Yanukovych Rejects Putin’s Gazprom-Naftohaz Ukrainy Merger Proposal
Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, met with his Ukrainian counterpart, Viktor Yanukovych, for the seventh time this year, in Kyiv on May 17-18, but contrary to general expectations no new gas agreements were reached. Ukraine rejected Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin’s, April 30 offer to merge the national oil and gas company, Naftohaz Ukrainy, with Gazprom. Kyiv’s position is that such a merger is impossible in principle as it would mean Naftohaz’s takeover by Gazprom, given the fact that the latter is much larger. Instead, Kyiv may agree to a joint venture between Naftohaz and Gazprom. Medvedev signaled his readiness to discuss this option.
Kyiv’s reaction to Putin’s proposal has been cautious from the outset. In early May, Kyiv indicated that it would proceed from national interests as far as Putin’s offer was concerned (EDM, May 12). As the opposition and the expert community stepped up criticism of the merger offer, the government also became more outspoken. Ukrainian Fuel and Energy Minister, Yury Boyko, was the first top official to rule out a “simple” merger of Naftohaz and Gazprom as it would be “unprecedented in scale,” he stated during a TV interview (ICTV, May 12). Boyko went to Moscow on May 13 to discuss Putin’s offer with Gazprom’s CEO, Alexei Miller, but no agreement was reached.
Yanukovych, speaking to Ekho Moskvy on May 13, said that a merger would be possible on the parity principle only. “If I had been there,” he said half-jokingly, meaning in Azarov’s place during his meeting with Putin on April 30, “I would have extended my hand to Putin saying ‘I agree on a 50/50 share.’” Yanukovych noted that the modernization of gas pipelines was more important for him than a merger. He reiterated that Russia should drop its South Stream pipeline project bypassing Ukraine and help to upgrade its pipelines instead, which would be a cheaper option. In another interview, on May 13, Yanukovych said in clear terms that there would be no merger. Russia would not agree to a 50/50 Gazprom-Naftohaz merger given Naftohaz’s small size compared to Gazprom, he explained. “However a merger on any other condition is impossible,” said Yanukovych (BBC Ukrainian Service, May 13).
Serhy Pashynsky, former advisor to Yulia Tymoshenko on energy matters, suggested that Kyiv would prefer the creation of a joint venture with Gazprom where 50-60 percent would belong to Ukraine and include hydrocarbon deposits in Russia (Kommersant-Ukraine, May 14). Former Deputy Foreign Minister, Valery Chaly, confirmed that such an option was discussed (Channel 5, May 17). Ukraine could contribute its gas storage facilities and pipelines to such a joint venture. Current Ukrainian laws prohibit this, but the pro-Yanukovych majority in parliament can easily amend them. Recently, a bill which if passed into law, will allow foreign participation in the gas transport network was registered in parliament (Ukrainski Novyny, May 14).
Medvedev, speaking in an interview to Ukrainian TV channels on the eve of his visit, agreed that a joint venture could be an option. Medvedev admitted that as Naftohaz is much smaller, a proper merger with Gazprom, whose value he estimated at $150-200 billion, would hardly be realistic. He suggested merging some assets of the two companies instead, but did not elaborate (Inter, 1+1 TV, May 16). Putin’s merger proposal was not discussed at the May 17 meeting of the Russo-Ukrainian interstate commission, which is co-chaired by Medvedev and Yanukovych, according to Andry Honcharuk, an aide to Yanukovych (Channel 5, May 17).
Miller, who accompanied Medvedev in Kyiv, indicated that he understood that a merger (or rather Naftohaz’s takeover by Gazprom) would not happen soon. He suggested a “stage-by-stage” merger (Ukrainska Pravda, May 17). This probably means that a joint venture will be set up after all, though Russia and Ukraine must assign different meanings to the process. While Moscow will view this as only the first stage in Naftohaz’s takeover, Kyiv will prefer that integration between the two countries’ gas sectors stops at that stage for the time being. The metals and chemical tycoons who are behind Yanukovych are uninterested in passing control of Naftohaz to Russia and consequently dominance on gas prices, on which their industries heavily depend.
Yanukovych, speaking at a joint press conference with Medvedev, signaled that Kyiv was unable to keep pace with Moscow regarding economic integration plans. “We have concluded that it’s impossible to work like this when seven meetings [between Yanukovych and Medvedev] took place over such a short period, so the heads of our working groups have to prepare different decisions in a hurry”, said Yanukovych (Inter TV, May 17).
The honeymoon period between Yanukovych and Moscow may soon be over. While Moscow wants to expand its economic interests in Ukraine as rapidly as possible, not sure of how long a friendly government will rule in Kyiv, Yanukovych’s approach must be increasingly viewed in Moscow as too cautious. No important economic agreements were reached between Russia and Ukraine this time. Among the five documents signed in Kyiv only one, on land border demarcation, is really significant as it was the result of many years of difficult talks. However, Moscow’s earlier offers on deep integration in the sectors of nuclear power generation, aerospace, and shipbuilding were left unanswered.
Publications
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Global Terrorism Analysis
China Brief
North Caucasus Analysis
Militant Leadership Monitor
Donate To Jamestown
New From Jamestown
Breaking News:
The South Caucasus 2021: Oil, Democracy and Geopolitics
May 4, 2012 04:32 PM
A retrospective of the 20 years of independence experienced by the countries of the South Caucasus clearly demonstrates the difficulties involved in building a state and restoring an economy after mor...
Kindle Books
December 20, 2011 11:10 AM
You've asked and we've delivered.
Books and Reports which have been published by The Jamestown Foundation will now be available for a substantial discount on Kindle.
Books can be purchased for $9.95...
The Reform Of Russia's Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges, & Policy Implications
October 6, 2011 02:28 PM
The Reform of Russia's Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges and Policy Implications, traces the complex origins of the reform, its numerous twists and assesses the key challenges it faces. ...
Volatile Borderland: Russia and the North Caucasus
May 20, 2011 09:54 AM
In Volatile Borderland: Russia and the North Caucasus, The Jamestown Foundation presents a collection of essays by leading experts on the North Caucasus that allows for an in-depth look at the key dev...
The Battle for Yemen: Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for Stability
April 21, 2010 10:15 AM
The Battle for Yemen is a rare and comprehensive volume that tackles the facets of instability that currently plague Yemen. It offers a wealth of analysis and keen observations from the experts of The...
The Sultan’s Raiders: The Military Role of the Crimean Tatars in the Ottoman Empire
May 18, 2013From the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, the Christian nations of Europe and the Shiites of Persia were forced to defend their lands against the inroads of an ever expanding Ottoman Empire, an empire whose awesome war...
Militant Leadership Monitor - April Issue
April 29, 2013This issue of Militant Leadership Monitor includes profiles of Saudi Arabia's Ahmed Abdullah Saleh al-Khazmari al-Zahrani, AQIM's Jemal Oukacha, Libya's Isa Amd al-Majid, the Niger Delta's al-Haji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari (Part Two),...
Militant Leadership Monitor - March Issue
March 29, 2013This issue of Militant Leadership Monitor includes in-depth analyses of Ansaru's Khalid al-Barnawi, the Niger Delta's al-Haji Mujahid Dokubu-Asari, succession scenarios after Talabani, and the second part of a who's who in...
Militant Leadership Monitor - February Issue
February 28, 2013This issue of Militant Leadership Monitor includes in-depth portraits of Tripoli's Hussam Abdullah Sabbagh, Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khalid Meshaal, Egypt's Muhammad al-Zawahiri and the Toulouse gunman Muhammad...
Pakistan's Tribal Militants: A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report
February 27, 2013In this Special Report “Pakistan’s Tribal Militants: Profiles from the Pashtun and Baloch Insurgencies,” we examine some of Pakistan’s tribal militant leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West...
Militant Leadership Monitor - January Issue
January 30, 2013This issue of MLM features profiles of Alghabass ag Intallag, Syrian Major General Abdulaziz al-Shalal, Who’s Who in the Jordanian Opposition, Mullah Nazir the "good Taliban", and Female PKK leader Sakine...
Straddling Russia and Europe: A Compendium of Recent Jamestown Analysis on Belarus
January 30, 2013This report features a collection of recent analysis written in Jamestown's flagship publication, Eurasia Daily Monitor. The included articles were written by Jamestown's foremost experts on Belarus and cover a wide array of...
Mayhem in Mali: A Militant Leadership Monitor Report
December 29, 2012In this Quarterly Special Report (QSR) on Mayhem in Mali, we focus on the various Islamist fighters who have taken over northern Mali. The QSR includes profiles of important personalities in the Sahel region such as Abou Zeid, a...
Northern Nigeria's Boko Haram The Prize in al-Qaeda's Africa Strategy
November 26, 2012The Occasional Paper, entitled “Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram: The Prize in Al-Qaeda’s Africa Strategy” is now available for purchase on our website. This Occasional Paper examines the evolution of al-Qaeda’s Africa strategy...
Elections Issue: Militants in Libyan Politics: A Militant Leadership Monitor Special Report
August 16, 2012In this Special Report on the Libya Elections we examine the entrance of militant leaders into the political scene as the country recovers from several decades of Gaddafi's rule. This 2012 Quarterly Special Report features five...













