). 

China hopes that its strategic recalibration in Burma will grant it greater leverage to protect its vital interests and prepares it for a much more competitive landscape there. The effort, however, also has its limits. More engaging diplomats and marginal improvements in corporate social responsibility may not be sufficient to reverse the fierce anti-Chinese sentiment already stoked by specific infrastructure projects and Beijing’s chosen role in Burma. The same Chinese fears over increased Western involvement in Burma, which partly prompted its policy review could also lead to serious tensions in the bilateral relationship, further alienating Naypyidaw and pushing it even closer to other actors including the United States. Beijing’s more aggressive role with respect to sensitive issues like ethnic rebel groups in Burma will likely buy it less, not more influence in Naypyidaw as China is seen as an increasingly untrustworthy partner interfering in internal affairs. 

While it is too early to assess the prospects for China’s strategic recalibration in Burma, one thing is clear. After some initial missteps, Beijing has regained its footing in Burma and is adapting shrewdly to the new environment. Those prematurely writing China off should take note. With so much at stake in Burma, Beijing is not going down without a fight no matter the odds.

The title of this year’s defense white paper, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” refers to the “diversified tasks” (duoyanghua renwu) the heart of the “historic missions of the armed forces in the new period of the new century,” often referred to simply as the “historic missions.” The missions concept refers to strategic guidance that then-Central Military Commission (CMC) Chair Hu Jintao provided to the military in late 2004 and which has been mentioned in defense white papers since 2006. The historic missions consist of four requirements: (1) provide an important security guarantee for the party to consolidate its ruling position; (2) provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for national development; (3) provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests; and (4) play an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development" (Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP]). As the PLA essentially provides the ultimate backstop for the first requirement, it is not really addressed in the paper. The other elements, however, frame the main content of the white paper.

Core Interests Elevated in Importance

This year’s white paper similarly elevated the importance of the core interest (hexin liyi) concept. This concept has appeared in some form in defense white papers since 2002. The term is a party concept which refers to the most important national interests, which Chinese analysts define as the collective “material and spiritual demands of a state and people.”

Chinese media has explained consistently how the evolving definition of national interests has driven the military to update its mission. The most recent development has been the addition of “developmental interests” to the older groups of security and sovereignty interests, as well as a refinement of the meaning of all three groups in light of China’s growing power and integration into the global economy. A typical PLA Daily article explained that China’s economic growth now required the PLA to protect national “developmental interests” (fazhan liyi) as well as “survival interests” (shengcun liyi). It contrasted the missions and functions of the military in the “agricultural and industrial age,” which focused on “manning the frontiers and defending the territories,” with new mission requirements to “protect China’s peaceful development and great power status” in the “information age” (PLA Daily, December 8, 2005).

Like the historic missions, the core interest concept offers a clearer way to organize thinking about security than the political language of the Mao and Deng eras. Discussing security threats in wildly hyperbolic, rigidly ideological terms are a luxury that economically enfeebled, autarkic communist countries might indulge in, but something that a rising great power can ill afford, especially when surrounded by wary, heavily armed, modern nations. The modernizing PLA of the Deng and early Jiang eras avoided this pitfall, but the lingering influence of communist orthodoxy contributed to a low level of rigor and clarity of thought. By contrast, delineating categories of core interests that tie directly to China’s higher strategic priorities facilitates more precise analysis and allows the PLA to prioritize responsibilities, evaluate threats, and develop plans and capabilities in a rational manner more appropriate for the needs of a great power with global interests.

Why the Concepts Have Risen in Importance

Both the core interests and the historic missions derive from assessments formalized around the year 2000—the start of what the CCP refers to as the “new period in the new century.” Two important developments led to the current elevation in importance of the concepts in the current paper: an increase in political authoritativeness; the relative growth in Chinese power, which has raised the feasibility and urgency of implementing the new guidance.

The ability of the party’s strategic concepts to drive policy is determined in part by the level of authority of those concepts. The higher a strategic concept climbs in authority, the more likely related policies are to enjoy support. The ultimate status for a strategic concept is for it to be adopted as part of the “guiding ideology” (zhidao sixiang). Once a strategic concept attains this status, it enjoys supreme authority and associated policies rise in priority and importance.

Both the historic missions and the core interest concept are associated with the Scientific Development Concept articulated by Hu Jintao soon after taking power in 2002. Thus, when the 17th Party Congress incorporated the Scientific Development Concept into the CCP Constitution, it boosted the legitimacy of the historic missions and core interests. At the 18th Party Congress, the Scientific Development Concept gained the “guiding ideology” status, reflecting strong leadership consensus (“The 18th Party Congress Work Report: Policy Blueprint for the Xi Administration,” China Brief, November 30, 2012). This ensured that the related historic missions and core interest concepts would play a definitive role in China’s security thinking. The revised format of the defense white paper is a symptom of this development.

In addition, China has seen its relative national power continue to increase in recent years. As its surging economy over took Japan to be the second largest in the world in 2010, China has witnessed the European Union’s economy continue to struggle and the United States remain mired in political gridlock. Meanwhile, China’s military continues to expand at a healthy clip. Symptomatic of its growth in power, efforts by the Philippines and Japan to shore up their eroding position on disputed maritime claims vis a vis China have foundered against Beijing’s assertive reactions in the Scarborough Reef and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands situations.

Not only has China’s growing power bolstered its leverage, it also has increased its sense of urgency regarding security. In particular, the increasing anxiety of the region and attention from the United States in the form of the Rebalance has raised the importance for Beijing of adjusting its security strategy to reduce vulnerabilities, protect core interests, and shape a favorable, stable security environment to enable the nation to maintain its focus on rapid, balanced development.

The New Security Framework in the White Paper

Just as the implications of China’s growing power in an era of globalization lies at the heart of the core interests concept, the challenge of balancing a peaceful, stable security environment with the need to reduce strategic vulnerabilities and protect a growing array of core interests lies at the heart of the historic missions concept. The white paper focuses on both by providing a more thorough description of the core interests viewed from the point of view of the military, and by describing how the military implements the historic missions guidance.

Core Interests. The third chapter of the white paper focuses on the “sovereignty” and “security” core interests. The white paper recognizes that these are the most basic and most important of the core interests. In addition to naming the “core security needs” as “national defense, resisting foreign aggression and defending the motherland,” the chapter discusses air, land, and maritime territorial integrity. While not new, additional leverage granted by its growing power has spurred Beijing to reinterpret its sovereignty and security interests. As but one example, the white paper mentions that the PLA Navy now carries out “blue water training,” which includes “remote early warning” and “open sea interception.” This illustrates that what China regards as necessary for the security of its wealthy seaboard has expanded in depth. Similarly, the white paper mentions that China now has “space and cyber security interests,” concepts that did not appear in official documents ten years ago.

The fourth chapter focuses on the interests related to national development. Two large groups are highlighted: maritime rights and interests, and overseas interests. The former are understood to refer to the economic and legal rights—such as minerals, fishing and other resources—to which China feels entitled. China’s growing appetite for resources has increased the value of the maritime regions. Further, many of the areas that involve direct Chinese maritime interests overlaps with its security interests and sovereignty claims, increasing the strategic value of those waters.

The overseas interests mentioned highlight sea lines of communication and Chinese nationals abroad. This is a growing area of military responsibility, as noted by the paper’s discussion of the continued Gulf of Aden and Libya evacuation missions. These similarly reflect the expansion of Chinese strategic interests as part of its growing power and integration into the global economy.

Historic Missions. The paper is largely organized around the military challenge of balancing the imperative to provide security for the growing array of core interests with the imperative to help shape a favorable security environment. This requires the PLA to respond to non-traditional threats such as disasters and terrorism which could threaten Chinese interests at home and abroad. The white paper employs the Western term “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) to describe these duties. The white paper, however, makes clear that the term “diversified tasks” refers to the PLA’s ability to execute both war and MOOTW in support of the nation’s development. The paper’s second chapter outlines how the PLA’s modernization is enabling it to carry out these responsibilities.

The third and fourth chapters highlight the military’s role in coordinating closely with civilian authorities to protect China’s sovereignty, security, and developmental interests. The picture painted is one in which the military provides direct support to the whole of government’s efforts to incrementally increase the administrative, legal, and economic de-facto control of disputed maritime claims and other interests. As an example, the paper describes how the PLA Navy provides “security support” to maritime law enforcement, fisheries, and oil and gas exploitation. It also discusses cooperation with international bodies to protect China’s overseas interests.

The fifth chapter on “safeguarding world peace and regional stability” speaks to the PLA’s role in shaping a favorable security environment. This means first of all that the PLA play a role in promoting the global and regional stability critical to enabling the country’s development. Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) also allows provides useful political cover to enhance security of its overseas interests, as the PLA has done through participation in UN anti-piracy operations to protect its sea lines of communication near the Horn of Africa.

Implications

Of the PLA’s mission set, the most challenging may be the task to promote regional stability. China seeks to avoid what it deems unacceptable compromises on its interests while simultaneously avoiding instability from conflict over those interests. Key to easing this dilemma is close PLA cooperation with civil authorities, who carry out the sensitive work of enforcing China’s maritime claims. Underlining this point, the white paper sets up the political argument to justify any potential military response to protect its claims and other interests. The paper repurposes Mao’s dictum, “We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counter attack if attacked” from one of defense against invasion and nuclear attack to one which warns neighboring powers that China will “resolutely take all measures necessary to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”  This approach shrewdly allows China to quietly consolidate its claims in a manner that minimizes alarm, while throwing the onus on its neighboring powers to risk dramatic action to halt Chinese encroachments, knowing full well that China will exploit any misstep to consolidate its gains even further.

Feasibility will likely remain the key to how fast or hard China pushes on its core interests. If the Chinese feel their leverage has grown to an extent that they can make gains with minimal cost, they are likely to do so. To the extent its actions prove too destabilizing due to insufficient leverage, Beijing may well slow the consolidation of its interests. Moreover, the tensions between the imperatives to enhance control of core interests and maintain a stable security environment are beyond the abilities of China to manage alone. Efforts to tighten control of disputed claims, after all, invariably generate instability, while China lacks leverage to compel powerful neighbors like Japan to concede on maritime disputes. China will continue to reach out to the United States and other great powers to promote international stability and to help China consolidate control of its interests.

The 2012 Defense White Paper presents a clearer picture than its predecessors of how China views security through the lens of its growing power and globalizing interests. The political consensus behind this approach, confirmed at the 18th Party Congress, ensures that this will be the de facto security strategy for the foreseeable future. Understanding the centrality of the core interests and the historic missions concepts for China’s strategic thought can help policy makers more effectively anticipate and respond to future Chinese security-related developments.

Notes:

1. The 2013 white paper The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces is available at the Ministry of National Defense website <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Video/2013-04/19/content_4443469.htm>. Previous Chinese defense white papers are available at the Chinese Central Government’s Official website <http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-08/17/content_24165.htm>.

The white papers repeat long-established policy and usually contain some new information and updates to earlier versions. Their opening sections serve as a barometer for Chinese government’s views of the international security environment. Although military personnel have the lead in drafting the defense white papers, the text is coordinated with other central government ministries and the final product is issued by the Information Office of the State Council—not by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). White papers, however, are not the vehicle the Chinese government would use to announce new policies.

White papers build on information provided in previous editions. Readers studying a specific subject should examine each of the eight white papers, beginning in 1998, to see how that topic is or is not addressed in each one.

It is unfortunate, but true, that readers need to be familiar with the content in previously issued white papers to judge the latest edition [1]. While the Chinese government has provided a lot of information in the series of Defense white papers, knowledgeable readers always will find that subjects are not discussed at all or in sufficient detail to answer many longstanding questions, especially about the military budget or new weapons and equipment entering the PLA.

For a different perspective on many of topics covered by the Chinese and for significantly greater detail about weapons capabilities and numbers, readers also should consult the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual reports to Congress about the Chinese military.

A Taxonomy of “New” Information

Several types of “new” information may be found in each white paper. First, some “new” information simply brings readers up-to-date with developments concerning topics that had previously been discussed in prior white papers. This often is the most prevalent form of information, frequently addressing basic national security and military policy issues.

Second, some “new” information may be a “first” for inclusion in a white paper. This sort of information usually has already been released in the official Chinese media to less fanfare and attention.

Third, some white papers contain “new” information that is the first time the Chinese government has ever divulged this specific fact or figure. This information usually amounts to a very small proportion of any single white paper’s content.

Fortunately, the Chinese take the extra step of translating each white paper into English for the benefit of foreign readers, their main target audience. Comparing the Chinese and English versions can be a fruitful language exercise and helpful in understanding the exact meaning of some terms.

What’s “New” in the 2013 white paper?

The first new element in the 10,000-word white paper published on April 16, 2013 is not so much in its content, but in its form. The report’s main author, Major General Chen Zhou of the Academy of Military Science, points out that this edition is “a thematic white paper that focuses on the diversified employment of China’s armed forces,” as opposed to the comprehensive papers of previous years (China Military Online, April 18). As such, this year’s emphasis is on what the Chinese armed forces are doing to defend sovereignty, support national economic development as well as contribute to peace and stability.

Before discussing these topics, the white paper starts with a section on the international situation and the missions of the armed forces. Though “peace and development remain the underlying trends of our times” (a theme first identified in the 1998 white paper), these trends are faced with “new opportunities and challenges.” The preface reiterates China’s basic defense policies, such as China’s defensive posture and its commitment not to seek hegemony, military expansion or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Foreign audiences frequently dismiss such statements as “boilerplate” or the “party line,” but, for Beijing, they serve as a statement of China’s strategic intentions.

While mentioning “signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism,” the international environment portrayed was considerably less hostile than might have been expected. For example, there was only one direct reference to the United States, “The [United States] is adjusting its Asia-Pacific security strategy,” and an indirect statement that “Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser.” This tone is considerably less confrontational than found in previous papers, such as in 2000 when the U.S. was mentioned by name over half dozen times, in particular for its arms sales to Taiwan.

Despite having been included in every other white paper, arms sales to Taiwan were not mentioned this year. The absence of this subject does not indicate it is no longer a priority issue for China. In fact, the topic was raised a week later during Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey’s visit to China (Xinhua, April 22).

Similarly, cross-Strait relations were described as “sustaining a momentum of peaceful development” and Taiwan independence forces mentioned only once. On the other hand, stronger words were directed at Japan, which “is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands.” Still, the tone of this language toward Japan was restrained compared to how the Chinese might have described the state of the bilateral relationship. India is not mentioned in this section.

Despite the tenor of the treatment devoted to the international situation, the white paper leaves no doubt of China’s commitment to defending its national sovereignty and territorial integrity—which are an official part of China’s “core interests.” The white paper states China will defend itself by implementing the “military strategy of active defense” (based on the premise “We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counterattack if attacked”) and developing “new ideas for the strategies and tactics of people’s war.”

The third section of the paper is devoted to defending national sovereignty through “the diversified employment of the armed forces aims to maintain peace, contain [deter] crises and win wars.” This section is a recitation of longstanding elements of defense policy supported by discussions of the PLA’s “scenario-based exercises,” trans-military region deployments, force-on-force exercises and “blue water” training to prepare for these missions. Much of this information has been reported before in the Chinese military and civilian media and interested readers easily can augment this information—often with much greater detail.

One last not-so-new, new element to this white paper is the identification of the goal “to build a strong national defense and powerful armed forces which are commensurate with China’s international standing”—a task previously specified in the 18th Party Congress Work Report in November 2012 (Xinhua, November 16, 2012). Many foreign analysts have long attributed a similar goal to China as it seeks “its rightful place in the world” [2].

Perhaps intentionally for the domestic readership, on the same day the white paper was published the Chinese-language military newspaper PLA Daily described a much more severe situation: “Hostile western forces have stepped up the strategy to westernize and divide our country and to do everything possible to curb and contain China’s development” (PLA Daily, April 16). Similar language was used in China’s National Defense in 2008: “[China] faces strategic maneuvers and containment from the outside.” The authors of the 2013 white paper, however, appear to have decided to take a more conciliatory tone toward foreign threats.

What’s Really “New”?

The white paper actually did contain some new information that previously had not been released by the Chinese government. For the first time, it announced personnel numbers for the PLA Army’s “mobile operational units” of 850,000, along with 235,000 for the Navy and 398,000 for the PLA Air Force. These numbers, however, do not represent the total PLA active duty force of 2.3 million, which was last reported in the 2006 edition.

In the same paragraph as the Army numbers, the paper states, “The PLA Army (PLAA) is composed of mobile operational units, border and coastal defense units, guard and garrison units.” The 850,000 figure does not include “border and coastal defense units, guard and garrison units,” nor does it include Army personnel assigned to the four General Departments in Beijing and their affiliated organizations, the seven Military Region headquarters, or the personnel in the local headquarters at provincial, prefectural, and county levels (described by the 2004 and 2006 white papers), or those in the Army’s system of military academies and universities. Second Artillery personnel also are not included in the 850,000 (some estimates assess the Second Artillery to have about 100,000 personnel).

By subtracting the personnel numbers for the Navy and Air Force from the PLA’s total strength of 2.3 million, 1,667,000 personnel remain. That number represents the combined strength of both the Army and Second Artillery. The 850,000 number is a subset of the 1.667 million—or, slightly more than half of the total Army and Second Artillery manpower.

The white paper also identified each of the 18 “combined corps” (or group armies) and listed which Military Region (military area command) they are subordinate. This is a new degree of transparency for an official Chinese source, but several foreign sources, including the Pentagon’s reports to Congress, have provided this (and greater) level of detail for decades.

Also new is the description of three alert levels for the PLA from Level III, the lowest, to the highest Level I. The white paper, however, did not provide any further elaboration of what these alert levels meant for preparations and readiness.

Another new number is the 68 incidents of “serious violence” the People’s Armed Police has “participated in handling” from 2011 to 2012. Given the tens or hundreds of thousands of “mass incidents” reported in China, 68 incidents appear to represent a very small percentage of the total [3]. Like many “statistics with Chinese characteristics,” the white paper, however, does not define what “serious violence” or “handling” the incidents are. Though this is a “new” data point, it is unclear exactly what it means.

Despite the flaws in the new numbers, their inclusion was a positive sign and should be of value when foreigners have the chance to discuss these issues with knowledgeable Chinese.

What Was Not Included?

By limiting its scope to the “diversified missions” of the armed forces, some subjects previously addressed in other white papers were not addressed this year. For example, in response to a question about whether China had changed its “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear weapons policy, Major General Yao Yunzhu noted that this year’s paper does not have a section on “National Defense Policy.” In previous editions, that section usually contained the specific NFU commitment (China-U.S. Focus, April 22). In other editions, the NFU statement was found in an “Arms Control and Disarmament” section, which also was not included in 2013. Nonetheless, the latest paper describes the Second Artillery’s nuclear counterattack role in language consistent with established NFU policy and Yao assured the world that there had been no change to Chinese policy, though she did acknowledge that “calls for a policy change on the official NFU pledge are repeatedly heard in the Chinese media.”

Likewise, because of the limited scope of the white paper, there was no discussion of the defense budget. In previous years, the white paper included a section on “Defense Expenditures,” which provided more information about the defense budget than was released during the official budget announcements made during the annual National People’s Congress. Perhaps a future white paper can offset this omission by making defense expenditure its primary theme.

While this year’s and other white papers provide a lot of data and statistics, they do not attempt to analyze that information. For example, the 1,842 Chinese personnel participating in UN peacekeeping missions are far less than one percent of the total PLA manpower strength. Moreover, using statistics for each individual mission provided on the UN website, it can be seen that Chinese participation in no case amounts to the majority of personnel on the mission and usually falls between one and seven percent of the mission’s personnel [4]. Similar analysis could be performed for the individual ships that have participated in the Gulf of Aden missions compared to the total number of PLA Navy surface combatants or the numbers of troops who have participated in exercises with other countries. Such analysis would show that many more PLA personnel have been involved in domestic disaster relief efforts or in support of national development projects than have been deployed overseas on peacekeeping, maritime escort, or training operations and exercises. Nonetheless, the white papers are a good starting point from which to begin more detailed analysis.

Since the white papers are targeted at foreign audience and have an important role in China’s deterrence objectives, it should come as no surprise that they do not include assessments of the PLA’s capabilities. The Chinese military media frequently carry stark evaluations made by unit commanders and staff officers of shortcomings in PLA personnel abilities, command and control, organization, training and logistics. This body of data contributes to the “Two Incompatibles” (liangge buxiang shiying) assessment of PLA capabilities attributed to Hu Jintao, which roughly says, “the level of PLA modernization is incompatible with the demands of winning a local war under informatization conditions and our military capabilities are incompatible with the demands of carrying out the Army’s historic missions.” This assessment was seen most recently in the PLA Daily commentator article of April 16 and is intended to acknowledge the progress made in modernization and training in recent years but also to urge the troops to continue the hard work ahead.

Finally, the white paper did not mention Xi Jinping’s appointment as chairman of the Central Military Commission (the 2004 report noted Hu Jintao’s assumption of that post). Nor did it mention Xi’s guidance to the armed forces to “build a people’s military that obeys the party, can fight and win wars, and has an excellent image” (wei jianshe yi zhi ting dang zhihui, neng da shengzhang zuofeng youliang de renmin jundui). This statement reflects the continuation of the armed forces’ priorities of maintaining loyalty to the Communist Party, striving to raise their operational capabilities, and acting as models for the rest of society—rather than loyalty to any specific personality.

Conclusion

The 2006 and 2008 white papers identified 2049 as the completion date for the multi-faceted military modernization process that began in the late 1970s. This transformation aims to create a smaller, more technologically-advanced PLA and includes comprehensive changes to its personnel, training, education and logistics systems, major modifications to force structure, doctrinal updates to accommodate new missions and the introduction of new equipment. The pace of the process increased in the mid- to late-1990s, boosted by an influx of funding and newly-available domestic electronics. The PLA still lacks the support of a professional non-commissioned officer corps and recent combat experience in modern joint and combined arms warfare. The senior PLA leadership understands the difficulties in this undertaking and recognizes that it can only make gradual changes in the modernization process trajectory, because of the human and experiential factors. Xi’s guidance, along with details found in the white paper, indicate continuity in the course of Chinese military modernization as it prepares to perform the deterrence, warfighting and non-traditional security tasks assigned by the Communist Party leadership.

Notes:

1. The 2013 white paper The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces is available at the Ministry of National Defense website <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Video/2013-04/19/content_4443469.htm>. Previous Chinese defense white papers are available at the Chinese Central Government’s Official website <http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-08/17/content_24165.htm>.
2. For one relevant example of this analysis, see James A. Lewis, “Cyber War and Competition in the China-U.S. Relationship,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2010, available online <http://csis.org/files/publication/100510_CICIR%20Speech.pdf>.
3. Manfred Elfstrom and Sarosh Kuruvilla, “The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China,” International Labor and Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, July 2–5, 2012, available online <http://ilera2012.wharton.upenn.edu/NonRefereedPapers/Kuruvilla,%20Sarosh%20and%20Elfstrom,%20Manfred.pdf>.
4. United Nations Peacekeeping Website, “Troop and Police Contributors” (Updated Monthly), available online <https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

At its simplest level, the China Dream or the renaissance of the Chinese race simply means an economically prosperous and militarily strong China. When Xi first put forward his pet idea while inspecting an exhibition of recent history at the China National Museum in last November, he laid down two specific objectives about economic progress. By 2021, the centenary of the CCP’s establishment, China should meet the target of “constructing a xiaokang [moderately prosperous] society.” Furthermore, by 2049—the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic—China will have developed into a “modernized socialist country that is rich, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious” (Xinhua, November 29; People’s Daily Online, November 29). According to Wang Yiming, a senior economist at the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s GDP is expected to hit 90 trillion yuan ($14.6 trillion) by 2020, at which point per capita GDP may breach the psychologically important watershed of $10,000 per capita. Wang further projected that by 2050, the country’s GDP could reach 350 trillion yuan ($56.6 trillion), and per capita GDP could reach 260,000 yuan ($42,000) (China News Service, March 7; sme.gov.cn [Beijing] March 6).

How about socio-political development, particularly the flowering of democratic ideals? Upon being elected State President at the National People’s Congress (NPC) last March, Xi dropped hints about some form of commitment to egalitarianism when he revisited the China Dream leitmotif. He indicated that “the China Dream is the dream of the [Chinese] race as well as the dream of every Chinese [person].” The supremo further pledged that all Chinese should “have the chance of distinguishing themselves in their lives.” “They should enjoy opportunities of having their dream come true,” he added, “They should have the opportunity of growing up and making progress in tandem with the motherland and the times” (CCTV News, March 17; China News Service, March 17).

It is apparent, however, that Xi, who is also Chairman of the policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC), was not referring to Western or universal precepts of equality and democratic rights. After all, Xi has vowed that while the CCP administration “will avoid old roads that are closed and fossilized, it will also not go down the slippery path that involves changing the flags and colors” of socialism with Chinese characteristics (China.com.cn, December 14, 2012; Southern Daily [Guangzhou], November 17, 2012). Indeed, in his NPC speech, Xi laid down three prerequisites for attaining the China Dream: “The China Dream can only be fulfilled via going down the China road; realizing the China Dream necessarily means propagating the China spirit; and realizing the China Dream requires concentrating and crystallizing China’s strength” (Xinhua, March 17; People’s Daily Online, March 17). This essentially ruled out the introduction of Western ideas and institutions of governance. Moreover, the Xi-Li administration has through a series of administrative restructuring concentrated more power than ever in a few high-level, non-transparent party organs, such as the Central Committee Secretariat (“Centralized Power Key to Realizing Xi’s ‘China Dream’,” China Brief, March 28).

Conservative opinion-makers have warned that Xi’s slogan must not be interpreted as an endorsement of “bourgeois-liberal” values. Wang Yiwei, a political scientist at Beijing’s Renmin University, has laid into liberal intellectuals “who want to equate ‘the China Dream’ with all-out Westernization.” It was wrong to equate the China Dream with ideals such as “the dream of constitutional governance or the dream of human rights and democracy,” he noted. Professor Wang added that the China Dream actually meant “the Sinocization of Marxism through taking into consideration China’s own conditions, so as to open up the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Xinhua, April 16; Global Times, April 16). In a commentary on the same subject, the usually hard-line Beijing Daily pointed out that Xi’s rallying cry was aimed at promoting patriotism as well as obedience to CCP edicts. The paper noted “We must meld together the country’s dream and the dream of the [Chinese] race with each individual’s dream.” The commentary went further, adding “The China Dream is about goals that Communist party members struggle hard to achieve...It also represents the [collective] aspirations of all Chinese men and women” (People’s Daily Online, December 19, 2012; Beijing Daily, December 18, 2012).

Despite the fact that Xi has the past decade avoided touching upon the sensitive issue of political reform or ideological liberalization, a number of free-thinking intellectuals have given a liberal interpretation of the “China Dream.” Leading dissident Bao Tong, who is the former personal secretary of disgraced General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, called upon Xi to “return the dream to the people.” Bao, who is under 24-hour police surveillance, indicated that Xi at least recognized that the “subject” (zhuti) of the China Dream was individual Chinese and not the state. “Xi has made clear that the China Dream should be realized according to the private ownership system,” Bao noted in an article last March for Radio Free Asia. “The China Dream must not be monopolized by the state,” he wrote, “The country should allow us common folks to each dream his own dream.” Bao added that his own dream was that all Chinese “can have freedom of expression…and freedom from fear of being harassed and censored” (Radio Free Asia, March 21). Similarly, Peking University law professor and internationally-known public intellectual He Weifang offered his personal reading: “The most important goal of a modernized nation is to allow the people to have dignity, freedom and [civil] rights so that each person can work hard to fulfill his own dream” (Deutche Welle Chinese edition, March 21).

It is significant that even scholars who are affiliated with units that are at the center to the party establishment apparently have given a relatively unorthodox spin to the “China Dream.” For theorist Zhou Tianyong, who teaches politics at the CCP Central Party School (CPS), the China Dream meant that “every Chinese can work and live in the midst of democracy, equality, fairness, justice [and] righteousness—and in a well-ordered harmonious society.” Professor Zhou added that “the state should come up with policies so that each person who tries hard should have the chance [to realize his dream].” Xin Ming, another well-known CPS scholar, put forward a similar characterization of the “China Dream.” Xin pointed out that the China Dream should have the following connotations: “a sufficient level of democracy, well-developed rule of law, [the enshrinement of citizens’] sacrosanct human rights…and the free and full development of every citizen” (Caixin, April 17; Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong] April 13).

Discord over the meaning and significance of the China Dream also manifests itself in different interpretations over the rallying cry’s implications for foreign policy. Xi has made it clear that the ideal of the China Dream is not confined merely to the People’s Republic and its citizens. In an interview with journalists from BRICS nations last March, Xi pointed out that “China being the world’s second largest economy, the China Dream also will bring opportunities to the world” and “The China Dream will be realized through a road of peace.” While speaking at the Moscow Academy of International Relations, he reiterated “The China Dream will bring blessings and goodness to not only the Chinese people but also people in other countries.” It was while touring Tanzania that the new head of state gave the clearest indication of the global significance of the China Dream mantra. While waxing eloquent on the “African dream” and the “world dream,” Xi said: “Together with the international community, the Chinese and African peoples will work toward realizing the global dream of sustained peace and joint prosperity” (China News Service, March 26; wenming.cn [Beijing], March 19). These statements, which were tailor-made for a global audience, seemed indicative of Xi’s desire to highlight Beijing’s commitment to “peaceful development” and to dispel the “China threat” theory. 

It must be noted, however, that there is clearly a military—and globally assertive—aspect to the China Dream and “the renaissance of the Chinese race.” While inspecting divisions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) last December, Xi reiterated that the China Dream also meant “the dream of a strong China” and “the dream of a strong military.” “To attain the great renaissance of the Chinese race, we must uphold [the principle of] the synthesis of a prosperous country and a strong army, and we must assiduously build up and consolidate national defense and a strong military,” Xi noted (People’s Daily Online, December 13; China News Service, December 13). On numerous occasions, Xi also called upon PLA officers and soldiers to “get ready to fight and to win wars” (“Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping Raises the Bar on PLA ‘Combat Readiness’,” China Brief, January 18).

Moreover, the PLA top brass seems keen on interpreting the China Dream in such a way as to justify its lobbying for more economic resources and a greater say in national affairs. In a recent editorial entitled “The whole army must provide resolute and strong support to guarantee the realization of the China Dream,” the PLA Daily indicated that the defense forces would “struggle hard for the fulfillment of the dream of a strong China and a strong army.” “Only when national defense construction is up to scratch will there be a strong guarantee for economic construction,” the PLA mouthpiece added, “Boosting national defense construction also will give a significant push to economic and social development” (PLA Daily, March 18; China.com, March 18). 

Compared to predecessors ex-presidents Jiang and Hu at a comparable stage of their tenure as party chief, Xi has been able to much more quickly and solidly firm up his power base in the party, government and military. Now the 59-year-old head of the “Gang of Princelings” must prove to both Chinese and foreign audiences that he is at least as capable as his father, former Vice Premier Xi Zhongxun, of thinking outside the box and offering unconventional yet effective solutions to China’s myriad problems. Otherwise, Xi risks going down history as yet another unscrupulous politician who has failed to deliver improvements in the people’s living standards and civil rights while using patriotic and high-sounding slogans to cover up the party elite’s many shortcomings.

Following Xi’s first mention of the need to recalibrate U.S.-China relations toward a more positive vision of great power relations, his predecessor Hu Jintao elaborated four sets of actions both sides needed to continue. They were assuage mistrust through senior-level dialogues and regular communications among principals; continue and expand win-win cooperation in traditional fields, such as law enforcement, and non-traditional fields, such as energy and the environment; minimize the impact of outside factors and third parties on the U.S.-China relationship; and share international responsibilities to maintain a “healthy interaction” in the Asia-Pacific (Xinhua, June 20, 2012).

Shortly thereafter, Cui Tiankai, then-Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and now Chinese Ambassador to the United States, along with co-author Pang Hangzhao provided a lengthy and official elaboration of a “new type of great power relations.” Cui and Pang unsurprisingly echoed Xi and Hu’s basic framework, but highlighted at least three obstacles to achieving this new vision for U.S.-China relations. The first was strategic mistrust. The second was conflicts over China’s “core interests” or, rather, U.S. interference in those interests. The third was brewing competition in the Asia-Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012).

Although Beijing and Washington both had important roles to play in managing a “new type of great power relations,” Cui and Pang placed the responsibility for resolving the aforementioned problems squarely on the United States. China’s commitment to the U.S.-China relationship, as always, was never in doubt. They wrote “what the United States has done in matters concerning China's core and important interests and major concerns is unsatisfactory.” In most respects, according to Cui and Pang, Beijing was not part of the problem: “There have been some problems recently in China's neighborhood. China is not the maker of these problems, and still less the perpetrator of the harm. Rather, it is a victim on which harm has been imposed” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012). Overall, the message appeared to be a statement that Washington needed to accommodate China’s rise without reciprocal Chinese concessions to similarly long-standing U.S. principles and policies (“China’s Search for a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’,” China Brief, September 7, 2012).

At the Moscow State Institute of International Relations late last month, Xi gave a speech where he called upon the world to observe a “new kind of international relations” with win-win cooperation and common development at the core. The latter means countries must respect each state’s right to pursue its own political and economic development. Xi noted the world’s increasing interdependence and non-traditional security threats meant that states should not pursue security unilaterally, but should rely on cooperative security, collective security and common security (hezuo anquan, jiti anquan and gongtong anquan) to address their threat environment (People’s Daily, March 24). Although it would be easy to dismiss these comments as rhetorical flourish, they have since been picked up and elaborated on in other media outlets with varying degrees of authoritativeness.

The most recent and authoritative explanation came in a “Voice of China” (zhongsheng) editorial run earlier this week, coinciding with the visit of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey. The article also specifically quoted Xi’s Moscow address, reprinting some of the same language even when not quoting the speech directly. In an interdependent global village, Zhongsheng argued, security comes from cooperative measures and allowing other states space for their security, rather than unilateral measures (People’s Daily, April 23).

An unsigned editorial, entitled “Xi’s Security Outlook,” published after Western media speculation about whether Xi rebuked North Korea in his speech to the Boao Forum explained the president’s comments on security in interdependent world thusly:

“This new concept of shared security is in stark contrast to the parochial approach, which tends to view security based on one's own interests and needs. Driven by such an undesirable approach, a country will always calculate its own gains first whenever there is a regional or global security crisis. From the Syria crisis to maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China seas, in the final analysis many of the world's security woes today can, one way or another, be traced back to the pursuit of selfish gains in disregard of regional and global security needs” (China Daily, April 10).

Qu Xing, a scholar with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-run think tank China Institute of International Studies, also elaborated on President Xi’s remarks in an interview with the International Herald Leader that was redistributed through Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi). Qu explained that the “new type of great power relations” was only one integral if subordinate component of the larger “new type of international relations.” The focus of the great power-version, according to this scholar, was eliminating the curse of conservative, established powers, initiating competition to prevent peaceful development. Perhaps most interestingly, Qu said engaging Russia, which he considers an influential great power, under Xi’s rubric should pull Washington toward greater acceptance of Chinese positions and better bilateral relations—an updated form of triangulation even if China does not pursue a formal security agreement (International Herald Leader, April 11).

The evolution of “new type of great power relations” into “new type of international relations” signals Beijing is doubling down on its past principles of foreign policy. At a time when Chinese scholars and public intellectuals are advocating a different approach to some of Beijing’s biggest foreign policy problems and principles, President Xi seems to be sticking to the old path (Foreign Policy, April 23; “Is Enough Finally Enough for China and North Korea?” China Brief, March 15). Even though Xi’s statements about contributing to collective security are a nod in the right direction, the view of sovereignty and the need to allow state’s their space echo the League of Nations rather than the United Nations. Under the former, sovereignty was absolute; under the latter, sovereignty is conditional. The best way to characterize this would be that a “new type of international relations” is a small step forward for China, but a step backward for the international community.