North Caucasus Analysis - The Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown.org/ Current headlines from the North Caucasus Analysis publication from The Jamestown Foundation. en North Caucasus Analysis - The Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown.org/fileadmin/templates/images/rss_icon.gif http://www.jamestown.org/ 50 50 Current headlines from the North Caucasus Analysis publication from The Jamestown Foundation. TYPO3 - get.content.right http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Fri, 10 May 2013 11:08:00 -0400 Dagestan’s Bloodshed Continues to Grow http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40864&cHash=55f5c8e95bb8f6dbe2e4e2691007ba49 May 2013 in Dagestan began in the usual bloody manner. On April 30, the eve of the May 1 holiday in...

May 2013 in Dagestan began in the usual bloody manner. On April 30, the eve of the May 1 holiday in Russia, three police officers – a major, captain and lieutenant - were killed when an unidentified group attacked the Buinaksk district police station in the city of Buinaksk (http://kavkasia.net/Russia/2013/1367444462.php). Dagestan’s Islamist insurgents were apparently behind the attack.

On May 1, two teenagers, aged 14 and 15, were killed in an explosion when they tried to open a package lying near the door of a shop. Two male passersby, aged 40 and 47, were injured. According to investigators, the perpetrators of the blast were trying to pressure the shop’s owner. They said unidentified people had previously tried to extort money from the business owner. Three months earlier, an IED had been placed by the shop’s entrance, but was defused

(http://kavkasia.net/Russia/2013/1367473288.php).

On May 2, an explosion took place next to the front gate of the home of Malik Oruskhanov, the former head of administration of the town of Semender in Makhachkala’s suburbs. Makhachkala Mayor Said Amirov had earlier fired Oruskhanov for allowing illegal construction in the suburb (www.echo.msk.ru/news/1066104-echo.html). However, it is no secret, that Oruskhanov was sacked following a police special operation in the town in March. At that time, the authorities thought that the leader of the Gimry jamaat, Ibragim Gajidadaev, was also among the five militants killed in the operation. The killing of Gajidadaev in the incident, however, has never been confirmed: indeed, DNA tests were inconclusive because Gajidadaev’s brother was also

killed in the operation. According to rebel news sources, Ibragim Gajidadaev actually managed to escape the scene of the operation. If confirmed, this would mean the much hailed security service operation was in fact a failure (http://kavpolit.com/ibragim-gadzhidadaev-otstrelivaetsya-v-gimrax/). The authorities accused Gajidadaev of multiple attacks on police forces, as well as being the mastermind of the assassination of Dagestani Interior Minister Adilgirei Magomedtagirov in 2009 (http://kavigator.ru/articles/23956).

Also on May 2, police defused an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that had been placed underneath a police officer’s car in Buinaksk. The police officer himself had spotted the IED. The IED was destroyed in a controlled explosion, but no one was injured (www.rg.ru/2013/05/02/reg-skfo/zaminirovano-anons.html).

On May 3, Britain’s Foreign Office advised its subjects to refrain from traveling to Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and several other Russian territories in the North Caucasus because of a heightened terrorist threat. The Foreign Office also discouraged travel to Budyonnovsk, Levokumsk, Neftekumsk, Stepnoi and Kurski districts of Stavropol region. Travel to North Ossetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria was recommended only for urgent visits (www.bbc.co.uk/russian/rolling_news/2013/05/130503_rn_fco_advice_chechnya.shtml).

The concerns of the UK’s Foreign Office are quite understandable. After the bombings in Boston, dozens of British journalists flew to Dagestan to find out what made Tamerlan Tsarnaev carry out his senseless attack. They noticed that the situation in Makhachakala is far from normal, with explosions regularly heard at dusk. Locals no longer pay much attention to reports of clashes between militants and government forces, because they happen so often. Islamic culture is certainly dominant in Dagestan compared to other parts of Russia. The Foreign Office’s statement evoked an indignant response from North Caucasian governors, who have been trying hard to convince the outside world how calm their region really is. Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin-backed leader of Chechnya, invited all English people to visit him, claiming that Chechnya is far safer than London (www.24news.ru/news/politics/860064n.html). Ingushetia’s leader also invited tourists to assess how safe his republic is (http://u-f.ru/News/u272/2013/05/05/654492). The governors of Stavropol region, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Dagestan also expressed their displeasure with the Foreign Office warning as well and one wonders whether other foreign governments, including the United States will respond to the notice from Whitehall.

The fact that the situation in Dagestan remains permanently tense is no secret to anyone. Indeed, that is why police forces from all over Russia are dispatched to Dagestan, as well as to Chechnya, for six month periods to restore order in these unstable territories (http://news.mail.ru/inregions/ural/74/society/12984189/).

Trying to improve Dagestan’s image, the republic’s official news agency, RIA Dagestan, has several items on its website about the achievements of the republic, the victories of its athletes and multiple meetings between government officials and the general population. There is not even a hint about the upcoming presidential elections in the republic, which are set to take place in four months. The Kremlin’s candidate, Ramazan Abdulatipov, need not worry about competitors, given that the president of the republic will be elected by the republican parliament. The members of the Dagestani parliament are fully aware of to whom they owe their seats, so there will not be any surprises at the ballot boxes.

In any case, elections for president will change little in the general situation in the republic. The armed confrontation between the jihadists and the government is intensifying, despite frequent losses among the members of the local jamaat’s involved in the regional insurgency. The jihadists are at a stage in which their ideological base in the republic continues to expand, so the culmination of this struggle probably lies ahead.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Mairbek Vatchagaev Fri, 10 May 2013 11:08:00 -0400 Radicalization of Tsarnaev Brothers Likely Did Not Occur in Chechnya http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40858&cHash=e4aa013132193dc06820a76420fcdc04 The role of the brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the Boston bombings is assessed... The role of the brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the Boston bombings is assessed differently on either side of the Atlantic. In the United States, few doubt they are terrorists and that the youngest son, Dzhokhar, who remains alive, deserves the severest form of punishment. However, in Russia and the post-Soviet space, the two brothers have become almost heroes and are viewed as martyrs in an outbreak of growing anti-Americanism that the Kremlin does not seem to be opposing.

Support groups for Dzhokhar have been set up around the country. His support group on one of the Russian online social networks, VKontakte (In Contact), for example, has gathered 8,332 fans (http://vk.com/johar_tamerlan). A Facebook group called “Dzhokar Tsarnaev is Innocent” received support from 21,104 people (www.facebook.com/groups/axjhelpdzhokhar/). A second support group on Facebook called “Dzhokar Tsarnaev Is Innocent (Official Group)” has 7,478 members (http://www.facebook.com/groups/tsarnaev.free/). On Twitter, 22,320 follow Dzhokhar at one address, 8,000 at another and over 10,000 at a third (https://twitter.com/crunkbiebs), and so on across multiple social networks.

It is worth noting that there are also a few US groups in support of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. As of April 27, 15,000 people had signed a petition on behalf of Tsarnaev addressed to US President Barak Obama (www.change.org/petitions/-1235909).  In another case a group called ACTIONS FOR JUSTICE (AXJ) is collecting signatures on a similar petition in support of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, this one was posted on the official White House website’s petitions page. AXJ believes the Tsarnaev brothers were framed (https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-must-be-granted-habeas-corpus-and-all-charges-dropped-based-lack-evidence-and/bMJpDrNq#thank-you=p).

In various countries in the post-Soviet space, leaflets have appeared proclaiming Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s innocence. He is presented as a victim of US reprisals against young people who, by chance, happened to be at the site of the explosions. For example, leaflets in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek have called on people to pray for Dzhokhar, saying he was baselessly accused of horrific crimes (www.spbdnevnik.ru/news/2013-05-03/-pomolites-za-dzhokhara---na-ulitsakh-bishkeka-raskleivayut-listovki-o-nevinovnosti-tsarnaeyva-mladshego/). In the Chechen capital Grozny, leaflets all across the city have called on people to sign a petition to the US president, arguing the Tsarnaevs were framed (www.echomsk.spb.ru/news/obschestvo/listovki-tsarnaeva-grozny.html). The same leaflets also appeared in the city of Karaganda in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan.  After this development, police reportedly launched an investigation to find out who spread the leaflets (http://publicpost.ru/news/id/2863158/).

Meanwhile, in the capital city of Makhachkala, Dagestan, Kheda Saratova, a human rights activist, has also agreed to defend the Tsarnaev brothers (http://kavpolit.com/agenty-fbr-poobshhalis-s-roditelyami-bratev-carnaevyx-vzorvavshix-boston/). Saratova became the Tsarnaev family’s defender in Makhachkala. According to Saratova, Moscow lawyer Zaurbek Tsadarkhanov also has offered his services to the Tsarnaevs pro bono (www.svoboda.org/content/article/24968674.html).

In the US, the most prevalent belief is that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is an ethnic Chechen and that the crime he committed had an Islamist coloring related to what has been happening in Chechnya during the past ten years. Is there a real basis for this view? The answer is yes and no.  There is growing evidence that the family may actually have closer ties to the Putin-anointed leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, than possibly Dagestani militants. The leading source for this claim is none other than the father of the Tsarnaev brothers—Ansor Tsarnaev. In an interview with the Chechen service of the Prague-based Radio Liberty, Ansor Tsarnaev rejected even the remote possibility that the Russian security services were involved in the bombings and openly announced he was a supporter of Ramzan Kadyrov, who is widely accused of human rights abuses in the Chechen republic (www.radiomarsho.com/content/tsarnayev-chechnya-dagestan-boston/24962911.html).  In another example, a rebel website echoed this claim suggesting that the Tsarnaev family may be linked to the Chechen authorities. This allegation is grounded solely in the fact that the husband of Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s sister is a member of Kadyrov’s forces (www.kcblog.info/2013/04/blog-post_6185.html). The sister herself lives in Urus-Martan, Chechnya, and Tamerlan probably visited her during his trip to Chechnya in 2012.

Said-Hussein Tsarnaev, a relative who currently resides in Chechnya but lived with the family in the city of Tokmok in Kyrgyzstan until 1969, said in an interview that the Tsarnaevs did not meet with relatives during their last two visits to Chechnya (http://www.radiomarsho.com/content/who-is-behind-the-bostons-explosion/24967417.html). Said-Hussein, who is a well-known Chechen photo-journalist, said he had not seen Anzor Tsarnaev for almost 40 years. For his part, Anzor Tsarnaev said the family only met with close relatives when in Chechnya.

On the other hand, during his seven months in Dagestan, Tamerlan Tsarnaev might have met with Salafis working openly and officially under the umbrella of the Association Ahlu al Sunna. The Association Ahlu al Sunna is an official and legal Salafi organization in Dagestan. In Chechnya, it is not feasible even to talk about endorsing Salafis: indeed, people in Chechnya are persecuted for any deviation from Sufism, and anyone expressing support for the militants in any form is immediately arrested (http://lifenews.ru/news/24733). No allowances are made for the age or sex of the suspects (www.ekhokavkaza.org/archive/news/20121210/3235/2759.html?id=24793921).

Given the fact that Tamerlan’s brother-in-law appears to be serving in Kadyrov’s forces, it is unlikely the older Tsarnaev brother would have expected him to be a sympathetic interlocutor when talking about government persecution of Islam. The differences between the two men probably explain why Tamerlan visited his sister in Chechnya only twice while he was in Dagestan, even though Grozny is only 170 kilometers—a two-hour drive—from Makhachkala (www.avtodispetcher.ru/distance/?from=%D0%9C%D0%B0%D1%85%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B0&to=%D0%93%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9).

At the same time, the belief that the United States is responsible for all the misfortunes and sufferings of the Islamic world is fairly widespread in Russia and a common view backed by the Kremlin-controlled Islamic media. So Tamerlan and his Chechen contacts could perhaps have found some common ground, based on a shared view of the US’s alleged misdeeds in Muslim countries.

Whatever the case, there is no doubt the Federal Security Service (FSB) could answer all these questions, given that the Russian security services likely followed the guest from America. According to all of their rules, the FSB should have known about all of Tamerlan’s contacts and conversations he had while he was in Dagestan. Still, the notion that there was a “Chechen trail” in Tamerlan’s radicalization appears to be the weakest theory among those currently under discussion; the roots of his radicalization more likely occurred in Dagestan or in Boston than in Chechnya.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Mairbek Vatchagaev Thu, 09 May 2013 16:56:00 -0400 Russian Experts Call on Moscow to Turn North Caucasus into ‘Internal Turkey’ http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40848&cHash=c0cddcdb6157151a48f9d1a1c744a1bc Analysis provided by a group of Russian experts suggests that the Russian government should move...

Analysis provided by a group of Russian experts suggests that the Russian government should move away from large economic projects in the North Caucasus to creating a favorable environment for local entrepreneurs. In order to achieve the goal of steady economic development of the region, the government should make use of the strong attributes of the North Caucasus, such as its relatively low cost labor and substantial entrepreneurial class, turning the region into what they call an “internal Turkey.” It is noteworthy that the authors of the report start off by defending the North Caucasus as part of the Russian Federation and not a region outside the rest of the country, as ethnic Russians often refer to it. Large-scale government investment in the region creates a “budget market” and suppresses real market forces, argue the authors of the report (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/222451).

The usual hallmark of Russian expert assessment of the situation in the North Caucasus is that plausible explanations for the adverse processes in the region are combined with unrealistic recipes for success. The primary problem encountered by Russian experts is that to change the situation in the North Caucasus, political reforms are needed, not only economic reforms. Political reforms envisage democratic governance and rule of law. The problem with this approach is that undemocratic governance and a lack of legal protections are the features of the current Russian regime in general.

So however well the problems in the North Caucasus are diagnosed, there is no political will to implement the right solutions. Instead of a regular democratic political process and free and fair elections, Russian experts come up with elaborate schemes of creating public commissions, elders’ councils, elites’ assemblies, and so on in the region. The reason for such tortuous ways of reform in Russia’s periphery is that Russia proper needs the reforms just as much as the North Caucasus and they are nowhere in sight.

There is also an intrinsic contradiction in Moscow’s desire to spend less on the North Caucasus, provide employment for the locals and at the same time keep the region sufficiently tied to Russia. Russians are afraid that if the North Caucasus is too self-sufficient, it will be harder for Moscow to maintain control over it. Russian economists, therefore, try to devise schemes to ensure that North Caucasus development is accompanied by its incorporation into the Russian market, not the international market.

In the meantime, Russia’s political leadership acts against the recommendations of the experts on the region, curbing even the modest gains that participatory politics have made in the rest of the country. Dagestan and Ingushetia both have opted out of holding popular elections in September 2013, instead reverting to appointment of their governors by the Kremlin. While Moscow pretends these regions chose this way of changing the leadership, few observers doubt the Russian government “advised” them to do so. The increasing administrative control over the North Caucasus at the expense of self-governance promotes instability in the region and alienates the locals from Moscow, argues the well-known Dagestani expert Enver Kisriev. “The [Russian] authorities reckon that the [North] Caucasus appreciates only brute force and so it should be squeezed by brute force,” he said. “This is a huge mistake, because the [North] Caucasus indeed appreciates brute force and that is why it responds to brute force with brute force. Choosing this way of pacifying the [North] Caucasus is similar to pouring fuel onto fire” (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/223234/). Ironically, the Kremlin abolished direct elections for governors where they were needed most—in the North Caucasus—while the Russian government continued to bemoan the underdevelopment of this volatile region.

The North Caucasus ski resorts project is gradually fading from memory and is being replaced with other plans, less grandiose, but still substantial. In fact, the portfolio of investment projects in the region has increased to nearly $40 billion, compared to $33 billion in 2011. The most ambitious is a $5 billion construction project in the Makhachkala suburbs that should be finished by 2018. Nearly as ambitious is the plan to build a ski resort in the North Ossetian mountains for $4.8 billion. Given the fact that there are hydroelectric plants in the North Caucasus that have waited for completion since the 1970s, chances are not very high that the present plans will be implemented any time soon (http://kavpolit.com/otravlennye-dengi-dlya-kavkaza/). The government’s lofty plans for developing the North Caucasus appear to serve only the purpose of distracting the local elites from the lavish spending on construction for the Winter Olympics in nearby Sochi next year. After the Olympics are over, the cheap talk about expensive projects in the North Caucasus is also likely to dissipate.

The outside world should refrain from seeing violence, the spread of radical Islam and economic underdevelopment in the North Caucasus through Moscow’s prism. Russia is not simply putting down a senseless rebellion in the North Caucasus, but is part of the problem by actively suppressing the region’s political and economic development. In Putin’s Russia, social and political cleavages are almost bound to grow into large security threats and protracted conflicts. As Russian experts are caught between the hammer and the anvil, having to find narrow ways for reforming the North Caucasus without undermining Russian authoritarian rule, outside experts should not restrict themselves to such limited views of the situation in this region.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Valery Dzutsev Wed, 08 May 2013 14:58:00 -0400 Circassians Urge Russian President and Parliament to Recognize Circassian ‘Genocide’ http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40838&cHash=5630fca3b21dc58fadf839217c978c3d On May 2, three major Circassian organizations addressed an appeal to President Vladimir Putin and... On May 2, three major Circassian organizations addressed an appeal to President Vladimir Putin and the Russian parliament. In it, they urged the Russian government to recognize the Circassian “genocide” and provide favorable conditions for the return of the descendants of the Circassian exiles in Syria to their historical homeland in the North Caucasus. “Under the current circumstances, ignoring the obvious historical fact of the genocide of Circassians by the Russian Empire in 19th century has created space for the excessive politicization and outwardly entirely legitimate resolutions by a foreign state, recognizing the Circassian genocide,” the statement read. Its authors boldly endorsed the Georgian parliament’s resolution on the Circassian “genocide” that was passed in May 2011. At the same time, the statement tactfully declared that the Olympics in Sochi in 2014 should not be politicized (http://aheku.org/page-id-3542.html).

Overall, the statement was well crafted and leaves an impression that its signatories tried to use wording that would not antagonize the Kremlin while at the same time advancing the Circassians’ interests, using international attention to the region in the run-up to the Sochi Olympics. The appeal was signed by three persons—Adam Bogus, the head of the Adygean organization Adyge Khase; Mukhamed Cherkesov, the head of Adyge Khase in Karachaevo-Cherkessia; and Asker Sokht, the head of the Adyge Khase organization in Krasnodar region. The latter two Circassians have been known as ostensibly pro-Moscow figures in the Circassian leadership, and yet they signed a fairly bold statement. “In our view, endlessly ignoring these issues is counterproductive,” the appeal concluded. “We hope that our address will be received with due attention, while the problems we have raised will find an effective resolution” (http://aheku.org/page-id-3542.html). Unless the appeal was unofficially invited by the Kremlin to show some limited recognition of Circassian issues, this document suggests that the Circassians’ awareness of their problems and their desire to resolve them have grown significantly over the past several years.

While some observers might find the Circassians’ demands excessive or unrealistic, the letter also lists quite basic expectations that would be accepted immediately in many other countries, except perhaps for regimes like Russia. For example, the Circassian activists asked that greater interaction between the North Caucasian Circassians and the large Circassian diaspora abroad be permitted. According to some estimates, about 90 percent of ethnic Circassians live outside the Russian Federation, primarily in Turkey, but also in other countries including Syria, Jordan, Israel, Germany and the United States. Travel to the North Caucasus is so difficult due to stringent rules for getting Russian visas, and so expensive due to intentionally blocked travel routes, that many ethnic Circassians residing outside Russia cannot visit their homeland despite the fall of the Iron Curtain more than 20 years ago. The Circassians also asked the Russian government to include a Circassian cultural element in the Olympics’ program. The Russian government thus far has been intent on presenting the Cossacks as the “native residents” of Sochi region, even though it is a historical fact that Cossacks along with the regular Russian army drove the Circassians out of this area during the Russian conquest of the region in the 19th century.

In fact, the Russian government has gone to great lengths to erase all traces of the Circassians in the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions and “mark” them with Russian symbols that are often offensive to the Circassians and other North Caucasians. “Russia’s Krasnodar and Stavropol regions have turned into exhibitions of achievements of militarist monumental propaganda,” a Circassian analyst pointed out. New statues of Alexei Yermolov, the Russian general known for his brutality during the 19th century Russian-Caucasian war, were erected in Pyatigorsk and Mineralnye Vody in Stavropol region. A new statue of a Russian general from the same epoch, Grigory Zass, was erected in Armavir in Krasnodar region. In Sochi, the authorities put up a monument depicting Ivan Lazarev. Both generals Lazarev and Zass were known for extreme cruelty in waging wars against the Circassians in the northwestern part of the Caucasus (http://aheku.org/page-id-3006.html). As Russians celebrate these controversial figures, Circassian rhetoric also escalates, which produces cleavages in an area already riven with ethnic tensions and conflict.

Instead of finding some common ground with the Circassians, Russian think tanks close to the government and the security services, such as the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, have lamented the “impunity of Circassian activists” and called on the government to crack down on them and “amend” textbooks in order to excise accounts of the painful past that are unfavorable to the Russian government (http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1532239.html#ixzz1vFGpQI5R).

Moscow’s unwillingness to make any meaningful steps to accommodate Circassian grievance, appear to be antagonizing even traditional Kremlin loyalists among the Circassians. With the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi quickly approaching, Circassian activists are bound to ramp up their actions to draw the world’s attention to their issues. Even though Moscow has so far remained largely unperturbed by Circassian activism, the world’s attention to the region certainly presents the Circassians in the North Caucasus and worldwide with a unique opportunity to advance their interests.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Valery Dzutsev Mon, 06 May 2013 16:27:00 -0400 Is Kabardino-Balkaria Following the Path of Dagestan? http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40833&cHash=a5a79ecfa1fda01ed0c3cffbc0ddae29 The tragedy in Boston reminded the world about the simmering conflict in the North Caucasus, which... The tragedy in Boston reminded the world about the simmering conflict in the North Caucasus, which has not been resolved because the West largely ignored the region. The outside world pretended Russia’s claims that the North Caucasus had turned almost into a paradise that could be trusted. In order to make sure this distorted view of the situation was accepted by the outside world, Moscow kicked international organizations out of the region so that they could not see what was occurring there (www.ng.ru/politics/2012-10-10/100_unicef.html). Vladimir Putin even decided to hold the Winter Olympics in the subtropical part of the Caucasus in Sochi in 2014.

Over the years, The Jamestown Foundation has insistently tried to make the point that the situation in the North Caucasus poses a security hazard and should be watched closely. The analysis of the Jamestown Foundation was based on Russia’s own media. No other research and analysis organization in the world has been as consistent with its view of this region as Jamestown. By illuminating different dimensions of the situation in the North Caucasus, Jamestown has tried to show that the conflict has become much more complex and multi-dimensional and that the threat was only increasing from year to year. The attempts by some experts to simplify everything and connect the events in the North Caucasus to al-Qaeda have been misleading. The al-Qaeda explanation is the trump card that poorly informed regional experts often resort to in an effort to explain the complexities of the region.

In the wake of the crime in Boston, many people have discovered that apart from Chechnya there is also the previously unknown Dagestan. But the conflict is not limited even to just these two regions. The conflict in the North Caucasus includes tiny Ingushetia, diverse Kabardino-Balkaria and, still in a state of suspended animation, Karachaevo-Cherkessia. Also, how the Muslims of North Ossetia behave depends on how they are treated, given the fact that Ossetian youth are increasingly turning to Islam. All in all, one sees a region that slipped out of Russian control in 1991. Moscow’s attempts to resolve the separatist issues in 1994–1996 and 1999 led to a situation in which the independence movement was replaced by the movement for building an Islamic state in the region.

Kabardino-Balkaria is one of the problem areas of the North Caucasus, and the events of the last few days of April indicate that the situation in the republic remains tense. No rosy official reports can conceal the tensions in society or existence of an armed underground movement.

On April 27, police found a so-called shahid (martyr’s) belt in the home of a 23-year-old female resident of Chegem in Kabardino-Balkaria. The woman had been on the Russian federal list of missing persons. The shahid belt was made of an army sword belt with a 0.2-kilogram TNT explosive device attached to it with tape. The improvised explosive device (IED) was furnished with bolts and nuts as shrapnel, an electric detonator, a toggle switch and a 9-volt battery (www.ntv.ru/novosti/573498). It was unclear how many belts there were and where the owner of the belt was. Strangely, important evidence like this is invariably destroyed by investigators, and in this case, as well, police destroyed the belt in a controlled explosion. Most of the time, this raises questions about the veracity of investigators’ claims about the existence of the shahid belts.

The next day, April 28, unknown assailants fired on a unit of special forces in a forest near the village Zhankhoteko in Kabardino-Balaria’s Baksan district. No one was reported hurt among the servicemen and the attackers fled the scene without suffering any casualties (http://kavkasia.net/Russia/2013/1367199774.php).

In the early hours of April 30, Federal Security Service (FSB) officers tried to stop a car on the highway between Khasanya and Gerpegezh to check the documents of those inside. The driver opened fire at the servicemen and was killed by return fire. An IED exploded in the suspect’s car during the gun battle. The slain driver turned out to have been involved in an earlier attack on law enforcement personnel (www.regnum.ru/news/kavkaz/kab-balk/1654821.html). Of course, it is unlikely that the FSB came out at 6 a.m. to check the documents of random passers-by. Most likely, the officers knew who was driving their way and either tried to arrest him or fired at his car, destroying it and then portraying the incident as the detonation of an IED that was inside the suspect’s car.

An admission made by the Kabardino-Balkarian Deputy Interior Minister Kazbek Tatuev confirmed that the situation in the republic is developing according to a scenario dreaded by Russia. At a press conference on April 25, Tatuev stated the insurgency in the republic may have as many as several thousand members (www.regnum.ru/news/kavkaz/kab-balk/1653351.html). This was the first sensational admission of its kind, and it went against the authorities’ demand to emphasize positive news in the North Caucasus with the approach of next year’s Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. A statement by the republican interior ministry that there has not been a single case of a rebel surrendering to the authorities was just as revealing as the estimate of the number of insurgents.

A commission for adapting former members of the illegal armed formations was established in the republic back in May 2011 (www.kp.ru/online/news/894025/), and it appears that this initiative was little appreciated by the rebels. Previously, the authorities reported cases of rebels who supposedly surrendered (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/212526/). In reality, however, it is not the rebels themselves, but rather their relatives who normally appeal to these commissions, in an effort to help family members. Also, people who think they have come under suspicion may sometimes address these commissions to clear their reputations.

Thus, it is not worth looking at one of the republics in the North Caucasus and considering it a specific case with unique processes. In fact, all the republics in the region have the same diagnosis—they are infected by a virus of radicalism that is contracted through the adoption of Salafi ideology. So analysts will have to return to exploring the situation in the region again and again, because it will allow them to understand not only the problems of the region, but also the nature of Russian policies toward Muslims and how Moscow’s approaches to dealing with this problem are part of the problem, not the solution.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Mairbek Vatchagaev Fri, 03 May 2013 17:00:00 -0400 Why Tamerlan Tsarnaev Is Outside of Chechen Mentality http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40827&cHash=ae3378143a9cf758de98540f6dbcc497 Why did Tamerlan Tsarnaev—one of the alleged April 15 Boston Marathon bombers who died in a... Why did Tamerlan Tsarnaev—one of the alleged April 15 Boston Marathon bombers who died in a shoot-out with police on April 18—not demand an end to the bloodshed in Dagestan, but was instead interested in what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq? The casualties in Dagestan are quite comparable to the casualties in those countries: in 2012, nearly 700 people were killed or injured in the republic, while in 2011, the figure was 800 (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/218698/). Dagestan was Tamerlan’s homeland on his mother’s side and the place where he lived for one and a half years, in 1999–2001, and where he spent six months in 2012. So why did Dagestan not become important to him?

The members of the Tsarnaev family who were born in the Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan bore the historical memory of Soviet repression against the Chechens. The deportation of 1944 remains one of the most important historical memories for all Chechens of all generations (see EDM, February 22, 2007). The Tsarnaev family, descendants of the Keloi highlanders’ clan, whose members reside in the Chechen village of Chiri-Yurt, chose not to settle in their historical homeland, but in neighboring Dagestan.

In Chechnya, there are no nursing homes and orphanages, not because there are no elderly, orphans or sick people, but because every person is cared for by his or her family, relatives and clan, and the society as a whole. Parents never live on their own, because the youngest man in the family is required by common law to live with his parents until they pass away.

The Chechens say “it is hard to be a Chechen” (http://old.sakharov-center.ru/chr/chrus04_1.htm). This means that the Chechen mentality shapes the surrounding world in a very specific manner, through the prism of duty before the Chechen people, ancestors, history, traditions and customs, Islam and so on. The question whether he or she is a Muslim is meaningless to a Chechen, since being a Chechen and a Muslim are seen as identical.

It is especially difficult to understand the underlying logic of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, whose life in the United States cut him off from the Chechen world, so that there was quite little that connected him to Chechnya, apart from the language. This is a rare feature among Chechens. Since the family was of mixed Chechen-Dagestani origin, the father being an ethnic Chechen and the mother being an ethnic Avar from Dagestan, Tamerlan’s links to the Chechen culture must have been impaired. Being born to parents with superficial knowledge of the Muslim faith, Tamerlan appears to have started his exploration of Islam under the influence of Salafist ideology. Salafist teaching does not recognize nationality and requires a rejection of traditions, customs and one’s family. In the Chechen case this would be equal to a dismissal of the cult of parents. All of these requirements of Salafism put the young person outside the cultural code of his people and forces him to become a subject of the universal Muslim culture.

After the Boston bombings, all Chechens are asking the same question—why did Tamerlan pick the US as the target of the attack? If he wanted to take revenge for Chechnya or for Dagestan, he had the ideal opportunity to do so when he was in Dagestan for six months in 2012. All that he would have been required to do was to prove that he was not a Russian security services agent and then join the rebel forces. Instead, Tamerlan traveled back to the United States.

The report in the newspaper Novaya Gazeta, alleging a link between Tamerlan and the slain young Dagestani Mahmud Mansur Nidal (www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/57925.html), seems highly implausible. According to the police, Nidal joined the underground movement in December 2011 (http://polit.ru/news/2012/05/19/mansur/). The article’s claim that Tamerlan traveled to Toronto as an opportunity to meet local radicals such as William Plotnikov—who allegedly studied Islam in Dagestan in 2010 and was killed in this North Caucasian republic in 2012—is also a stretch and likely to mislead a casual reader.

While many look for Tamerlan’s contacts in Dagestan, he more likely became a Salafist not in the Caucasus, but in Boston. The roots of his transformation into a radical should be found there, not in Dagestan and even less so in Chechnya. Indeed, it was Boston that became the centerpiece of Tamerlan’s ideological base and caused him to seek justice for the killings of Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq, not for the killings in Chechnya or in Dagestan. So at that moment he did not perceive himself as a Chechen, which is not typical for a Chechen at all.

The story surrounding his mysterious Boston contact named Misha is indicative of how young Muslims turn violent in the US and why Islamic youth become aggressive and willing to surreptitiously but violently strike out against their society. Had Misha not existed, he would have been invented (www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/23/tamerlan-tsarnaev-mysterious-muslim-radical_n_3141919.html). Misha may very well have recruited Tamerlan as the circumstances were favorable. Tamerlan came from a nation that is entirely Muslim. The only thing that was required from the recruiter was to convince Tamerlan of the injustice that some people inflict on Islam worldwide. To convince someone like Tamerlan of joining an ongoing worldwide jihad, he would have to have been deprived of contacts with Americans, their culture and only be told about society’s negative attitude toward Islam.

Thus, it would be fruitful to explore the atmosphere that causes a young, promising person to abandon the opportunities for becoming the pride of a nation and turn into its enemy—despite the fact that the society provided him with an education, career and opportunities for personal success. Only by examining these paths is it possible to thwart future strikes by the supporters of war and conspiracy theories.

According to experts who visited Dagestan and truly experienced surveillance by the Federal Security Service (FSB), Moscow should have been aware of every step of a young man who came from the US (www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/boston-terror/1649772.html). The FSB was certainly aware of all of Tamerlan’s contacts and the details of his stay in the capital of Dagestan. Makhachkala experiences bomb explosions, firefights between rebels and police, killings of young people and arrests of militant sympathizers on almost a daily basis. The FSB should have asked for information from their American counterparts after Tsarnaev’s visit to Dagestan in 2012, not only in 2011, before he made that trip. Knowing of Tamerlan’s suspicious contacts in Dagestan in 2012 and having suspected him as early as 2011, it is unclear what prevented the FSB from seizing him when he was leaving Russia via Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport. What prevented the FSB from giving this information to the US? The answer must arguably be that there was nothing suspicious in his behavior at the time. The manufacture of a North Caucasian link to Tamerlan’s attack started only after the tragedy in Boston, so that Russia could take part in the investigation in Boston.

In all this tragedy, Moscow seems to consider itself a winner. President Vladimir Putin said at a press conference that Russia had long sought cooperation from the US in the field of international terrorism (www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/putins-live-show/1648501.html). There was more of a reprimand of the US in Putin’s words than an admission of Russia’s own guilt for the attack in Boston. Moscow interprets terrorism in quite broad terms and includes everyone who is dissatisfied with the Russian political system and seeks to secede from Russia.

The development of American youth under the conditions of multiculturalism will shed more light on Tamerlan’s evolution than his contacts in the North Caucasus. Locating Tamerlan’s ideological trajectory in the North Caucasus may prove to be little more than a distraction. The available evidence suggests that he broke all connections with that part of his life and became a young radical while living in Boston.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Mairbek Vatchagaev Thu, 02 May 2013 17:23:00 -0400 Experts Warn Moscow’s North Caucasus Policies Exacerbate Regional Instability http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40821&cHash=2da1f283ffd8a63ac92a7bac0093fb1d Emil Pain, the well-known Russian expert on ethnic conflict and former Russian government official,... Emil Pain, the well-known Russian expert on ethnic conflict and former Russian government official, has warned that the conflict in the North Caucasus is escalating. According to the Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasian Knot) website, the number of casualties in the North Caucasus dropped to 199 in the first quarter of 2013 from 253 in the same period of the previous year. Pain, however, pointed out that the lower numbers of casualties was due to a change in tactics by the North Caucasus insurgency, which shifted its attacks from indiscriminate assaults to more targeted operations against government officials, police and official Muslim clergy. So, while the number of casualties plummeted, the number of attacks actually increased. According to Pain, the conflict in the North Caucasus is no longer just a religious or ethnic conflict, but spans different domains, including religion, ethnicity and territory (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/223312/).

If the changing statistics of the conflict in the North Caucasus indeed reflect a change in the tactics of the insurgency, then this also may point to an increase in the insurgency’s operational capabilities. Targeting select individuals among the authorities and police presumably requires substantially more preparation and support on the ground than carrying out indiscriminate attacks.

Commenting on the ongoing massive police and military special operation taking place in the Dagestani village of Gimry, Pain noted: “To imagine that it is possible to cleanse some sort of virus and resolve the issue through military means is an absolutely insane idea. This is not some sort of a finite resource that one can remove and clean out once and for all. New offended people will appear and relatives of those who were offended will also appear—the process will escalate. Moreover, the hostilities have escalated, since the war is not waged against narrow groups anymore. Today, the whole population is increasingly involved in the standoff” (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/223312/).

One of Russia’s best known experts on the North Caucasus, and a former member of Boris Yeltsin’s national security council, Pain also suggested that the conflict in the North Caucasus is gradually acquiring the distinct character of a colonial war against the general population of the region, specifically in Dagestan. As happens in a colonial war, the warring sides are increasingly divided into local militants and their supporters on the one side, and Russian and local forces ostensibly propped up by Moscow, on the other.

In Chechnya, on the contrary, Pain discerns a situation that resembles the 1991–1994 pre-war period, when Dzhokhar Dudaev came to power in the republic. Kadyrov’s forces are essentially not subordinated to the Russian federal government, so the regional forces may again block the Russian military garrisons in the republic, as happened under Dudaev. The increasingly personalized rule of Vladimir Putin is linked to the overall fragility of the situation in the North Caucasus. For example, few experts have predictions about how Kadyrov will behave after Putin, or what will happen in Chechnya after Kadyrov.

Ruslan Aushev, the former president of Ingushetia who remains a prominent figure in North Caucasian politics, unexpectedly spoke out against Moscow’s policies in the region. After Ingushetia’s parliament decided that it will appoint the region’s head in lieu of direct elections, Aushev apparently decided to express his political opinions extremely bluntly. Answering an innocent question about Moscow’s subsidies to the North Caucasus, Aushev lashed out at Russian critics of the region. Referring to the start of the Russian-Chechen war, he stated: “The Chechens said—‘give us independence, we do not need your money.’ The federal center said, ‘No, never.’ They went through [Chechnya] with fire and sword, returned [it] to [the Russian] legal space and said: ‘You will receive money, good subsidies’” (http://kavpolit.com/prezidentom-rossii-mozhet-stat-kavkazec-no-ne-sejchas).

Furthermore, Aushev openly stated that the head of Ingushetia should hold talks with the rebels, understand what they want and how to make peace with them. The former president of Ingushetia waved away Moscow’s disapproval of such contacts. “In Moscow, there are no militants and that is why they [Russian authorities] do not support [talks with them],” he said. “If militants scurried around somewhere in the Moscow region’s forests, the Kremlin would talk to them, I am certain of that” (http://kavpolit.com/prezidentom-rossii-mozhet-stat-kavkazec-no-ne-sejchas).

As instability in the North Caucasus persists, experts are increasingly coming to the realization that Moscow’s present policies in the region can hardly address the pressing issues of the area. Even though Russian authorities appeared to be satisfied with a containment strategy in the North Caucasus for limiting violence to the region, this approach does not seem to work. A territorial dispute between Chechnya and Ingushetia, a revolt by ethnic Russians in Stavropol region, and the expanding conflict in Dagestan and elsewhere in the region indicate that instability is not simply simmering at a certain level, but is proliferating and emerging in unexpected forms and in new territories. Given the current dynamics of the security situation unfolding in the North Caucasus, chances are slim that the Olympics in Sochi in 2014 will not be affected in some adverse way by regional developments and blowback from the ongoing insurgencies in the North Caucasus.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Valery Dzutsev Wed, 01 May 2013 16:16:00 -0400 Russian Security Services Offer Surprising Revelations About Boston Bombings http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40810&cHash=376d2419d96f888bb6231cef64189fff On April 27, the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta published an article on the dead Boston bomber... On April 27, the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta published an article on the dead Boston bomber suspect, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, based on information it received from the Russian security services. It cited officers of the Dagestani Center for Combating Extremism who said they became aware of Tsarnaev’s presence in the republic in April 2012 and registered his “repeated” meetings with 18-year-old Mahmud Mansur Nidal, who had previously been under surveillance for a year. The police considered Nidal to be a recruiter for the Dagestani insurgency, so the police scrutinized everyone who contacted him extensively (http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/57925.html). The Novaya Gazeta report directly contradicts an earlier statement by Dagestani Interior Minister Abdurashid Magomedov, who stated that Tsarnaev indeed visited Dagestan in 2012, but stayed in the republic only for 3–4 days to receive his passport and left the republic before the passport was ready (http://top.rbc.ru/politics/24/04/2013/855465.shtml).

Nidal was killed in a special operation in Makhachkala on May 19, 2012. The police accused him of participating in a terrorist attack on a police checkpoint in the city last May 3. That day, police sealed off a house in the Dagestani capital in which Nidal was located along with several other people, including women and children. About 300 protesters gathered nearby to prevent the security services from storming the building. Eventually, everyone in the house was allowed to come out alive, but Nidal was killed. Conflicting reports circulate about his death. Some sources claim that he was killed on the spot as he tried to surrender (http://ummanews.com/news/kavkaz/6972-2012-05-20-11-22-33.html); while other sources asserted that he resisted the police and was subsequently killed (http://moidagestan.ru/news/antiterror/16933; lomalkinn.livejournal.com/24229.html).

Nidal’s alleged involvement in the attack on the police checkpoint in Makhachkala was peculiar in that he was reportedly responsible for the recruitment of new rebels, and presumably not directly involved in insurgent operations. Even more puzzling is the fact that after registering repeated meetings between Nidal and Tsarnaev and killing the former in a special operation, the police did not even question Tsarnaev. The older Tsarnaev brother stayed in Dagestan for another two months after Nidal was killed, so the security services had ample time to interrogate him.

The special treatment Tsarnaev received in Dagestan is especially surprising in light of what happened to another foreign citizen of Russian origin. William Plotnikov, a 21-year-old Canadian citizen, was detained in the coastal Dagestani city of Izberbash south of Makhachkala in 2010. Plotnikov had reportedly converted to Islam in Canada and went to Dagestan to study Islam. According to Novaya Gazeta’s source in the security services, they used “a wide range of special equipment” on Plotnikov and extracted from him a list of people he communicated with abroad, including Tamerlan Tsarnaev. On July 14, 2012, Plotnikov was killed by the police forces in Dagestan, on July 16, 2012, Tsarnaev left Russia for the United States, according to the same sources in the Russian security services. The sources further alleged that Tsarnaev had unsuccessfully tried to join the insurgents, became scared and left Russia in a hurry. Curiously, even though the Russian security services put Tsarnaev under surveillance, they did not detect his departure from Dagestan or, later, from Russia (http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/57925.html).

The Novaya Gazeta report raises several important questions. The Russian security services admitted they extensively interrogated Plotnikov, a suspected radical who was a citizen of Canada and possibly of Russia. The authorities interrogated Plotnikov in 2010 despite the fact that they had practically no incriminatory information on him and thus eventually released him. At the same time, they followed up on Tsarnaev, who allegedly met and had meetings with Mahmud Mansur Nidal, a known radical, but did not even bother to question Tsarnaev, who was even more susceptible to being interrogated by the Russians since he apparently was applying for a Russian passport and did not have US citizenship.

The Russian media displayed an uncharacteristic attitude toward the suspected terrorists. On April 28, one of the country’s major TV channels, NTV, featured an interview with the mother of suspects, Zubeidat Tsarnaev, in which she again insisted that her sons had been “framed.” The substantive part of the interview revealed little that was new, but what was interesting was the very fact that she was featured on a major Russian TV channel (http://www.ntv.ru/peredacha/CT/m23400/o163397/). This is normally not the way relatives of suspected terrorists are treated in Russia. On the one hand, Russian media are threatened by the law against “propagating terrorism,” and featuring a suspected terrorist’s mother would count as such an act. In addition, the relatives of suspected terrorists are often treated with suspicion, based on an implicit expectation that they could carry out an attack to avenge the killing of their relative. Zubeidat and Anzor Tsarnaev do not seem to have experienced any of these usual attitudes in Russia. If the Russian security services had prior information about Tamerlan’s attempt to join the North Caucasian insurgency, then they surely cannot trust his parents. Yet the Russian security services appear to be courting the parents instead of persecuting them. Zubeidat and Anzor Tsarnaev reportedly left Dagestan for Moscow. While in Dagestan, the police protected Anzor Tsarnaev from excessive contacts with journalists. This level of protection for someone whose sons are accused of terrorist activities, not only abroad, but also domestically, is highly unusual in Russia.

The Russian security services’ gradual leaking of information invites more questions than it answers. Much more information will have to be released in order to understand why the Tsarnaev brothers turned so violent in Boston.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Valery Dzutsev Mon, 29 Apr 2013 18:36:00 -0400 Kumyk Leader Murdered in Dagestan http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40803&cHash=ae7d40f76563d88be87a3ae94cb47648 The Kumyks are the third largest ethnic group in Dagestan. According to official data for 2010, an... The Kumyks are the third largest ethnic group in Dagestan. According to official data for 2010, an estimated 422,000 Kumyks lived in the mountainous republic (www.webcitation.org/616BvJEEv), ranking third after the Avars, with a population of 814,000, and Dargins, with a population of 510,000 in the republic. Historically, the Turkic-speaking Kumyks controlled almost all of Dagestan’s lowlands along the Caspian Sea coast. As the highlanders moved down to populate the lowlands, relations between the Kumyks and other ethnic groups of Dagestan deteriorated. Land disputes are the most acute issues in Dagestan.

The leaders of the Kumyk national movement have constantly tried to shield their land from encroachment by the highlanders, above all the Avars, Dargins and Laks, who have descended on land that the Kumyks consider their own (http://kumukia.ru/article-9400.html). The Kumyks have also been dissatisfied with the way that top government positions are distributed among ethnic groups in Dagestan, viewing themselves as being at a disadvantage in comparison to the overrepresented Avars.

The Kumyks have had this land ownership dispute with the other ethnic groups in Dagestan for the past several decades. Hence, the murder of the Kumyk public figure Yusup Ajiev on April 19, 2013, near Khasavyurt was seen by the Kumyks as an attack against the entire Kumyk movement. Ajiev was killed in broad daylight in front of his seven-year-old child and nine-year-old nephew. Moreover, the perpetrator of the crime did not even try to hide his face. After quickly approaching the victim, the killer said something to Ajiev, fired 17 shots at him and managed to leave the scene unimpeded (http://kavpolit.com/komu-nuzhna-smert-yusupa-adzhieva/). Everybody seems to be curious about the fact that Ajiev’s bodyguard had previously been detained by the police, thus the victim appeared without security protection at a local mosque.

Yusup Ajiev was considered the informal leader of the Kumyks in Khasavyurt district. The Kumyks there expected he would run for the leadership of the district, which is considered one of the most troubled in Dagestan. Ajiev’s public image was controversial. His younger brother Sultan was suspected by the law enforcement agencies of membership in the Sharia Jamaat (www.ng.ru/regions/2005-04-21/1_dagestan.html) and was killed earlier. Yusup himself barely survived when Chechen law enforcement agents fired shots at him on September 17, 2004 (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/61744/). Six months later, on April 20, 2005, Chechen law enforcement agents attacked Ajiev again, but the attacker once more failed to kill Ajiev, and a Federal Security Service (FSB) officer was killed in the clash (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/223127/). On April 28, 2010, Ajiev was arrested in Makhachkala and was released only under pressure by the Kumyks, who staged a protest in reaction to his arrest. Ajiev was considered a viable candidate for the leadership of the Khasavyurt district and planned to run for the position.

Dagestan’s Khasavyurt district borders Chechnya and draws much attention from the authorities because of its potential for conflict. The district is rife with territorial disputes between Chechens, Kumyks, Laks, Avars and Andys (www.bigcaucasus.com/review/interview/23-04-2013/83117-Gereev_Adjiev_ubiistvo-0/). Many everyday conflicts in this part of the republic transform themselves into ethnic standoffs, and the killing of Ajiev in April was not the first high-profile crime against Kumyks in the republic. On September 27, 2009, Alimsoltan Alkhamatov, the head of Khasavyurt district, was killed in Moscow (http://kumukia.ru/author?q=1185). Alkhamatov had been the district’s head since 2005.

Absalidin Mirzaev, a member of the Dagestani Public Chamber and the head of the Council of Elders of the Kumyk people, was recently beaten up. Four assailants attacked him in the Dagestani capital Makhachkala and fled after the incident. Mirzaev was known for his militant statements on issues related to land disputes and had led Kumyk protests (http://tvrain.ru/articles/v_dagestane_izbit_lider_kumykov_zaschischavshih_svoi_zemli-337916/). He fiercely opposed a government plan to relocate Laks to the Kumyk lands near Makhachkala and antagonized republican authorities. Even the recently appointed head of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, commented on this issue, saying that land has no ethnicity (www.riadagestan.ru/news/2013/2/6/150510/). This remark certainly made many enemies for Abdulatipov among the Kumyks. Many observers regarded the beating of the leader of the Kumyk protest movement as an alarming signal from Ramazan Abdulatipov’s team (http://nazaccent.ru/content/7032-politolog-napadenie-na-kumykskogo-lidera-mozhet.html) and an attempt to scare the Kumyks and force them to renounce their public protests.

Mirzaev was one of the organizers of the extraordinary conference of the Kumyk people that took place on February 10 in Pyatigorsk. The very fact this conference was being held, and being organized in Pyatigorsk, made a conflict between the Kumyk leaders and the Dagestani authorities nearly inevitable. At the conference, the Kumyks complained that they were sidelined again when government positions were distributed in the republic and that they had the right to traditional Kumyk territory. In order to retain control over such land, the Kumyks proposed establishing a new district near Makhachkala called Tarkinsky (http://flnka.ru/digest-analytics/1346-kumyki-poydut-za-zemley-k-hloponinu.html). Kumyk conferences, congresses and rallies have periodically taken place since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, the problems that were voiced 22 years ago are still at the same stage of resolution as they were back then (http://kumukia.ru/article-101.html).

Therefore, the attacks on the Kumyk leaders are not entirely mysterious and inexplicable. Usually, as the Kumyks ramp up their demands in regard to land distribution, the attacks against Kumyk leaders also intensify as well. Multiple complaints by Kumyk public figures on lawlessness in the republic addressed to the president of Russia, the State Duma and the Federation Council have gone without a response (http://kumukia.ru/article-9400.html).  Moscow directs those complaints back to Makhachkala—to the same people the Kumyks complain about.

This dismissive approach by the government results in young people increasingly adopting Salafist ideas as a form of social protest, which they perceive to be a way of resolving all problems based upon Sharia law (www.arhiv.ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=2471#). This in turn creates another layer of conflict, in which armed resistance groups fighting the Dagestani government try to impose their own radical ideology onto the entire republic.

Arguably, the murder of Yusup Ajiev showed that the Dagestani government largely failed to resolve the Kumyks’ problems in Dagestan. If anything, it will only intensify Kumyk desperation. However, Ajiev’s death is unlikely to result in an open confrontation between the Kumyks and the Dagestani authorities. Rather, the Kumyks will search for other forms of protest, and will likely intensify their turn to religion as one such form. It has become a situation in which it is hard to draw a line between the philosophy of Islam and its interpretation by some Islamic scholars, especially those who spread the ideas of Salafism. This is a result of Moscow’s policies in Dagestan, which like everywhere else in the North Caucasus end up being largely counter-productive and only intensify problems that could be resolved peacefully.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Mairbek Vatchagaev Fri, 26 Apr 2013 16:21:00 -0400 Parts of Boston Bombers’ Radicalization Narrative Remain Murky http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40790&cHash=b61ba8026e65fb520693798f27f7386a Since the start of the second Chechen war in the fall of 1999, the Chechen armed resistance has... Since the start of the second Chechen war in the fall of 1999, the Chechen armed resistance has evolved, with poorly educated people from the villages gradually replaced by young people with higher education. This is a kind of protest reaction by youth against the Kremlin’s policies in the North Caucasus.

This pattern, however, does not apply to Tamerlan Tsarnaev. He was an ethnic Chechen who was born in the remote Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan. He did not reside in Chechnya, and did not have contacts with Chechens who lived in Chechnya. All his relatives and friends were in Kyrgyzstan as he was maturing. Even the fact that the Tsarnaev family moved to Dagestan in the North Caucasus in 1999 does not mean that he experienced any pressure there. Along with his brother Dzhokhar and his sister, Tamerlan was in Dagestan for a little more than a year and then returned to Kyrgyzstan to travel to the United States.

Tamerlan arrived in the US in 2003, when he was 15–16 years old. He adopted the local way of life, and his aim was to become an American and an athlete competing for the United States (RIA Novosti, April 25). Tamerlan married 24-year-old Catherine Russell and they have a daughter who is now three years old. According to his wife and his in-laws, he was not a particularly religious person, although he had recently started to pray five times a day, which he had not done before (www.ntv.ru/novosti/565876#ixzz2R4yeTMnE).

Tamerlan’s uncle, Ruslan Tsarni, who lives in the US, said that he noticed changes in his nephew’s behavior in 2009, when Tamerlan accused him of not following Islamic traditions. This attitude is a feature of followers of Salafi teaching and runs completely against Chechen traditions. In his uncle’s opinion, Tamerlan was strongly influenced by an Armenian convert to Islam. Thus the available evidence suggests that, by 2009, Tamerlan was a 21–22-year-old young man who was being influenced by a recent Muslim convert. In 2009, he was interrogated for an incident of domestic violence and was later denied US citizenship. It is possible that this event may have pushed him toward Islam. He perhaps decided that, without citizenship, he had poor prospects in the US (www.itar-tass.com/c1/714050.html). It is not unusual for individuals who become interested in Islam at this age to start looking for answers on the Internet and watch a multitude of videos on this topic on YouTube. But Tamerlan’s YouTube page does not list anything special, and nothing on this page suggests he had a particularly deep engagement with the Muslim faith (www.youtube.com/user/muazseyfullah). Rather, his YouTube viewing history includes two video addresses of a Dagestani rebel, Emir Abu Dujan, and songs by Timur Mutsuraev, a Chechen bard who is well-known in Russia. The singer, however, renounced the resistance, met with Ramzan Kadyrov and left the Chechen political scene in 2007 (www.utro.ru/articles/2008/07/01/748508.shtml). Overall, the elder Tsarnaev brother’s YouTube channel provides no grounds for considering him a radical.  

Tamerlan visited the capital of Dagestan, Makhachkala, in January–July 2012 (http://m.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/20/tsarnaev-brothers-dagestan-boston-bombings). By the time he visited Russia, Tamerlan already had Russian citizenship. However, his Dagestani neighbors and relatives claim they did not see him make any suspicious contacts while there.

Earlier, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) asked the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to probe whether Tamerlan was involved in radical movements (http://news.mail.ru/incident/12823795/). Moreover, according to his mother, FBI officers had followed Tamerlan for the past five years (www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=agqESYHqOwg). Yet, it appears that Tamerlan was not considered to be dangerous by the US security services, either five years ago or one year ago, and he was allowed freely to leave and enter the country.

Russian security service veterans, on the other hand, argue that Tamerlan was used by experienced and well-trained professionals to carry out the attacks in Boston. Indeed, Tamerlan behaved more like an amateur (www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=Ym3aWDS92QM&feature=endscreen). Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why, after such a tragic operation, he did not bother to hide, even though he should have known he would have been recorded by numerous security cameras around the Boston Marathon. The younger brother, Dzhokhar, apparently attended a party and a gym two days after the explosions in Boston (http://investcafe.ru/news/29585?utm_source=web&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+skyline2+%28Investcafe_news%29).

Tamerlan Tsarnaev represents a case of a Chechen who was born far away from his historical homeland, and such people, arguably, tend to be greater patriots of their republic and nation than Chechens who are raised at home. These diaspora members voraciously consume information about Chechnya and look for opportunities to aid their homeland. However, such a desire sometimes pushes these people in the wrong direction. While in the North Caucasus, Tamerlan in all likelihood would have been interested in what was happening in Chechnya and in the North Caucasus in general. However, several questions arise: Why did the Russians not question him, if they noticed he had made any suspicious contacts in Dagestan? And if they suspected as much, why did the Russian authorities not warn their US counterparts that Tamerlan had contacts with Salafis—for example, members of the Association of Scholars Ahlu-Sunna?

The Tsarnaevs’ choice of the target country is also strange, if Tamarlan was being influenced by North Caucasian militants. As the insurgents in the North Caucasus blame Russia for all of their troubles, they have not been hostile toward the United States. And, in fact, for a long time, the US tried to aid Chechens, including Chechen activists who were raising awareness about human rights abuses in the North Caucasus. Tamerlan may have been torn between his American dream and his patriotic feelings toward his homeland. Hopefully, the surviving attacker, Tamerlan’s brother Dzhokhar, will reveal what happened and explain why they targeted the Boston Marathon.

Meanwhile, activists have created a group in support of the Tsarnaev brothers on the Russian social network Vkontakte. On the very first day of its existence, the group already had 800 members (http://vk.com/johar_tamerlan). The principle that “the worse the situation is for America, the better it is for Russia” still runs strong in Russian society.

]]> North Caucasus Analysis By: Mairbek Vatchagaev Thu, 25 Apr 2013 21:06:00 -0400