North Caucasus Analysis - The Jamestown Foundation

Bombings and Shootings Reported Across North Caucasus

Tue, 02 Jun 2009 09:13:00 -0600

A month and a half after the President Dmitry Medvedev ordered an official end to the decade-long counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya, bombings and shootings have been reported there and in neighboring Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia over the past several days.

A man was hospitalized with shrapnel wounds in Dagestan's capital Makhachkala on June 1 when he accidently set off an improvised explosive device he found on the curb of a road in the city's Sovietsky district. Police who arrived at the scene of the blast found fragments of the explosive device, which was apparently made out of a plastic bucket, four kilograms of an ammonia nitrate-aluminum powder mixture, screws for use as shrapnel and a battery. A second blast took place in Makhachkala's Leninsky district as a police car was driving by. No one was hurt in the explosion, which police said had the force of 500 grams of TNT. The explosive device had been placed in a trash can (Interfax, June 1).

Two Federal Security Service (FSB) "spetsnaz" members and a district police officer were wounded in a shootout in Makhachkala on May 31. RIA Novosti reported later in the day that one of the FSB commandos, who had been shot in the head during the incident, had died in a hospital. A militant was also killed in the gun battle, which reportedly broke out after security forces tracked him down to an apartment in Makhachkala, surrounded the building and tried to negotiate his surrender via his wife, and then stormed the building when he refused to give up. The militant was identified as Gasan Gasanov, who authorities said was a member of an "illegal armed formation" - the standard official term for a rebel group - operating in Dagestan's Kizilyurt district. The apartment in which Gasanov was holed up was completely burned out during the operation, and several neighboring apartments were damaged by the fire. Security forces found a Kalashnikov automatic rifle, several grenades and ammunition in the apartment (www.newsru.com, RIA Novosti, May 31).

That same day - May 31 - three people were killed in an explosion in Ingushetia. According to the republic's Interior Ministry, the blast destroyed a car at a gas station in the city of Karabulak, killing two men and a woman who were inside the vehicle. An Interior Ministry spokesman said the explosion was the result of a bomb that had been placed underneath the car (Interfax, May 31). However, on June 1, Russian news agencies quoted law enforcement officials in Ingushetia as saying that among those killed in the car blast was Khamatkhan Gadaborshev, a 39-year-old resident of the village of Berd-Yurt who was a wanted member of the "gang underground" (a term often used by officialdom when referring to the rebel movement in the North Caucasus). Ekho Moskvy radio reported that there was no confirmation a woman had been among those killed inside the car, while ITAR-TASS quoted an unnamed official as saying the blast was caused by the accidental detonation of explosives which were being ferried inside the vehicle (Kavkazky Uzel, Ekho Moskvy, ITAR-TASS, June 1).

In North Ossetia on May 31 unidentified gunmen fired on a BMW X5 at the entrance to the city of Vladikavkaz. The Kavkazky Uzel website quoted an unnamed source as saying that two people in the car were killed immediately (the two victims were subsequently identified as Radik Sanakoev and Salvik Galoev) while two others were hospitalized with serious wounds. However, Gazeta.ru quoted a North Ossetian law enforcement source as saying three people were killed in the attack. A police source said the attackers were driving in a VAZ-2106 and that a large number of 5.45 mm and 7.62 mm shell casings were found at the scene of the shooting. The two men wounded in the attack were put under special police protection in the hospital (Kavkazky Uzel, www.gazeta.ru, May 31). It was not clear whether the attack in North Ossetia was the work of insurgents or an act of "ordinary" criminal violence.

Law enforcement sources in Chechnya said an arms cache was discovered in a house in the town of Shali on June 1. The cache, which included two Fagot wire-guided anti-tank missile systems, three 122 mm artillery shells and various other munitions, was destroyed in a controlled explosion (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, June 1).

A serviceman with the federal Interior Ministry's Interior Troops was killed May 30 when he stepped on a land mine while on a search and reconnaissance operation in a wooded area near the village of Benoi in Chechnya's Vedeno district. That same day, two members of a police foot patrol were wounded in the Oktyabrsky district of the Chechen capital Grozny when an improvised explosive device went off as they were walking by. Two other policemen who were part of the patrol unit escaped injury (Interfax, May 30-31).

A police officer was killed along with two suspected militants in a shootout in the Chechen town of Shali on May 28. The slain officer was identified as Timur Musaev, head of the Shali district police department's criminal investigation department. Another policeman, who was not identified by name, was wounded in the gun battle. A local police source identified the two dead suspected rebels as Yusup Askhabov, a 29-year-old Shali resident, and Aslan Makaev, a 26-year-old native of Grozny. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov visited the scene of the shooting in Shali and said the slain and wounded officers would each be awarded the republic's highest decoration - the Order of Akhmad Kadyrov - and that their families would be given financial support (Kavkazky Uzel, May 29).

Final Settlement of North Ossetian-Ingush Conflict is tied to Peace in Ingushetia

Fri, 29 May 2009 15:30:00 -0600

In a surprising statement, Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov said that violence in the republic was rooted in the unresolved Ingush-Ossetian territorial dispute. To stabilize the situation in the republic, Yevkurov promised that all displaced persons from North Ossetia would go back to their homes. According to the president, a total return of Ingush refugees to North Ossetia would deprive the Islamic insurgents of an important card (Rosbalt, May 25).

Since 2007, Moscow has claimed that the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of 1992 has been effectively resolved. While the North Ossetian side, as well as the previous, unpopular Ingush president, Murat Zyazikov, readily subscribed to this assertion, Ingush civil activists have insisted that the conflict and its consequences still needed to be dealt with. By bringing up the issue of the Ingush refugees, Yevkurov is implying Moscow�s declaration that the Ossetian-Ingush conflict has been resolved was not truthful and that stability in Ingushetia could be a bargaining chip in exchange for Moscow�s assistance in settling the Ossetian-Ingush dispute.

It is unlikely that a career military person like Yevkurov would make statements like these without approval from Moscow. Yevkurov�s remarks coincide with his promotion to the governing body of Russia�s State Council, which provides additional weight to the argument that Moscow approved Yevkurov�s demarche (Kommersant, May 25). This may signal a major shift in Moscow�s approach to the situation in Ingushetia and North Ossetia, favoring concessions to Ingushetia in the Ossetian-Ingush dispute. Yevkurov highlighted the grievances of the Ingush people, claiming that around 40 percent of the Ingush population feels that Russia does not care for them. Yevkurov further stated that the Ingush people felt especially unhappy because of the [excessive] attention that Russia paid to South Ossetia.

Russia�s protectiveness toward South Ossetia during and in the wake of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia has angered many in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Having witnessed and often experienced the two manifestly vicious counter-insurgency operations that Russia conducted in Chechnya, both Ingush and Chechens widely resented Russia�s official claim to be protecting the small Ossetian people from the nationalist Georgian government. Now, for the first time, this complaint is being voiced by the top Ingush official.

Ossetian-Ingush relations have been strained for most of the period since the beginning of 1990s. Five days of armed clashes between Ingush and North Ossetian paramilitary groups in the autumn of 1992 left over 500 dead, many of them civilians, while thousands of homes were burned down and tens of thousands people were displaced. The disputed territory�part of the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia and part of Vladikavkaz, capital of North Ossetia�underwent ethnic purges, as the Ingush population fled and was driven out by Ossetians forces, reportedly aided by Russian federal military detachments.

Since 1992, various Ingush governments have tried to return the Ingush refugees�at the height of the crisis estimated at 30,000-60,000�back to North Ossetia. Many of the Ingush refugees have returned, but there have been disagreements over the numbers and the exact places where they should or should not return. In addition, the returnees have largely remained isolated in North Ossetia, excluded from holding government office and other employment and educational opportunities.

Following the Beslan school hostage crisis in September 2004, which the North Ossetian public widely blamed on Ingush terrorist rings, the climate for Ingush refugees return to North Ossetia deteriorated further. Then Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the North Ossetian and Ingush governors to resolve the conflict by the end of 2006, but the process of making outstanding payments to the Ingush refugees extended well into 2007, and it was only then that the conflict and its consequences were solemnly proclaimed resolved.

Disagreements between the Ossetians and the Ingush run deeper than the issue of the Ingush refugees� return. The North Ossetian government points out that Article 11 of Ingushetia�s constitution explicitly sets reclaiming �unlawfully taken territories� as a top priority goal for the republic. Ingush activists still hope to actually redraw the administrative borders between the two republics. Even Yevkurov himself reserved the right �to hand over the knowledge to our posterity that Prigorodny is ancient Ingush land and Ossetians should not deny that� (Rosbalt, May 25).

Yevkurov originates from village of Tarskoe (or Angusht in Ingush), which is situated in the disputed territory in North Ossetia and may have a personal attachment to the issue. By reviving the issue of Prigorodny, Yevkurov�with tacit approval from Moscow�may be hoping to find greater support among Ingush nationalists and bring about a certain degree of stability that Ingushetia has desperately lacked during the past several years. The recent news from Ingushetia has sounded almost like war reports: on May 25, three policemen were killed in a mine explosion while one insurgent died in street fighting; on May 26, a civilian was gunned down by unknown attackers and another person was kidnapped by the law enforcement personnel. In addition, several people were wounded during that period (Ingushetia.org, May 25-26).

Surprisingly, in playing what seems to be the Ingush nationalist card, the president of Ingushetia is in some measures competing with the Islamic insurgents. Earlier in May, North Caucasus rebel leader Dokka Umarov issued a decree abolishing North Ossetia and merging its territory with Ingushetia (Caucasus Emirate website, May 11). The move perhaps reflected two trends among the insurgents: an attempt to appease nationalist sentiment and an acknowledgement of the Islamic insurgents� weakness in predominantly Christian North Ossetia.

Countering the insurgents� appeal to Ingush nationalism by solving the issue of the Prigorodny region is a logical move. Yet, the positions of the Ingush and the Ossetians have become so entrenched during the past 17 years that it is hard to imagine how they can be shaken and fundamentally transformed without destabilizing the status quo.

It is clear that even if all Ingush refugees return to North Ossetia, there will still be unsatisfied Ingush activists who will demand a redrawing of the administrative borders between the two republics. At the same time, North Ossetia will hardly be able to provide equal opportunities and services to the Ingush inhabitants of the republic, because of the deep distrust between the two people and overall poor governance. These circumstances are enough to make almost any quick solutions fail.

Therefore, the expectation that the security situation in Ingushetia will improve as soon as the Ingush refugees return to North Ossetia, is not well founded. In fact, this move may even facilitate the spread of the insurgency from Ingushetia to North Ossetia.

The Hunt for Rebels in Chechnya and Ingushetia Enters a Second Week

Fri, 29 May 2009 15:29:00 -0600

Military operations targeting rebel fighters in Chechnya and Ingushetia were conducted between May 17-24 near the villages of Bamut and Alkhasty in the Assa river valley, which serves as a boundary between the two republics. The operation involved up to several thousand Chechen policemen, among other troops.

According to Chechen Deputy Interior Minister Colonel Roman Edilov, over the last month, the number of casualties among the police exceeded those of rebel fighters. Edilov told Ekho Moskvy radio that �at least five rebels� were killed over the last month. The Voice of Russia radio, however, quoted Edilov as saying 19 rebels had been killed over the last month (http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?&q=114878&cid=437&p=24.05.2009). According to Interfax, Edilov said nine policemen were killed and 12 were wounded during that period, while 26 rebel fighters and 33 rebel supporters were captured (www.novayagazeta.ru/news/544062.html). Those accused of being rebel accomplices usually have nothing to do with the militants and are arrested for the sole purpose of creating the appearance that the Chechen government�s counter-insurgency efforts are working.

Against this backdrop of heavy losses among Chechnya�s police forces, the head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Prosecutor General�s Office, Alexander Bastrykin, created an unexpected stir when he put the number of rebel fighters currently active in the North Caucasus at approximately 1,500 (lenta.ru/news/2009/05/20/boevicks). Intriguingly, Bastrykin recanted his words only a few hours later without offering an explanation of whether this turn was caused by misquoting on the part of the news agency or by the reporter�s incompetence (RIA Novosti, May 20).

Bastrykin�s numbers are important because last year, the commander of the Interior Ministry�s forces, Nikolai Rogozhkin, claimed that the rebel forces in the North Caucasus numbered 400 to 500 men (http://www.chechnya.ru/view_date.php?part=news&dp=1242763200). Based on these two claims, it appears that after years of war in Chechnya, the rebels� ranks have grown rather than dwindled. This type of fuzzy math, which makes painfully obvious the groundless nature of these estimates of rebel strength, has been a fixture of the entire second military campaign in the North Caucasus since it started in the summer of 1999. In truth, it is doubtful that anyone today can provide even an approximate estimation of the true rebel numbers, given that the region in question includes as many as seven ethnically distinct republics (plus Stavropol and Krasnodar Krai) in which young people are joining the rebels in droves, and the FSB could hardly be expected to keep constant track of those who disappear from the public eye.

Looking at the casualty reports published by the Chechen government, it is easy to see the reason for the intense fighting in the mountainous part of Chechnya and Ingushetia. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov�s two personal visits to the front lines of the fighting (in the Sunzha and Achkhoi-Martan districts of Chechnya and the Sunzha district of Ingushetia) in just one week, combined with the appointment of Musa Delimkhanov to lead the operation, which involves troops from various areas of Chechnya and is headed by Kadyrov�s most trusted lieutenants, clearly point to the high priority given to this operation.

In a potentially sensational development, a news report out of Ingushetia on May 23 claimed that a group of 15 rebel fighters were detained near the village of Yandare (http://ingushetia.org/news/19446.html). The odd part was that this sizable group reportedly surrendered immediately without attempting to resist and, judging by the TV images, did not look like a group of rebels at all. The group of young men aged 18 to 33 appeared too well-groomed to have been living in the woods, and they were driving personal cars that no one reported stolen. A report by the separatist Kavkaz-Center website claiming that the detainees were members of the Sufi brotherhood of the Ingush Sheikh Batal-Hajji Belkharoev may very well turn out be true (http://kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2009/05/23/65808.shtml). Readers of the Ingushetia.org website certainly seemed to think so (http://ingushetia.org/forum_main/msg_424775_424554.html).

The putative rebels were arrested while leaving the village, where they were providing night security for gas stations that ensure a steady income for the owners. Members of this Ingush Sufi brotherhood always carry arms, and even the Soviet regime failed to disarm them completely. They lead a closed lifestyle, and handle all issues involving the government through negotiations and substantial bribe payments to assure the safety of brotherhood members. Therefore it is already quite clear that the matter will wind down quietly and the detainees will be released on probation.

Also on May 23, an armed clash between police and a 10-strong rebel unit broke out near the village of Bamut in Chechnya. After a brief exchange of fire, one rebel fighter was killed and one policeman was wounded (www.yuga.ru/news/155444). The slain rebel turned out to be one of the former policemen who joined the rebels last year.

Official government statements as well as news reports published by separatist sources indicate that anti-rebel operations are underway not only near the Chechnya-Ingushetia border areas but inside Chechnya as well (http://kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2009/05/23/65802.shtml). Armed combat was reported in the Urus-Martan, Vedeno and Achkhoi-Martan districts as well as the mountainous areas of Chechnya. These clashes were not special police actions but rather actual combat operations involving heavy artillery, tanks and military aviation, demonstrating that Kadyrov has secured support not only from Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov but from the Russian federal forces as well (http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/1735100.html).

That is, by publicizing its anti-rebel activities, the Chechen government is trying its best to keep the involvement of the Russian federal troops hidden from the populace. The significance of this is that the government appears to understand the public�s sensitivity to the presence of the Russian army, and therefore prefers to highlight the involvement of Kadyrov�s police forces.

As for President Kadyrov, he has been on national TV all week calling for harsh measures against those who left home to join the rebel armies, and against their families. He denied them any future amnesties and, moreover, drew other government and social leaders into his propaganda efforts (http://rusnovosti.ru/news/33714/). For instance, Mufti Sultan Mirzoev of Chechnya rushed to join Kadyrov and threatened to issue a fatwa (religious ruling) denouncing the rebels and their supporters as well as those responsible for acts of terror (primarily suicide bombers, also known as shaheeds).

Kadyrov made a surprising statement during a recent televised meeting with commanders leading special operations targeting the rebels near Bamut, alleging that his predecessor as Chechen president, Alu Alkhanov, was planning to assassinate him. In this startling and never-before heard revelation, Kadyrov said Alkhanov had been planning to assassinate him during the latter�s presidency, and that the plan called for coordinated action on behalf of everyone who was dissatisfied with Kadyrov�s influence. According to Kadyrov, a planning meeting for the assassination had taken place in Urus-Martan and included the Yamadaev brothers, Said-Magomed Kakiev, Movladi Baisarov, Beslan Gantamirov and others. One can only speculate about the reason Kadyrov chose to bring this up, but this author wrote about the potential establishment of an anti-Kadyrov block as early as during Alkhanov�s presidency.

Whatever the case, there is little evidence that the Chechen government has reason to be holding victory celebrations. The intense propaganda efforts unleashed by Kadyrov suggest that the Chechen president himself may even believe that the rebel forces number only a few dozen men. Combing Chechnya�s wooded areas in search of rebels, however, would hardly bring about the results he expects. Yet no one dares to explain to Kadyrov that it is not about the rebels. Rather, it is about the ideas that are finding support in the hearts of many more people than an actual headcount of the armed resistance�s ranks would suggest.

Briefs

Fri, 29 May 2009 15:28:00 -0600

North Caucasus Natives Reportedly Arrested in Egypt

Russian news sources reported on May 29 that Russian citizens in Egypt, most of them students at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, had been detained by authorities. Ingushetia.org quoted a Russian student at Al-Azhar as saying that Egyptian special services had arrested 198 students of Islam from Russia with families and children in Cairo, and that the arrests had begun on May 24. The website reported that among those arrested were 73 people from Chechnya, 12 from Ingushetia, 10 from Dagestan and three from Tatarstan. Subsequent reports by some Russian media on May 29 stated that �at least 35� Russian citizens had been arrested in Egypt.

Rights Group, Chechen Rights Ombudsman Slams Shamanov Appointment

Chechnya�s human rights ombudsman, Nurdi Nukhazhiev, criticized the appointment on May 25 of Vladimir Shamanov, the former commander of Russian forces in Chechnya, as commander of Russia�s airborne troops. Kommersant on May 26 quoted Nukhazhiev as saying that no one in Chechnya had �forgotten the violence this general perpetrated on peaceful residents and that he tried to shield military criminals.� Shamanov has publicly supported Yury Budanov, the Russian tank commander convicted in 2003 of murdering a Chechen woman, Elza Kungaeva, who was granted early release from his 10-year prison sentence last December, after serving eight years and six months. Human Rights Watch also condemned Shamanov�s appointment as airborne commander, stating on May 28 that the general had �presided over operations fraught with human rights violations and civilian casualties� and �should be investigated, not promoted.� The New York-based group noted that in February 2005, the European Court of Human Rights had ruled that Shamanov was responsible for a military operation in Katyr-Yurt in February 2000 that involved the �massive use of indiscriminate weapons,"� and led to the loss of civilian lives. According to Human Rights Watch, troops under Shamanov�s command also committed at least 14 killings that amounted to extrajudicial executions in the Chechen village of Alkhan-Yurt in December 1999.

Photo Surfaces of Sulim Yamadaev, Purportedly Among the Living

Fri, 29 May 2009 15:27:00 -0600

In the latest bizarre turn in the case of Sulim Yamadaev, the Chechen rebel website Kavkaz-Center on May 21 posted a photograph it said it received that day showing Yamadaev, the former commander of the Russian army�s elite Vostok battalion and rival to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov who was reportedly assassinated in Dubai in March, looking alive and well, lying in a hospital bed in black pajamas and holding a mobile phone.

One of Yamadaev�s brothers, Isa, has repeatedly insisted that Sulim survived the attack in Dubai and is recovering in a hospital. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, however, reported on May 25 that relatives of Sulim Yamadaev denied publicizing photos of him in the hospital. It also quoted Isa Yamadaev as acknowledging the likeness between Sulim and the man in the photograph but saying he had never seen the photo before and did not know where and when it was taken. RFE/RL quoted a second, unidentified relative as suggesting the photo may have been a montage and adding that if the family had wanted to circulate photographic evidence that Sulim was alive, they would not have sent it to the separatist Kavkaz-Center website.

Interfax reported on May 26 that Isa Yamadaev and another Yamadaev brother, Musa, were questioned the previous day as witnesses in the case of the disappearance of a Vostok battalion serviceman, Alikhan Khaladov, in July 2004. Isa Yamadaev told Izvestia earlier this month he would be willing to give evidence in the Khaladov case in Moscow but not in Chechnya, and denied any involvement in the serviceman�s disappearance.

On May 22, the head of the Moscow branch of the Prosecutor General Office�s Investigative Committee, Anatoly Bamet, said investigators would soon complete their probe of the murder of yet another Yamadaev brother, former State Duma Deputy Ruslan Yamadaev, who was shot to death in Moscow last September. Bamet said that the chief of the Investigative Committee, Aleksandr Bastrykin, has been personally supervising the probe from its start. As Interfax noted on May 22, a resident of Chechnya, Elimpasha Khatsuev, was arrested in April on suspicion of involvement in Ruslan Yamadaev�s murder and is also suspected of involvement in the assassination of Sulim Yamadaev.

Memorial: Kidnappings in North Caucasus Go Unsolved and Unpunished

Fri, 29 May 2009 15:26:00 -0600

Memorial said in a report released May 26 on the situation in the North Caucasus that more than 3,000 people have been kidnapped or disappeared without a trace in the region since 2000. According to the Russian human rights group, most of the abductions and disappearances have taken place in Chechnya, the victims� fate remains unknown and no one has been held responsible for the crimes.

According to Memorial, the North Caucasus remains one of Russia�s worst off regions in terms of human rights, as a result of ongoing armed conflict, corruption, official lawlessness and the actions of the security forces in the region, which the report calls a �policy of state terrorism.� Memorial says the number of reports of torture being used in the North Caucasus is growing, and the group is calling on the Russian Prosecutor General�s Office to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the actions of law enforcement and security structures in the region. The Memorial report also calls for representatives of international humanitarian groups, including the Red Cross, to be allowed into detention centers in the North Caucasus.

Meanwhile, Amnesty International says in a new report that human rights are routinely violated in Russia, with abductions of civilians continuing in Chechnya and police regularly violating basic constitutional rights. As The Associated Press reported on May 28, the Amnesty report on Russia is part of a larger publication warning that the global financial crisis has led cash-strapped governments to crack down on people protesting against poverty and unemployment.

Dagestan Plagued by Shootings and Power Cuts

Fri, 29 May 2009 15:25:00 -0600

The deputy mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan, Akhmed Tagaev, was shot dead in the republic�s capital, Makhachkala, on May 25. As Interfax noted, Tagaev was in charge of public and media relations for the board and regarded as �one of the main ideologists of opposition to religious extremism among Muslims.� Interfax on May 26 quoted Anas Pshikhachev, first deputy chairman of the Coordination Center of North Caucasus Muslims, as linking Tagaev�s murder to his professional activities and, in particular, to his opposition to radical Islam. Pshikhachev said Tagaev was a �strong opponent of Wahhabism.�

Also on May 26, a policeman was killed and another wounded when unidentified gunmen fired on a police post on the Khasavyurt-Makhachkala highway on the outskirts of Khasavyurt, Interfax reported.

On May 24, an improvised explosive device consisting of a plastic bucket filled with ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder and an electronic detonator was found on a section of a gas pipeline in Dagestan�s Kayakentsky district. The device was destroyed by bomb disposal experts but the blast nonetheless damaged part of the pipeline.

On May 22, a roadside bomb went off near a convoy of police vehicles on the outskirts of Khasavyurt. No one was hurt in the attack, Interfax reported.

Meanwhile, several dozen residents of a district in Makhachkala, unhappy over periodic power cuts, took over an electricity sub-station on May 27 and turned on feeders that had been shut off, Interfax reported. According to the St. Petersburg Times, it was the second seizure of a power station in Dagestan in the past two days: on May 26, a group of 60 to 70 people, most of them women, stormed a power substation in Sulak, switched the distribution feeders back on and secured the station with their own locks, RIA-Novosti reported, citing a statement from the Interregional Distribution Grid Company.

The St. Petersburg Times reported that electricity to Makhachkala and its suburbs was cut by 20 percent on May 21 because of the city�s 998 million ruble ($32 million) debt.

Kadyrov�s Income-and-Property Declaration Strains Credulity

Fri, 29 May 2009 15:23:00 -0600

Sergei Stepashin, who heads the Russian Audit Chamber, the federal budgetary watchdog agency, was asked by REN-TV on May 27 why Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov stated in his recently released official property and income declaration that his only car is a Russian Zhiguli when, as the television channel puts it, everyone knows he has an entire �stable� of expensive cars, including a Lamborghini. (President Dmitry Medvedev signed several decrees earlier this year ordering various senior officials to publish information about their incomes and property.) According to Newsru.com, Stepashin responded: �Well, that�s a good question � Ramzan Kadyrov has ownership of a whole republic. So you don�t have to worry about him.�

Itar-Tass reported on May 20 that Kadyrov had made public his income and property declaration for 2008, in which he stated that his salary was 3,422,000 rubles a year�around $110,000 at current exchange rates�and that he owned a three-room, 36 square meter apartment in Grozny and a VAZ-21053 car.

Gazeta.ru noted on May 20 that in the past, Kadyrov has given athletes, military men and journalists expensive presents, including gold watches and cars, and that he admitted this past spring (following the murder of Sulim Yamadaev in Dubai) that he employs an Iranian stableman in the United Arab Emirates to take care of his race horses (North Caucasus Weekly, April 10 and 17). The website also noted that Kadyrov has bragged about his collection of rare weapons, including a prize gold-plated Stechkin pistol, and has given similar weapons as gifts to his associates. One such pistol was reportedly found at the scene of the Yamadaev murder, which UAE authorities have accused Adam Delimkhanov, the State Duma deputy and Kadyrov�s cousin, of masterminding (North Caucasus Weekly, April 10 and 17, May 1).

Gazeta.ru, citing Izvestia, reported that Kadyrov�s horses in the UAE are worth $300,000 to $2.5 million each (there was no indication of how many racehorses he owns). The website also noted that Ilya Yashin, an activist with the pro-democracy Solidarity movement, had put on his website a video of Kadyrov�s motorcade on which one could see 10 BMWs, nine Porsche Cayennes, two Mercedes-Benz S-class and several Mercedes G-class cars, and eight Lexus LX 470s. According to Yashin�s estimate, the vehicles visible in the video were worth two million euros (around $2.77 million at current exchange rates).

In 2005, a journalist with GQ magazine who interviewed Kadyrov in his native village of Tsentoroi noted that a black Hummer, a Lexus jeep and several sports cars were parked outside his home. Newsru.com reported that a Lamborghini was visible in one of the GQ photographs of the sports cars parked outside Kadyrov�s home.

According to Newsru.com, Kommersant reported in 2007 that during a property battle over the �Progress� clothing factory in Kislovodsk (Stavropol Krai), Chechen OMON police officers who confronted local Cossacks guarding the site �threatened them with weapons and said the factory belongs to President Ramzan Kadyrov.�

Meanwhile, there was more violence in Chechnya and Ingushetia this past week as the authorities continued to conduct joint security operations. Itar-Tass on May 27 quoted an unnamed Ingush Interior Ministry official as saying that 12 militants had been killed, seven of them in Ingushetia, since joint security operations started on May 16. Interfax reported on May 27 that two alleged militants were killed in battles with police in Grozny. In one incident in the Chechen capital, a driver blew himself up with an improvised explosive device after exchanging fire with police who tried to stop him. In the second incident, another driver was killed in a shootout with police.

Interfax reported on May 26 that a warrant officer was killed and two other servicemen wounded when an explosive device was detonated as a truck carrying soldiers from the Russian army�s 42nd infantry battalion was driving along the Grozny-Argun highway. Meanwhile, three Chechen police officers were killed by a bomb on May 26 as they were conducting a reconnaissance operation in a wooded area near the village of Dattykh in Ingushetia�s Sunzha district. On May 25, a police officer was injured by a grenade near Roshni-Chu in Chechnya�s Urus-Martan district, near the Chechen-Ingush administrative border. A source in the headquarters of the Combined Group of Forces in the North Caucasus told Interfax on May 23 that army helicopters were being used to pursue a group of militants in Chechnya�s Achkhoi-Martan district (see Mairbek Vatchagaev�s article in this issue).

Militants Reportedly Killed in Nalchik Shootout

Fri, 29 May 2009 15:21:00 -0600

Several militants were reportedly killed during a special operation in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, on May 28. According to some Russian media, two rebels were killed after a 12-hour battle with security forces that had surrounded the apartment building in which they were holed up. Other Russian media quoted law enforcement sources as saying three militants�not two�were killed in the apartment.

The Moscow Times, citing Russia�s Channel One state television, reported on May 29 that the apartment was located just 300 meters from the republic�s counter-terrorism headquarters and that after �several hours of frantic shooting and the evacuation of the building�s residents, police used grenade launchers against the gunmen hiding in the ground-floor apartment.� Two bodies were retrieved from the subsequent rubble, the English-language newspaper reported. Channel One reported that two police commandos were wounded by booby traps set by the insurgents in the abandoned apartment.

RIA Novosti quoted a republican law enforcement source as identifying one of the slain militants as Murat Ristov, a 25-year-old native of Karachaevo-Cherkessia who is also a sambo martial arts world champion. Newsru.com reported on May 28 that Ristov received a gold medal in the 68 kilogram category in the world sambo championships in St. Petersburg last November, but that he was representing Adygea, not Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and was congratulated by Adygea�s president, Aslan Tkhakushinov.

According to Newsru.com, Ristov was detained in the city of Tyrnyauz, Kabardino-Balkaria, in March along with two residents of Karachaevo-Cherkessia, on suspicion of participation in �illegal armed formations,� but he managed to escape by jumping out a two-story window. RIA Novosti reported that Ristov was listed as a member of Russia�s team at the European sambo championship held in Milan, Italy, on May 15-17, but that he did not participate in the competition. The website reported that Ristov was living in Maikop, Adygea, and that he was put on the federal wanted list in March.

The Vzglyad newspaper website (Vz.ru) on May 28, however, cited various Islamic websites as reporting that Ristov had been detained while receiving medical treatment in Tyrnyauz in March and threatened with torture if he refused to confess to extremist activity. According to these sources, he managed to escape and filed a complaint with the prosecutors, which Vzglyad detailed and quoted.

Various Russian media reported that the second militant killed during the special operation in Nalchik on May 28 was none other than Anzor Astemirov, the leader of Islamic militants in Kabardino-Balkaria and one of the organizers of the October 13, 2005 rebel attacks in Nalchik, who more recently became head of the Sharia courts for the Caucasus Emirate, the radical wing of the North Caucasian insurgency. (An interview with Astemirov was published in North Caucasus Weekly on March 20.)

Kommersant on May 29 quoted special services sources as saying that Astemirov may have been inside the blockaded apartment, and quoted one source in the �power structures� saying that Astemirov had been killed in the operation. Yet, the newspaper reported that �this information was soon denied by another source, who said that he [Astemirov] was not among the militants in the apartment.�

Both RIA Novosti (on May 28) and the newspaper Novoye Izvestia (on May 29) quoted an unnamed republican law enforcement official as saying that one of the bodies of the dead militants may have been that of Astemirov but that an autopsy would be needed for a positive identification because the body had been severely disfigured by an explosion.

Fifty-eight men are now on trial for allegedly participating in the October 2005 rebel attacks in Nalchik, during which 35 law enforcement officers, 12 civilians and 92 rebels were killed.

On May 14, Lieutenant-Colonel Vitaly Bogatyrev, the deputy head of the remand prison where the 58 accused participants in the Nalchik violence are being held, was killed in a drive-by shooting in Nalchik.

On May 11, Kabardino-Balkaria�s Interior Ministry reported that two organizers of the October 2005 raids in Nalchik, Artur (Musa) Mukozhev and Marat Guliev, had been killed the previous day while resisting capture in the settlement of Dugulubgei in Kabardino-Balkaria�s Bakansky district.

Moscow sees Chechnya�s Kadyrov as a Silver Bullet for the North Caucasus

Fri, 22 May 2009 11:49:00 -0600

�We have agreed, that we will fight against the militants together, regardless of which territory they are in,� Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov stated on May 17 during a joint press-conference with Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. �I have waited long for this day� (Interfax, May 17). Kadyrov was visiting Ingushetia for the first time since Yevkurov replaced his predecessor, Murat Zyazikov, in October 2008.

On May 16, the Chechen, Ingush and federal forces launched joint operation in the border area between Ingushetia and Chechnya�an operation that is ongoing. According to Kadyrov, the leader of the Islamic separatists of the North Caucasus, Dokka Umarov, is among the group of approximately 25 fighters that were trying to escape encirclement by government forces (RIA Novosti, May 17). The insurgents� primary online resource, Kavkaz-Center, reported heavy fighting in both the Chechen and Ingush mountains, but did not specify the exact origins of the fighters. According to the website, government forces used heavy mortars and helicopters and both sides suffered several casualties (Kavkaz-Center, May 20).

During his meeting with Yevkurov, Kadyrov proclaimed that Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan should join their efforts to quell the resistance put up by Islamic insurgents in their respective regions. Kadyrov�s previous attempts to infringe on Ingush territory in order to carry out attacks evoked increased resistance from both the republican government and the Ingush public. Numerous clashes have been reported between the Ingush and Chechen police forces in the past, but now Yevkurov may well be under pressure from Moscow to accept Kadyrov�s assistance in suppressing the insurgency in Ingushetia. The substantial involvement of Chechen military detachments in the operation in Ingushetia highlights the higher level of Kadyrov�s involvement in the neighboring republic.

Little progress has been made in bringing down violence levels in Ingushetia since Zyazikov's dismissal last autumn. Violent attacks by insurgents and heavy-handed punitive actions by the government forces have become a daily routine in Ingushetia during the past several years.

Exasperation over the actions of both sides in the conflict�the government forces and the insurgents�has been growing in Ingushetia steadily. On May 9, the parents of an alleged insurgent gang member were killed in the settlement of Ordzhonikidzevskya in Ingushetia. This was the first event of this type in Ingushetia, and it strikingly resembles the tactics of threats and killings of alleged insurgents� relatives espoused by federal forces and Kadyrov in Chechnya.

While offering his services in Ingushetia, Kadyrov has been facing an increased level of attacks in his own domain, Chechnya, and even in its capital, Grozny. On May 15, two alleged suicide bombers killed four policemen in the vicinity of the Chechen Interior Ministry building in the Chechen capital (North Caucasus Weekly, May 15). Following the attack, Kadyrov�s forces killed four suspected collaborators in the attack on the spot. Kadyrov�s quick-tempered solutions to the problem of insurgency in Chechnya have been criticized by human rights activists as illegal and essentially leading to further radicalization of portions of the population.

According to Kadyrov, no more than 50-70 insurgents remain at large (RIA Novosti, May 16). Yet, the intelligence given by Kadyrov on the remaining number of fighters have been notoriously unreliable, and were habitually downplayed by Moscow and its representatives in Chechnya.

The increased activity of the insurgency in Chechnya comes as an embarrassment to Kadyrov, given that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev solemnly abolished the counter-insurgency operation regime in the republic on April 16. The Memorial human rights group has reported that following the official ending of the counter-insurgency operation regime in Chechnya, young people have been increasingly pressured by Kadyrov�s forces (Kavkazky Uzel, May 20).

In the meantime Yevkurov has imposed peculiar night guard duties on civilian government employees, in what seems to be a na�ve attempt to widen the social support base for his policies. The employees have to maintain vigilance alongside with the police, but without arms and corresponding training, essentially becoming human shields for the police forces (Prague Watchdog, May 16). Unarmed civilians observing civil order were fairly common across the country during the Soviet period, but at that time, no clandestine forces outside the government were armed with grenade launchers and other weaponry routinely used by the insurgents in the North Caucasus.

Both trends�the application of harsh, semi-legal tactics to quell the insurgency in Ingushetia and elsewhere in the North Caucasus, and recalling ghosts from the Soviet past, like civilian vigilance patrols�indicate a certain crisis in the thinking of the federal and local governments.

Having virtually eliminated representative democracy on the federal level, Moscow does not accept the fact that this cannot be done so easily also on a local level. As the former president of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev has repeatedly pointed out, the long term solution for stability in the North Caucasus is restoring popular elections for regional governors. Moscow is still grappling to understand why what works in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia backfires in Ingushetia and other republics of the region. Of course, in the current political environment it is hard to imagine that Moscow will start democratizing the North Caucasus in order to avoid a further escalation of violence.

At stake here is not only the fate of the North Caucasus region, but the future of Russia as a whole. If Moscow opts for a return to elections in Ingushetia, it will be harder for it to ignore calls for the liberalization of Russian political space elsewhere. That will essentially mean putting an end to Putin�s power vertical�an outcome hardly acceptable to the current Russian leadership.